THE  PHILOSOPHIC 

FUNCTION  OF  VALUE 


NATH/:-:  BLEC 


is? 


STUDIES  IN  PHILOSOPHY 


EXCHANGE 


STUDIES    IN    PHILOSOPHY 

GENERAL  TYPES  OF  SUPERIOR  MEN. 
By  Osias  L.  Schwarz. 

THE     PHILOSOPHICAL     BASIS     OF 

EDUCATION.     By  Holland  Merritt 

Shreves. 

THE    PHILOSOPHIC    FUNCTION    OF 

VALUE.      By    Nathan    Blechman. 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  CONDUCT.  By 

Samuel  A.  Martin. 

A  CRITICAL  HISTORY  OF  PHILO- 
SOPHICAL THEORIES.  By  Aaron 

Schuyler. 

FRIEDRICH  NIETZSCHE  AND  HIS 
NEW  GOSPEL.  By  Emily  S.  Ham- 
blin. 


RICHARD  G.  BADGER,  PUBLISHER,  BOSTON 


The   Philosophic 
Function  of  Value 


A  study  of  experience  showing  the  ultimate 
meaning  of  evolution  to  be  the  attainment  of 
personality  through  culture  and  religion 


BY 


NATHAN  BLECHMAN,  PH.D. 


BOSTON 
RICHARD  G.  BADGER 

THE  GORHAM   PRESS 


Copyright,  1918,  by  Richard  G.  Badger 


All  Rights  Reserved 


This  thesis  has  been  accepted  by  the  Graduate  School 
of  New  York  University,  in  partial  fulfillment  of  the 
requirements  for  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy. 


MADE  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  OP  AMERICA 


THE  GORHAM  PRESS,  BOSTON,  U.  S.  A. 


To 
PROFESSOR  ROBERT  MACDOUGALL 


373726 


PREFACE 

In  these  days  of  stress,  when  every  thought  is  bent 
towards  winning  the  great  war  that  has  become  a  crusade 
for  democracy,  an  explanation  may  perhaps  be  required 
of  a  book  on  a  subject  apparently  so  abstract. 

This  work  has  been  written  from  a  standpoint  of 
democracy.  Its  aim  is  to  get  close  to  the  life  of  man,  to 
comprehend  the  unique  restlessness  and  progressiveness  of 
his  experience,  to  see  just  how  evolution  is  really  a  de- 
velopment rather  than  a  series  of  adjustments.  It  draws 
a  contrast  between  a  purely  biological  situation  and  the 
thought-situation  as  the  unit  of  experience.  Evolution 
thus  becomes  the  never-to-be-completed  story  of  human 
selfhood  or  soul-life,  radiant  with  moral  beauty.  The 
soul  of  man  appears  both  as  the  subject  and  the  milieu 
of  evolution;  "the  mind  is  its  own  place."  Laboratory 
investigations  are  no  longer  all  that  is  necessary ;  the  prob- 
lem is  not  one  of  external  interaction,  but  of  experience, 
and  so  philosophy  must  take  up  the  task.  Reality  itself 
has  imposed  its  obligation. 

Man  is  more  than  ready  to  carry  the  burden  of  this 
responsibility;  his  whole  being  reaches  out  towards  this 
philosophical  task  as  the  fulfillment  of  his  most  imperious 
want.  He  too,  like  the  innumerable  creatures  that  strug- 
gle for  existence,  makes  his  way  by  his  hunger  and  his 
thirst.  But  he  hungers  with  a  spiritual  hunger  and 
thirsts  with  a  spiritual  thirst,  that  exalt  him  to  a  plane 
•»f  dignity  from  which  he  may  look  down  upon  and  over- 


vi  Preface 

come  all  things,  clearly  prophesying  his  own  salvation  and 
that  of  the  world.  His  vision  reveals  VALUE  as  the  key 
to  existence. 

Worth  makes  man  a  partner  and  a  builder  of  reality. 
It  shows  nations  groping  their  way  forward  and  ac- 
counts for  the  essential  unity  of  mankind.  It  reaches  out 
to  describe  destiny,  but  is  not  too  big  at  the  same  time  to 
explain  the  daily  course  of  the  average  life.  It  clarifies 
the  movements  and  the  articulations  of  the  thought-situa- 
tions which  are  the  material  of  experience.  Even  in  the 
ordinary  events  of  his  life,  man  is  living  in  the  moral 
situation,  his  path  turned  towards  an  absolute  evolution 
and  directed  towards  reality  and  destiny. 

Are  not  the  materials  of  democracy  made  of  such  stuff? 
As  a  man  thinks  in  his  heart,  so  is  he;  the  very  categories 
of  his  thought  proclaim  the  stage  of  his  evolution.  If  the 
mechanicalism  that  has  deluged  the  world  with  blood  and 
iron  has  proved  its  falsity,  is  it  not  time  to  reach  out  to- 
wards the  categories  of  life  ?  Refined  in  the  furnace  seven 
times  over,  mankind  is  reasserting  the  category  of  per- 
sonality, according  to  which  humanity  is  always  an  end 
and  never  a  means  only.  The  soul  of  man  has  been  re- 
made and  life  must  be  adapted  to  his  regenerated  spirit. 
The  concern  of  man  is  the  infinity  within,  and  the  infinity 
without,  his  sentiments  of  culture  and  religion.  Evolu- 
tion's center  of  gravity  is  man,  and  its  advancement  is 
continuous  creation  along  lines  of  personality.  Environ- 
ment is  a  field  of  values  and  not  a  mere  succession  of  ex- 
ternal stimuli.  An  absolute  evolution  should  be  attained 
in  an  environment  infinitely  perfecting  itself,  re-created 
by  soul  and  corresponding  to  it. 


Preface  vii 

The  culture  that  makes  religion  possible  and  that  signi- 
fies the  indefeasibility  of  the  individual,  cannot  by  any 
manner  of  means  be  the  kultur  that  on  the  other  hand, 
sweeps  the  individual  off  his  feet,  and  loses  him  with  his 
personal  moral  responsibilities  in  the  mustering  of  the 
mass.  The  one  speaks  from  the  human  soul,  while  the 
other  rumbles  from  the  vast  complexity  of  an  all  too- 
efficient  machine. 

A  few  words  further  as  to  a  possible  difficulty:  the 
words  idea  and  ideal  are  both  used  to  name  the  rounded 
content  of  the  thought-situation.  How  are  these  to  be 
discriminated  and  how  does  one  pass  into  the  other?  The 
distinction  is  not  to  be  grasped  from  the  intellectual  con- 
tent of  the  thought-units  considered  in  and  by  themselves. 
Idea  and  ideal  are  differentiated  through  the  inward  ap- 
preciation of  the'  self  as  a  whole ;  the  transition  to  ideals 
occurs  with  a  moral  crisis.  When  the  individual  is 
awakened  to  a  full  and  complete  realization  of  value,  then 
every  one  of  his  ideas  is  co-ordinated  with  the  moral  life, 
and  is  seen  also  as  an  organic  ideal.  The  quality  imposed 
by  value,  and  the  unrest  that  creates  a  progressive  suc- 
cession of  motives,  makes  every  thought  situation  an  ideal 
as  well  as  an  idea.  Thus  even  in  the  ordinary  moments 
of  life,  man  is  living  in  an  environment  re-constructed  by 
ideals. 

The  inspiration  of  much  of  the  thought  in  the  pages 
that  follow  is  gratefully  acknowledged  in  the  references. 
But  it  is  a  pleasant  duty  to  acknowledge  a  special  in- 
debtedness to  Professor  John  Dewey's  Studies  in  Logical 
Theory.  Furthermore  I  must  express  my  deep  sense  of 
obligation  to  Professor  Charles  Gray  Shaw  whose  attrac- 


viii  Preface 

tive  and  convincing  presentation  of  philosophical  truths 
has  extensively  influenced  the  following  pages;  and  to 
Professor  Robert  MacDougall  whose  inspiration  towards 
the  construction  of  a  personal  philosophical  environment, 
has  meant  more  than  I  can  well  express  in  words. 
January,  1918. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.     Introduction   15 

1.  Aim  or  Thesis  to  be  Proved 15 

2.  Method  and  Scope 15 

3.  Interests  to  Values 16 

4.  Genesis  of  Experience 17 

5.  The  Functioning  of  Will  and  the  Creation 

of  Value 17 

6.  The  Discovery  of  Self 1 8 

7.  Value  Through  Culture  and  Religion.  ...  19 

8.  Value  and  Theory  of  Experience 19 

9.  Value  and  Related  Problems 20" 

10.  Pragmatism  and  Voluntarism  as  Comple- 

mentary     21 

11.  Outline  of  the  Book 21  -" 

[I.     The  Biological  Situation  and  Interests 25 

12.  Life  and  Organism 25 

13.  The  Organic  and  the  Inorganic 25 

14.  Life,  the  Irreducible 26 

15.  Sentiency,  Nutrition,  Reproduction 27 

1 6.  Life  as  Internality-Externality 27 

17.  The  Reciprocity  of  Consciousness  and  Ob- 

jectivity      28 

1 8.  Self-Creation  in  an  Internal-External  Re- 

ciprocity by  Equilibration 30 

19.  Equilibration  in  the  Biological  Situation.  .  31 

20.  The  Minimum  of  Aim  that  Creates  a  Situ- 

ation      32 

IX 


x  Contents 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

21.  The  Life- World  of  Aims  and  Desires.  .  .      33 

22.  The  Reciprocal  Development  of  Organism 

and  Environment   33 

23.  Logic  of  Environment  Implies  Conscious- 

ness       34 

24.  Environment  an  Evolution  Based  on  In- 

terests         35 

25.  Evolution  a  Monistic  Conception 36 

26.  Dualism,  Anthropomorphic;  Monism,  Bi- 

ocentric    37 

III.  The  Rise  of  the  Thought-Situation  with  its 

Values    39 

27.  Life-Processes  Become  Experience 39 

28.  In    Self-Consciousness    Instinct    Becomes 

Intelligence 40 

29.  The  Reciprocal  Genesis  of  the  Elements  of 

the  Thought-Situation   42 

30.  Experience    Constructed    of    Things    and 

Relations    43 

31.  The  Thought-Situation  Like  a  Wave.  ...     44 

32.  Every  Situation  Co-ordinated  by  Ends  plus 

Values    45 

33.  Instinct  Knows  Interests  but  not  Values.  .     46 

IV.  Valuation  and  its  Conditions 48 

34.  What  is  Value? 48 

35.  How    Value    Differs    from    Sentient    In- 

terests         48 

36.  History  Advances  by  Ideal  Ends 50 

37.  The      Contradiction      of      Non-Intrinsic 

Values    51 


Contents  xi 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

38.  Self -Conscious   Evolution   Demands   Self- 

Selected  Values 53 

39.  Intelligence  Must  Set  its  Problems  as  Well 

as  Solve  Them 54 

40.  The  Adjustment  of  Intelligence  to  its  Re- 

ciprocal Environment 55 

41.  Ideals     Become     Permanent     Qualitative 

Values 56 

42.  The  Thought-Situation  is  the  Interplay  of 

Value  and  Relation 57 

43.  Value  Contrasted  with  Relation 59 

44.  Value  and  the  Self -Creation  of  Freedom  61 

45.  Value  Compared  with  Relation 62 

V.     Valuation  and  Self-Affirmation 63 

46.  The  Recurring  Problem  of  Value-Content  63 

47.  No  First  Value  in  Experience 64 

48.  Analysis-Synthesis  Reaches  Out  to  Prob- 

lems of  Reality 65 

49.  Intelligence  is  an  Actual  Datum 65 

50.  The  Metaphysical  Difference  Between  the 

Biological  and  Thought-Situations.  ...     66 

51.  Intelligence  is   Independent 67 

52.  The  Ego  the  Source  and  Aim  of  Analysis- 

Synthesis  68 

53.  The  Temporal  Element  of  Self -Positing. .     69 

54.  Self  the  Ultimate  Source  of   Qualitative 

Experience 70 

55.  The  Pre-positing  Understanding  and  the 

Positing  Self 70 

56.  The   Understanding  and   Reason  as   the 


- 


xii  Contents 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

Theoretical  and  Practical  Selves 71 

57.  Intelligence  in  Subject-Objectivity 72 

58.  The  Biological  Situation  Knows  no  Free 

Positing   73 

59.  Life's   Realization   in   the  Value-Positing 

Ego   74 

VI.  Freedom,  Value,  and  Habit 76 

60.  The  Moral  Dilemma 76 

61.  Psychology  Maintains  Autonomy 77 

62.  The  Contexture  of  Evolutionary  Experi- 

ence          78 

VII.  Self-Positing    in    a    Moral    Crisis,    and    the 

Mood  of  Want 80 

63.  A  Deeper  View  of  Intrinsic  Value 80 

64.  Self-Positing  in  a  Moral  Crisis  Gives  Real 

Value 81 

65.  The  Requirements  of  Such  Self-Positing.  .      82 

66.  Want  and  Prophecy  Work  Towards  Real 

Values    83 

67.  Plastic   Material   for   Revaluation   is   the 

Fulfillment  of  the  Biological  Situation     85 

68.  The   Biological   Situation  Anticipates  the 

Thought-Situation  86 

VIII.  The  Fulfillment  by  Idealizing  Will 87 

69.  Intellect  Must  be  Supplemented 87 

70.  Self  as  non-Temporalistic  over  against  an 

Ideal  of  Totality 87 

7 1 .  The  Constructive  Fulfillment  of  the  Mood 

of  Want 89 

72.  Moments  of  Self-Positing  Lead  to  Culture 


Contents  xiii 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

and  Religion   90 

73.  Happiness  of  Indefeasible  Self-Realization     91 

IX.  The   Categorical   Imperative  as   Culture   and 

Religion 93 

74.  The  Character  of  the  Law  of  Qualitative 

Values    93 

75.  Kant's    Categorical     Imperative    from    a 

Genetic  Approach 94 

76.  The  Re-statement  of  the  Categorical  Im- 

perative         94 

77.  The    Categorical    Imperative    Solves    the 

Contradiction  of  Extrinsic  Values.  ...     96 

78.  The  Categorical  Imperative  Provides  the 

Reciprocity  of  Culture  and  Religion ...     97 

79.  Perfect  Autonomy  Found  in  Culture  and 

Religion    98 

80.  The  Final  Support  of  Value  is  the  Re- 

ligious Mood 98 

X.  The  Moral  Crisis  in  its  Social  Genesis 100 

81.  The  Ego  and  Experience 100 

82.  Culture  and  Religion  Come  from  Social 

Experience 100 

83.  The  History  of  Value  Content 102 

84.  The  Rise  of  Value  Through  Revaluation  103 

85.  Freedom  of  Valuation  Through  the   In- 

dependence of  a  Moral  Crisis 105 

86.  Moral  Independence  and  Adolescence.  .  .    105 

87.  Absence  of  Self-Positing,  a  Negative  Proof 

of  Perfect  Freedom 106 

XI.  The  Nature  of  Conscience 107 


xiv  Contents 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

88.  Conscience     the     Coalescence     of     Social 

and  Individual  Worths 107 

89.  Conscience  More  than  Psychological 108 

90.  Conscience  Expresses  the  Joy  of  Self-Crea- 

tive Experience   108 

91.  Conscience  as  the   Self  Acting  Efficiently 

and  Intuitively 109 

92.  Conscience  as  the  Moral  Faculty 1 1 1 

93.  Psychological  Pleasure  and  Moral  Pleasure 

in  Autonomous  Activity 112 

94.  Summary   113 

XII.  Value  and  Deity 114 

95.  Value  Postulates  Deity  as  a  Guarantee  and 

a  Limit    114 

96.  The  Psychological  Ties  of  Value  Cannot 

be  Transferred  to  Deity 116 

97.  The   Supreme  Experience   is  Given  as  to 

Form  but  not  as  to  Content 117 

98.  Value  as  Founded  on  a  Personal,  Religious 

Relationship    1 1 8 

99.  God  and   Man  Co-operate  in  the  Exten- 

sion-Intension of  Experience 118 

100.  An  Illustration  from  the  Aesthetic  Field.  .    120 

XIII.  Values,  Economic  and  Moral,  and  the  Con- 

tinuity of   Culture 12 1 

101.  The  Differentiation  of  Values 121 

102.  How  Values  Attain  the  Moral  Quale  in 

the  Individual 121 

103.  The  Cultural  Willing  of  Life. 122 

104.  The  Continuous  Self-Revision  of  Culture  123 


Contents  xv 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

105.  Arrested  Culture 124 

106.  Moral  Values  are  Cultural 125 

107.  Economic  Values  are  Impersonally  Identi- 

fiable        126 

108.  Ideas  and  Institutions  as  Plans  of  Action 

May  Possess  an  Absolute  Moral  Value   127 

109.  Religious  Symbolism  Must  Find  Its  Mean- 

ing in  Absolute  Values 128 

no.  The  Historic  Method  of  Self-Positing  Has 

Been  Religion  128 

XIV.  Value  as  Philosophy  and  Life 130 

in.  Value  Indicates  No  Sixth  Sense 130 

112.  Value-Content  is  not  Final  or  Uniform.  .  131 

113.  The  Work  of  Self  in  Adapting  Environ- 

ment        132 

114.  The    Indefeasibility   and    Co-operation   of 

Selves 134 

115.  The  Vindication  of  Intelligence 134 

1 1 6.  Man  as  the  Master  of  Evolution 135 

117.  Value  Gives  a  Practical  Theory  for  Life's 

Activities    136 

1 1 8.  The  Reciprocity  of  Individual  and  Society 

in   the   Intension-Extension   of   Experi- 
ence      136 

119.  Value  Constructs  an  Ethical  Program.  ...  137 

1 20.  The  Category  of  Personality 138 

121.  Science  and  Religion  Reconciled  by  Value  139 

Bibliography    141 

Index   143 


PHILOSOPHIC  FUNCTION  OF  VALUE 


The  Philosophic  Function 

of  Value 

CHAPTER  I 

INTRODUCTION 

1.  Aim  or  Thesis  to  be  Proved.     We  shall  undertake 
to  show  that  a  valuation  process  functions  in  life,  and  that 
values  dynamically  express  themselves  in  the  structure  and 
in   the  constructive   unfoldment   of   experience;    further, 
that  such  values  are  the  landmarks  or  ends  that  disclose 
the  self  in  its  own  life-career  and  in  its  own  humanistic 
world.     Our  proof  will  develop  in  a  method  of  investiga- 
tion which  will  consist  in  a  direct  examination  of  life  as 
das  gegebene,  or  point  of  departure  or  datum,  as  found  in 
representative  situations  culminating  in  self-consciousness 
with  all  its  implications. 

2.  Method   and   Scope.     Our   method    will   have    the 
genetic  attitude,  attempting  so  far  as  it  bears  upon  value, 
a  reconstruction  of  these  situations  and  a  loosening  and 
identification  of  contributing  factors.    Life  will  be  studied 
in  two  general  units  or  types,  the  biological  situation  and 
the  thought-situation,  and  a  transition,  differentiation,  and 
relationship   will   have   to   be   established    between   them. 
Life  will  be  presented  as  a  continuity  with  especial  refer- 
ence to  the  possibilities  of  a  continuous  evolution  that  shall 
not  be  a  vain  universal  recurrence  dogged  by  involution. 
Our  procedure  will  be  a  direct  analysis  of  our  "given" 
as  apprehended  in  its  natural  activity  in  evolution,  aiming 

15 


1 6  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

also  for  a  c-itical  synthesis  and  a  metaphysical  insight. 
Life  will  be  grasped  in  the  mutuality  or  reciprocity  of  its 
environment.  The  analysis  will  have  to  be  throughout,  a 
dichotomy  exhibiting  these  mutual  factors  of  inward  and 
outward,  neither  of  which  possesses  any  real  significance, 
except  in  relation  to  its  other.  It  will  be  in  the  contact 
of  life  with  its  environment,  in  its  locus  amidst  its  environ- 
ment, that  the  functioning  of  valuation  will  be  discovered. 
3.  Interests  to  Values.  Life  as  a  complex  or  resultant 
ideally  factorable,  is  not  the  interactive  equilibrium  of  like 
forces.  There  is  an  inward  factor  that  manifests  itself 
uniquely  as  a  reaction  in  a  process  of  mutual  adaptation, 
so  that  life  adapts  itself  to  its  environment,  and,  advancing 
in  the  scale,  it  adapts  its  environment  increasingly  to  itself. 
In  the  biological  situation,  this  mutual  adaptation  is  per- 
formed by  means  of  interests.  Then,  as  life  reaches  a  ful- 
fillment or  a  self -disco  very  of  its  own  intention,  the  adap- 
tation becomes  thought,  and  interests  are  displaced  by 
values.  The  range  of  interests  is  limited,  and  provides  for 
an  evolution  that  might  prove  to  be  a  vicious  circle  of  mere 
adjustment.  The  range  of  value  is  unlimited  and  full  of 
rectilinear  promise.  In  the  stage  of  interests,  life  can  be 
described  as  over-experience  rather  than  as  experience,  for 
the  organism's  main  intention  is  continuance  without 
awareness  of  any  larger  temporal  ends  or  choice  of  re- 
actions or  deliberate  self-consciousness.  The  notion  of 
experience  would  tend  towards  something  over  or  beyond 
the  given  organism.  Each  interest  functions  on  occasion 
in  a  full-fledged  manner,  but  there  is  no  cumulative  se- 
quence. But  when  interests  are  transmuted  into  value, 
it  is  intelligence  that  is  revealed  as  acting  and  re-acting. 


Introduction  17 

There  is  real  experience  with  the  possibility  of  autonomy 
and  its  landmarks  are  the  values  themselves. 

4.  Genesis  of  Experience.     Thus  experience  appears  in 
life  simultaneously  with  the  genesis  and  growth  of  values. 
At  a  certain  stage  of  life  in  the  history  of  evolution,  it 
turns  upon  itself  and  reaches  self-consciousness  in  a  change 
that  makes  experience.     Interests  give  place  to  values  be- 
cause a  self -appreciation  of  inward  ends  has  arisen;    ex- 
perience really  becomes  such  because  there  is  now  an  ex- 
periencer.     It  augments  progressively  by  a  process  of  in- 
wardness and  of  judgment  expressing  itself  not  only  quan- 
titatively but  qualitatively.    The  preponderance  and  over- 
balancing of  action  is  on  the  side  of  self-consciousness, 
and  the  extension  of  the  environment  is  modified  by  an 
intension   of    it,    the    quantitative    instrumental    relations 
following  and  serving  the  qualitative  values.     Experience 
is  therefore  life  deliberately  positing  its  own  cumulative 
ends.      Personality   is  here   disclosed   in   an  environment 
where  mind  itself  furnishes  many  of  the  stimuli,  or  at 
least  modifies  all  those  that  are  found.     Experience  really 
reveals  an  evolved  environment  as  one  of  the  reciprocal 
dichotomous  factors.     So  to  the  conception  of  experience 
evolving  by  means  of  value,  there  will  have  to  be  added 
the  conception  of  an  ever-developing  environment. 

5.  The  Functioning  of  Will  and  the  Creation  of  Value. 
The  conception  of  an  evolutionary  intellectual  self  amidst 
an  evolutionary  environment  makes   possible   the  transi- 
tion from  biology  to  history,  that  is,  to  the  free  creation 
of  ideal  ends  guiding  personal  and  humanistic  experience. 
It  further  introduces  the  will  of  man  as  a  correspondent 
to  his  intellect  in  meeting  the  wants  of  man.     For  man  be- 


1 8  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

longing  no  longer  to  organisms  that  function  as  simple 
instrumentalities  of  life  in  the  form  of  non-subjective 
over-experience,  now  appears  in  evolution  as  a  being  char- 
acterized by  imperious  ideal  wants,  But  these  wants,  cre- 
ating as  they  do,  the  content  and  progression  of  the  rest- 
less round  of  experience,  never  can  be  quite  satisfied  in 
the  ordinary  course  of  events.  The  values  that  cor- 
respond to  these  ideal  wants  may  turn  out  to  be  a  mere 
scheme  for  logical  movement,  intrinsically  non-distinguish- 
able from  logical  relations,  and  functioning  simply  by  vir- 
tue of  a  local  position  in  the  thought-movement.  The 
great  problem  of  our  book  is  how  life  attains  qualitative 
and  intrinsic  values,  and  how  these  values  function  as 
such  in  experience.  This  problem  continues  until  it  is 
shown  that  the  totality  of  wants  manifests  itself  in  a 
single,  all-comprehensive  want  whose  satisfaction  is  ac- 
complished by  the  willing  of  supreme  value,  furnishing  a 
criterion  of  values,  and  enabling  a  functioning  of  values 
in  experience,  mainly  prospectively,  but,  by  the  linking  of 
a  cumulative  continuity  with  the  past,  retrospectively 
also. 

6.  The  Discovery  of  Self.  Through  the  sense  of 
want,  intelligence  discovers  itself  as  a  self  in  all  its  dignity, 
and  ideally  opposed  to  an  environment  fluid  enough  to  al- 
low it  to  realize  its  own  free  aims.  By  an  act  of  will,  the 
self  affirms  itself  and  affirms  its  purpose  of  actualizing 
the  totality  of  experience.  Such  an  ideal  is,  by  its  nature, 
of  non-empirical  content.  The  willing  of  the  totality  as 
its  sphere  of  activity  is  the  self's  most  fateful  moral  event, 
coming  as  a  moral  crisis  with  the  awakening  of  reason 
and  the  dawning  of  complete  inward  selfhood.  The  self 


Introduction  19 

thus  finds  itself  in  all  possible  experience;  it  transforms 
all  its  values  with  moral  quale,  which  is  imposed  directly 
or  indirectly  by  its  activity  in  the  free  building  of  a  uni- 
versal kingdom  of  ends.  Values  are  discovered  to  reside 
essentially  not  in  things  or  in  impersonal  events,  but  in 
persons  and  in  their  living  acts.  The  subject  is  seen  in 
the  object,  and  the  object  is  understood  in  view  of  its  sub- 
ject. 

7.  Value  through  Culture  and  Religion.     The  criterion 
or  law  of  values  is  re-summarized  in  Kant's  categorical 
imperative  which  specifically  emphasizes  the  moral  quale. 
The  two  forms  of  the  imperative  are  shown  to  character- 
ize, respectively,  the  culture  of  the  self  and  the  religion 
of  the  self.     Morality  is  the  link  that  unites  culture  and 
religion.     All  three  of  these  are  the  expressions  of  a  value- 
seeking  self  and  the  unification  of  its  experience.     Final 
analysis  shows,  further,  that  the  constructive  values  of  ex- 
perience are  posited  by  the  self  in  and  through  its  religion ; 
for  religion  is  the  personal  dependence  upon  the  claims  of 
totality;    it  is  the  category  of  values  as  such.      Its  only 
direct   concerns   are  persons   and   non-economic   interests. 
Value  is  thus  not  only  a  builder  of  experience  but  an  in- 
strument wherewith  to  approach  the  reality  of  the  whole. 
But  it  does  not  by  itself  offer  a  theory  of  reality. 

8.  Value  and  a  Theory  of  Experience.     Value  offers  a 
theory  of  the  evolution  of  experience.     The  category  of 
persons  is  advanced  to  the  chief  rank,  and  an  auto-centric 
reality  is  exhibited.     But  this  reality  is  that  of  a  growing 
evolutionary  experience  and  the  charge  of  subjectivism  or 
phenomenalism  would  be  entirely  irrelevant.     While  not 
touching  the  problem  of  the  thing-in-itself,  or  of  reality 


2O  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

apart  from  knowledge,  etc.,  the  philosophy  of  values,  con- 
fining itself  to  experience,  exhibits  it  as  infinitely  evolving 
in  the  two-dimensional  aspects  of  quality-quantity,  inten- 
sion-extension, motive-action,  deepening-lengthening,  ap- 
preciation-objectivity, etc.  Value  thus  brings  a  sense  of 
personal  co-operation  with  the  purposes  of  evolution  and 
reality.  The  sense  of  the  personal  and  the  active  brings 
to  the  basic  law  of  values  not  a  rigoristic  devotion,  but  the 
joy  of  achievement. 

9.  Value  and  Related  Problems.  The  full  implications 
of  the  conditions  under  which  intelligent  will  arouses  itself 
to  its  destiny,  will  furnish  a  clew  to  the  solution  of  many 
related  problems  of  value.  The  supreme  positing  of  the 
self  in  culture  and  religion,  amidst  supreme  value,  is  not 
only  the  work  of  the  moral  self,  but  equally  of  the  psycho- 
logical self,  with  its  biological  heritage  and  its  social  en- 
vironment. The  recognition  of  this  will  enable  us  to 
answer  such  questions  as  Kant's  moral  dilemma  that  duty 
as  such  cannot  be  performed  through  inclination ;  or  the 
nature  of  the  inward  freedom  of  acts  performed  by  the 
authority  of  society ;  or  the  problem  of  conscience ;  also 
the  relative  moral  values  of  economic  and  aesthetic  inter- 
ests; the  possibility  of  absolute  values  in  certain  institu- 
tions; and  the  fundamental  differences  of  value-content 
according  to  era,  race,  and  religion.  The  problem  of  the 
status  of  the  individual  is  solved  by  proving  his  absolute 
indefeasibility,  but  nevertheless  that  indefeasibility  is 
shown  to  possess  a  significance  mainly,  if  not  entirely,  in 
the  co-operative  relationship  of  the  individual  to  society. 
Value  insists  upon  full  recognition  of  personality,  but 
within  the  sociality  and  not  outside  of  it. 


Introduction  21 

10.  Pragmatism   and  Voluntarism  as   Complementary. 
Our  method  may  be  called  both  pragmatic  and  speculative. 
For   the   functioning  of   value    and   its   inward-outward, 
practical,  humanistic,  character,  it  will  be  based  on  the 
thought  process  or  experience  considered  in  the  unit  of  the 
thought-situation,   (so  named  by  Dewey,  Studies  in  Logi- 
cal Theory,  p.  4).     But  for  the  genesis  and  the  moral 
quale  of  values,  that  is,  to  establish  values  as  values  in  and 
for  themselves,  the  inadequacy  of  the  pragmatic  method 
is  supplemented  by  a  voluntaristic  and  monistic  conception 
of  experience.     Pragmatism,  strictly  considered,  can  only 
construe   and   verify   a   particular   situation  which   must, 
ndeed,  eventuate  in  an  idea  whose  test  is  empirical  use- 
fulness.    To  construe  the  totality  of  situations,  to  satisfy 
the  want  or  desire  that  is  more  than  the  summation  of  all 
particular  wants,  and  that  can  never  be  empirically  tested 
except  by  its  general  success,  the  aid  of  the  will  must  be 
called  in.    The  two  aspects  of  our  method  must  be  shown 
to  be  mutually  implicated,  for  the  monistic  construction 
of  a  totality  would  be  valueless  without  its  bearing  upon 
the  plural  situations.      In   this   reconciliation,   the  moral 
crisis  will  occur.    Value  will  stand  out,  not  merely  as  an 
intellectual  construction,  but  as  a  complete  expression  and 
summation  of  man's  life  and  experience.     Finally,  it  will 
vindicate  the  indefeasibility  of  intellect  when  the  self  is 
shown  by  means  of  value  to  be  not  merely  pragmatically 
instrumental,  but  inwardly  purposive  and  unifying  amidst 
the  problems  of  experience. 

11.  Outline   of   the  Book.     The   development   of   our 
thought  will  pursue  the  following  lines: 

(I).  The  biological  situation  as  an  anticipation  of 


22  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

the  thought-situation,  emphasizing  the  steps  in  evo- 
lution as  consisting  of  equilibration  or  harmoniza- 
tion accomplished  by  the  agency  of  instinctive  inter- 
ests; and  furthermore,  the  perfect  reciprocity  of  life 
and  environment  that  dictates  a  dichotomous  method 
of  analysis. 

(II).  The  thought-situation  and  the  rise  of  exper- 
ience with  life  recognizing  itself  and  displacing  over- 
experience.  Instinct  passes  into  intelligence,  and 
interest  into  values,  and  the  ego  appears  as  the  co- 
ordinator of  its  ends. 

(III).  The  passing  from  biology  to  history  by  the 
operation  in  life  of  ideal  ends.  What  valuation  is 
and  how  it  functions  in  relation  to  self,  freedom,  and 
qualitative  experience. 

(IV).  The  logic  of  experience  and  the  metaphysi- 
cal analysis  of  the  thought-situation.  How  the  self 
posits  itself  in  a  time-series  and  imposes  a  real  worth- 
coefficient  or  quality,  upon  values.  The  dual  self, 
theoretical  and  practical,  or  understanding  and  rea- 
son, is  discovered  as  the  functioning  of  the  ego  in  its 
qualitative  moral  world. 

(V).  The  moral  dilemma  of  freedom  and  habit. 

(VI).  The  re-appearance  of  the  persistent  contra- 
diction between  extrinsic  and  intrinsic  value.  The 
contradiction  is  solved  and  intrinsic  value  is  obtained 
when  the  self  with  its  mood  of  want  and  its  prophetic 
nature  posits  itself  in  a  moral  crisis.  The  temporal 
positing  discloses  meanwhile  the  stabilizing  function 
and  the  fulfillment  of  the  non-temporal  biological 
situation. 


Introduction  23 

(VII).  The  inward  movement  and  the  structur- 
izing  of  the  supreme  self-positing  or  the  moral  crisis. 
Will,  energizing  intellect  creates  a  final  isolation  that 
produces  and  standardizes  value.  This  final  ideal 
willing  must  be  that  of  the  non-empirical  self  over 
against  a  non-empirical  totality.  The  mood  of  want 
is  fulfilled  in  religion  and  in  culture,  and  indefeasible 
self-realization  is  followed  by  the  joy  of  labor  and 
achievement. 

(VIII)  The  law  of  valuation  in  the  evolution  of 
experience  takes  the  form  of  Kant's  categorical  im- 
perative.     Its  two   formulations   correspond   to   per- 
sonality and  to  totality.     The  culture  and   the   re- 
ligion of  the  self  in  bestowing  real  autonomy  prove 
the  existence  of  values  that  are  intrinsic. 

(IX)  The  psychological  aspects  of  the  moral  cris- 
is and  the  natural  and  social  history  of  values.   Value 
really  arises  as  an  awakening  in  a  process  of  re-val- 
uation. 

(X)  The  logic  of  conscience  and  its  functioning 
as  individual  and  social,  as  psychological  and  moral, 
and  as  expressing  personality  in  the  task  of  extension- 
intension  of  experience  according  to  values. 

(XI)  Value  and  Deity  and  the  religious  basis  of 
worth.     The  value  approach  to  Deity  presents  the 
universe  as  a  plastic  construction   in  which   persons 
are  indefeasible. 

(XII)  The  differentiation  of  values  into  economic 
and  moral.     The  moral  value  must  be  recognized  in 
the  very  act  and  flows  only  from  a  Weltanschauung. 
Values  as  the  specific  field  of  religion. 


24  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

• 

(XIII)  Our  conclusion  will  attempt  to  show  how 
value  may  furnish  a  practical  philosophy  of  life,  an 
ethical  theory;  also  how  it  vindicates  the  self  and 
mediates  between  the  individual  and  society;  finally 
the  reconciliation  of  religion  and  science  on  the  basis 
of  worth. 

Recalling  the  central  point  of  our  thesis  that  values  are 
constructive  in  a  progressive  evolutionary  experience,  and 
our  method  furthermore  of  direct  approach  to  life  and 
consciousness  in  their  given  condition  with  a  consequent 
disclosing  of  the  synthetic  elements  by  a  dichotomous  an- 
alysis, we  may  now  proceed  to  our  task  of  showing  what 
value  is,  does,  and  must  be,  and  how  it  may  be  adjudged 
a  key  to  experience.  Experience  will  be  considered  as  a 
system  of  thought-situations  and  therefore  we  must  com- 
mence our  investigation  with  the  history  and  the  explana- 
tion of  the  single,  or  typical,  thought-situation. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE    BIOLOGICAL    SITUATION    AND    INTERESTS 

12.  Life  and  Organism.     Having  taken  as  the  point  of 
departure  for  experience,  the  complex  of  consciousness  in 
the  unitary  cross-section  of  the  thought-situation,  and  the 
genetic  or  historical  development  as  our  method,  let  us  at- 
tempt a  general  picture  of  its  purely  biological  ancestry 
or  anticipation.     There  is  here  no  evidence  of  a  thought- 
situation  in  the  proper  sense,  there  is  no  self-conscious  pro- 
cess.    There  is,   however,   a   life-situation   and   that   be- 
comes the  given,  the  datum.    There  is  resistance  of  some 
kind,  and  therefore  activity.    There  is,  moreover,  organi- 
zation, for  that  resistance  whether  to  mere  passive  dis- 
integration or  whether  in  a  struggle  for  self-preservation, 
is  somehow  localized,  and  so  even  at  its  lowest  terms,  an 
organism.     Life  expresses  itself  in  an  organic  process,  and 
appears  as  its  own  end.     An  organism   is   its  own  end, 
whose  parts  are  their  own  ends,  and  yet  all  contributing 
to  the  major  organic  end.      (Cf.   Kant's   conception   of 
organism  in  Richard   Falckenberg's  History   of  Modern 
Philosophy,  tr.  A.  C.  Armstrong,  p.  409).     Life  and  or- 
ganism,  bringing  activity   and  movement  into   play,   are 
thus  the  primal  aspects  of  the  biological  situation. 

13.  The  Organic  and  the  Inorganic.     But  organism  as 
definitely  centralized   activity,  as   resistance  for  its  own 
end,   is   also  modification   of   self.     Here   is   the  crucial 
distinction  between  the  inorganic  or  the  mechanical,  and 
the  organic  or  the  living.    The  former  is  also  a  resistant 

25 


26  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

activity,  but  it  can  form  only  an  atom,  or  element,  of  a 
group  of  activities.  It  does  not,  indeed,  lose  its  identity 
as  a  unit,  and,  considered  as  an  analytical  factor,  it  is  truly 
incapable  of  quantitative  modification.  Nevertheless,  it 
does  not  operate  except  to  the  utter  loss  of  its  individu- 
ality. It  becomes  part  of  a  resultant,  which  again  con- 
verges into  a  larger  resultant,  and  so  on  throughout  the 
whole  economy  of  nature's  forces.  There  is  indefinite 
self-combination,  but  there  is  no  activity  or  attempt  to- 
wards self-maintenance  or  preservation.  That  would  be 
the  description  of  life,  which  simultaneously  has  to  intro- 
duce a  distinction  between  self  and  not-self,  or  internal 
and  external,  or — as  expressed  in  its  most  elemental  con- 
dition— between  organism  and  environment. 

14.  Life,  the  Irreducible.  In  the  organic  world,  there 
is  no  longer  a  general  inter-reducibility  of  forces.  Life 
has  introduced  the  irreducible  and  the  incommensurable. 
Operating  in  or  with  the  organism,  it  will  freely  utilize 
the  environment  and  its  forces.  It  will  unhesitatingly 
forego  its  habitual  organic  forms  if  necessary;  it  will 
modify  itself  unstintingly.  But  it  submits  in  order  to 
dominate.  The  situation  remains  its  own.  It  is  still  the 
incommensurable.  It  is  not  a  unit  element  on  equal  terms 
with  similar  elements  in  a  group.  Whatever  its  modifi- 
cations, it  rather  becomes  itself  the  unitary  and  co-ordin- 
ating principle  of  a  converging  group  of  forces.  It  is  both 
aim  and  method,  and  becomes  the  definite  common  purpose 
of  activity.  While  its  aim  is  to  continue  itself,  its  meth- 
od is  to  express  itself.  It  is  in  its  expression,  and  is  the 
principle  of  its  expression.  If  the  organic  processes  may 
be  termed  forces  that  interplay  with  non-organic  forces, 


The  Biological  Situation   and  Interests  27 

it  must  also  be  added  that  they  manage  to  maintain  life 
as  the  common  denominator.  Life  processes  are  methods 
developed  by  necessity  in  an  organism  whose  business  it 
always  is  to  utilize  or  to  resist  the  facts  of  its  externality 
or  environment. 

15.  Sentiency,  Nutrition,  Reproduction.      That  there 
should  exisit  some  other  than  a  quantitive  relation  between 
the  externality  and  the  selfward-turned  internality,  that 
there  should  be  self  protective  reaction,  there  must  then 
be  the  process  of  irritability  or  sentiency;    there  must  be 
replenishment  of  energy  or  nutrition ;    there  must  also  be 
replenishment    of    the    organism    itself,    or    reproduction. 
The  life  process  as  a  whole  is  one  of  uninterrupted  adjust- 
ment and   re-adjustment.     This  is  evolutionary  growth. 
Though  in  the  individual,  growth  is  dogged  by  involution- 
ary  diminution  or  decay,  yet  the  species  in  the  process  of 
reproduction   presents   a   continuous  expansion  except  as 
checked  in  the  universal  conflict  of  nature. 

1 6.  Life    as    Internality-Externality.       Life    may    be 
characterized  as  an  original  diremption  of  external-inter- 
nal, of  environment  and  organism.     A  reconstruction  of 
the  life-process  will  not  show  these  factors  as  ready-made, 
except  in  the  case  of  man  in  his  most  evolved,  intellec- 
tualized,  and  socialized  status.     It  is  in  society  only,  that 
progress  may  take  the  form  of  imitative  adaptation.     The 
life-process  in  its  grander  evolutionary  phases,  however,  is 
just  this  self-creation  in  indefinitely  varying  multitudinous 
stages  by  means  of  this  internal-external ;   evolution  is  cre- 
ative not  merely  of  the  organism,  but  inevitably  and  inex- 
tricably of  its  environment  also.     Development  and  evolu- 
tion are  not  peculiar  to  the  individual,  the  organism,  the 


28  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

internality,  alone;  they  are  equally  and,  we  may  add  sim- 
ultaneously descriptive  of  the  individual's  world,  his  envir- 
onment, his  externality.  The  growing  complexity  of  or- 
ganism advancing  from  the  amceba  stage  can  best  be 
studied  from  the  point  of  view  of  life's  intention,  with 
reference  to  the  mutuality  of  a  growing  complexity  of  en- 
vironment. The  organism  is  already  found  as  an  activity 
in  its  environment.  The  division  into  organism  and  en- 
vironment is  a  logical,  working,  differentiation,  not  a  rig- 
id, original  difference.  The  evolutionary  work  of  adjust- 
ment in  passive  resistance  or  active  conflict  that  spells 
the  continuance  of  life,  means  the  active  life  of  an  organ- 
ism in  its  environment.  The  organism  has  no  interest  in 
any  other  environment,  but  a  very  vital  interest  in  its  own. 
Though  a  bird's-eye  view  of  the  totality  of  evolution  may 
reveal  the  overlapping  of  environments,  yet,  strictly  speak- 
ing, there  are  as  many  environments  as  there  are  organ- 
isms. It  would  be  humanizing  the  oyster,  or  even  the  dog, 
to  suppose  that  he  has  the  same  world  of  objects  as  we. 
'The  more  consciousness  is  intellectualized,  the  more  is 
matter  spatialized."  (Henri  Bergson,  Creative  Evolu- 
tion, tr.  Arthur  Mitchell,  p.  189).  Life,  then,  manifests 
itself  as  an  immediate  antithesis  of  internal-external,  of 
organism-environment.  It  develops  by  the  interacting 
reconstruction  of  both.  We  are  sure  of  the  factors;  but, 
except  in  the  case  of  our  own  consciousness,  we  can  only 
negatively  visualize  the  result. 

17.  The  Reciprocity  of  Cojisciousness  and  Objectivity. 
The  biological  situation  in  its  myriad  units,  is  not  one 
shifting,  evanescent  scene  among  many  on  the  universal 
stage  of  life.  The  various  species  do  not  move  and  live 


The  Biological  Situation   and  Interests  29 

and  have  their  being  in  the  same  theatre  of  activity.  Nor 
do  the  humbler  creatures  share  Man's  world  of  beauty 
and  anticipation  and  fear  and  conquest.  The  lamb  is  still 
ever  led  innocently  to  the  slaughter: 

/ 

'The  lamb  thy  riot  dooms  to  bleed  to-day, 
Had  he  thy  reason,  would  he  skip  and  play?" 

Without  more  than  merely  remarking  the  composite  na- 
ture of  our  perception  and  the  character  of  our  perceptual 
world  of  objects  as  an  intellectual  synthesis,  and  without 
pressing  metaphysical  consequences  that  might  eventuate 
in  a  Humian  atomism  of  impressions  or  a  Hegelian 
thought-context  of  reality;  we  may  safely  assume  in  all 
conscious  life,  even  at  its  remotest  origins,  and  at  its  low- 
est ebb,  a  perfect  reciprocity  of  consciousness  and  world. 
In  the  very  conception  of  a  world,  it  is  difficult  to  escape 
the  centrality  of  man,  because  it  is  our  own  consciousness 
that  is  thus  orientating  itself.  The  objects  in  our  world 
of  time  and  space  are  cut  along  the  lines  of  our  life-sit- 
uation, our  vital  conscious  activity.  (Cf.  Bergson,  Crea- 
tive Evolution,  tr.  Mitchell,  p.  153).  They  are  plans 
and  modes  of  action  facilitating  the  continuum  of  our  ex- 
perience. They  are  our  objects,  our  external  world,  and 
yet  at  the  same  time  our  internal  world.  Developing  ex- 
perience bifurcates  into  these  two  factors,  but  the  divi- 
sion is  purely  an  ideal  one.  Our  objects,  then,  are  pe- 
culiarly our  own.  Envisaging  the  whole  of  life's  con- 
tinuum, there  is  no  reason  to  apprehend  any  variation  in 
the  process  of  externalizing  internality.  Every  species 
has  a  world  of  objects  peculiarly  its  own.  (Cf.  Geo.  F. 


3O  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

Stout,Manual  of  Psychology,  pp.  265-267).  But  we  should 
not  insist  on  objects.  "In  order  to  follow  the  indications 
of  instinct,  there  is  no  need  to  perceive  objects,  it  is 
enough  to  distinguish  properties."  (Bergson,  Creative 
Evolution,  tr.  Mitchell,  p.  189).  Here,  the  use  of  the 
term  object  is  symbolic  of  actuality  rather  than  precisely 
descriptive. 

1 8.  Self-Creation  in  an  Internal-External  Reciprocity 
by  Equilibration.  An  analysis  of  the  contexture  of  the 
vital  movement  thus  will  disclose  the  activity  of  continu- 
ous self-expression  or  creation  by  the  mutual  reference  of 
the  internal  and  the  external.  This  creation  is  a  syn- 
thetic complex  of  currents  of  energy.  The  recoil  of  the 
life-current  upon  itself,  its  self -insistence  upon  its  integ- 
rity, takes  the  form  of  an  assertive  struggle,  a  conflict 
with  forces  of  externality.  These  external  forces  may 
be  the  inorganic,  illustrated  in  the  internalizing  assimila- 
tive activity  of  the  world  of  plants,  when  for  example, 
"the  nitrates  and  to  a  less  degree  the  ammonia,  produced 
by  bacterial  activity  in  the  soil  are  taken  up  through  the 
roots  and  built  up  into  protoplasm  and  complex  proteins;" 
(Buchanan,  Household  Bacteriology,  p.  180),  or  they  may 
be  the  whole  round  of  the  purely  mechanical  forces  of 
nature;  or  in  the  redoubling  and  crossing  of  the  life-cur- 
rent, they  may  be  found  to  be  other  organic  processes,  now 
considered  as  external  to  the  one  in  question.  But  it  is 
just  in  this  conflict  that  life  asserts  itself,  becoming  self- 
creation  in  the  activity  of  self-adjustment.  The  strug- 
gle, then,  is  formative  of  vital  manifestations;  the  evolu- 
tion of  the  internal  has  been  in  the  midst  of  an  equal 
evolution  of  the  external.  It  is  a  process  of  harmoniza- 


The  Biological  Situation  and  Interests  31 

i 

tion  and  equilibration.  The  external  is  taken  up  into  the 
internal  and  adapted  or  harmonized.  From  a  comple- 
mentary point  of  view,  the  internal  is  just  as  well  exter- 
nalized. Every  organ  of  adaptation  would  be  a  conflu- 
ence of  currents.  So  also,  the  simplest  independent  or- 
ganism is  one  whose  adaptations  have  been  manifold  and 
progressive;  one  whose  history  will  uncover  many  strata 
of  externality  that  have  been  adapted  with  internality. 
The  one-celled  animal  may  be  considered  the  simplest 
organism.  Its  very  division  is  the  continuance  of  the  vital 
process  in  an  adaptation  of  mutuality,  a  confluence  of  vital 
and  other  forces.  Cell-division  takes  place  on  account  of 
the  decreasing  ratio  between  surface  and  volume.  "Since 
amoeba  takes  in  food,  gives  off  waste  material,  and  carries 
on  respiration  through  its  surface,  the  activity  of  the  cell 
must  decrease  with  increase  in  size  until  further  growth  is 
impossible.  The  solution  of  the  problem  is  the  division 
of  the  animal  into  two  whereby  the  ratio  of  surface  to 
volume  is  increased."  (Robert  W«  Hegner,  College 
Zoology ,  p.  32).  If  the  cell  were  not  alive,  it  would 
break  up  and  dissipate  in  a  simple  conversion  of  forces. 
But  being  alive,  it  maintains  itself  by  a  kind  of  compro- 
mise, yielding  to,  and  at  the  same  time  using  non-organic 
forces  to  continue  the  equilibrating  procedure  of  its  life. 
The  radius  of  internality  is  constantly  lengthening  to  in- 
clude an  ever  widening  circle  of  problems.  But  the  es- 
sential nature  of  the  synthesis,  which  is,  in  reality,  a  pro- 
cess of  self-creation,  is  the  fact  of  equilibration,  the  con- 
flict plus  the  harmonization.  (Cf.  Geo.  F.  Stout,  Man- 
ual of  Psychology,  p.  245). 

19.  Equilibration    in    the   Biological   Situation.     How 


32  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

does  life  act  in  producing  equilibrium  to  succeed  equil- 
ibrium? The  biological  situation  is  activity  by  means  of 
instinct.  Instinct  is  natural,  unacquired  impulse;  it  is 
the  very  original  impetus  of  life;  it  is  the  automatism  of 
the  primal,  self-active  manifestation  of  life.  Without  en- 
tering into  theories  of  instinct,  or  taking  sides  in  such  dis- 
puted questions  as  to  whether  instinct  is  modifiable  by 
inheritance,  or  whether  it  may  be  likened  to  "lapsed  intel- 
ligence" or  pure  mechanism,  we  may  with  Bergson  define 
its  operation  as  "using  and  even  constructing  organized 
instruments."  (Creative  Evolution,  tr.  Mitchell,  p.  140). 
He  looks  for  its  concrete  explanation  in  the  direction,  not 
of  intelligence,  but  of  sympathy.  He  compares  it  to  the 
aesthetic  faculty  that  perceives  not  merely  the  outwardly 
assembled,  but  the  mutually  organized,  the  intention,  and 
the  significance.  What  is  important  is  that  in  instinct,  as 
in  the  totalizing  faculty  of  man  to  which  it  is  likened, 
(Ibid.  p.  176)  we  possess  a  distinct  center  of  reference,  a 
pivotal  point  of  experience,  an  internality  that  develops 
by  meeting  and  absorbing  an  externality,  an  instrumen- 
tality that  actualizes  the  imperious  self-demand  of  life  for 
continuance. 

2O.  The  Minimum  of  Aim  that  Creates  a  Situation. 
Conscious  rationality  does  not  have  to  be  introduced  at  the 
stage  of  instinct,  unless  one  desires  to  posit  a  constitutive 
thought  with  Hegel,  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  universal, 
upward,  intelligent  trend  of  evolution.  But  leaving  aside 
the  issue  between  mechanism  and  finalism,  neither  of 
which  has  to  assume  that  any  species  or  organism  possesses 
the  consciousness  of  a  relative  rank  or  place,  one  must 
assume  that  instinct  involves  a  kind  of  consciousness  that 


The  Biological  Situation  and  Interests  33 

creates  a  situation,  focuses  activity,  and  affirms  an  aim. 
This  aim  in  its  lowest  condition  is  nothing  more  than  the 
original,  self-regarding  aim  of  the  life-process.  A  second 
aim,  separable  only  ideally  from  the  first,  consists  in  the 
necessary  forms  of  life-maintenance  and  life  continuance, 
namely:  sentiency,  nutrition,  and  reproduction.  This 
instinctive  consciousness,  though  not  blind  to  an  aim,  is 
probably  in  no  way  commensurable  with  deliberative  intel- 
ligence. 

21.  The  Life-World  of  Aims  and  Desires.     The  action 
of  instinct  thus  produces  a  factorable  world  of  aims  and 
desires,  of  needs  and  interests.  The  specific  aims  are  nutri- 
tion and  reproduction,  but  in  order  to  obtain  leverage  in 
its  factorable  world,  instinct  turns  upon  itself  in  irritabil- 
ity or  sentiency.     Sentiency  is  life  in  collision,  the  very 
lever  of  action  and   re-action.      (Cf.   Chas.   C.   Everett, 
Fichte's  Science  of  Knowledge,  p.  203).     As  organisms 
evolve,  so  does  the  sentient  complex  that  has  charge  of  the 
primary  aims.     Sentiency  in  a  non-deliberative  being  must 
be  immediately  correlated  with,  the  direct  present  needs 
of  the  organism;    it  is  the  instinctive  "yes"  and  "no," 
which  survives  perhaps  in  some  individuals'  intuitive  first 
impressions.     The  organism  instinctively  establishes  a  di- 
rect and  healthy  response  to  pleasure  and  pain.     It  pro- 
ceeds from  one  state  of  equilibrium  to  another,  instinc- 
tively  meeting   its   adjustive   problems,    and    instinctively 
finding  its  life  in  its  environment. 

22.  The    Reciprocal    Development    of    Organism    and 
Environment.     However,    whilst    living    in    its    environ- 
ment, the  organism  re-constructs  that  same  identical  envir- 
onment by  the  reciprocal  process  of  internal-external.     It 


34  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

cannot  live  except  in  an  external  world.  Considering  the 
outlook  of  life  and  its  differentiated  instincts  within  any 
organism,  it  cannot  be  said  that  this  outside  world  is  given 
in  its  fullness  to  the  organism  in  the  latter's  stage  of  a 
well-defined  growth  or  full-formed  maturity.  The  very 
process  of  maturity  consists  rather  in  a  growing,  activistic, 
relationship  to  such  a  world.  The  living  being  develops 
in  so  far  as  it  finds  centers  of  instinctive  interest.  These 
centers  are  not  strictly  speaking,  found,  but  are  just  as 
well  self-creations,  formed  by  the  inherent  needs  of  the 
instinctive  processes  in  that  particular  phase  of  evolution. 
If,  indeed,  it  is  the  characteristic  function  of  instinct  to 
make  use  of  organized  mechanisms,  (Cf.  Bergson,  Crea- 
tive Evolution,  tr.  Mitchell,  p.  140),  then  it  is  just  the 
range  of  those  mechanisms  and  nothing  else,  that  comes 
within  its  sympathetic  apprehension.  In  fine,  the  living 
know  the  world  in  which  they  live,  after  the  manner  of 
their  instinctive  consciousness,  but  they  know  only  their 
own  world.  They  are  not  aware  of  any  general  external 
world.  They  are  in  creatively  conscious  relation  with 
that  externality  only,  that  facilitates  the  healthy  growth  of 
their  internality,  making  possible  the  formation  of  succes- 
sive, satisfying,  states  of  equilibrium.  The  fixed,  radical, 
distinction  between  the  external  and  the  internal  is  a  pro- 
duct of  intelligent  consciousness;  to  the  animal  mind, 
these  are  but  the  reciprocal  moments  of  its  life. 

23.  Logic  of  Environment  Implies  Consciousness. 
The  environment  thus  evolves  with  the  organism.  The 
evolution  of  the  externality  is  dependent  upon  and  coeval 
with  the  evolution  of  the  internality.  The  environment  as 
an  explanation  of  species  is  only  a  fragment  of  the  life- 


The   Biological  Situation   and  Interests  35 

story.  While  species  are  an  adaptation  to  their  environ- 
ment, it  is  equally  true  that  their  respective  environment 
is  an  adaptation  to  them  and  of  their  own  making.  If 
there  is  a  relative  passivity  in  adaptation,  it  is  to  be  reck- 
oned on  the  side  of  the  environment  rather  than  on  that 
of  the  ceaseless  activity  which  is  life.  "It  is  not  the 
action  of  the  environment  so  much  as  the  reaction  of  the 
plant  or  animal  against  its  environment,  which  interests 
us.  The  living  being  is  a  self-active  energy  persisting 
under  various  environments  and  manifesting  his  power 
by  modifying  his  environment  and  by  modifying  also  his 
own  organism  to  accomplish  his  work  better."  (Win.  T. 
Harris,  Hegel's  Logic,  p.  287).  The  action  and  re-action 
are  the  forces  expressive  of  the  mutual  synthesis  of  life 
and  its  conditions. 

24.  Environment  an  Evolution  Based  on  Interests.  The 
environment  as  contributing  to  organic  life  is  therefore  a 
self-construction  of  life,  a  precipitate  due  to  the  nature  of 
the  specific  instincts  that  are  involved.  The  surrounding 
world  grows  into  such  in  so  far  as  it  is  based  on  the  life- 
interests,  however  "subjectively"  unintelligible  they  may 
be,  of  the  organism  or  of  the  species.  Life  itself  is  the 
grand  end  that  dictates  its  interests;  and  pleasure  and 
pain,  in  the  non-existence  of  the  higher  mental  processes, 
must  give  the  clue  to  a  world  of  things,  or  interest-centers, 
introducing  even  qualitative  distinctions  in  the  variation 
of  their  intensity.  While  environments  are  interlaced  as 
indeed  species  themselves  are,  if  instinct-consciousness 
suddenly  should  receive  the  power  of  communication,  dis- 
tant species  would  have  as  many  inexplicable  things,  or 
words,  as  a  modern  tongue  which  has  to  be  rendered  into 


36  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

a  primitive  dialect.  The  world  of  nature,  then,  is  not  an 
invariable  datum  or  constant,  given  equally  at  every  stage 
of  life.  In  fact  the  very  notion  of  nature  is  a  reflection 
of  a  universalizing  and  poetical  intelligence.  It  represents 
the  completest  and  most  ideal  enlargement  of  man's  envir- 
onment. Its  final  limits  are  as  theoretical  as  those  of  in- 
vestigation or  of  human  knowledge. 

25.  Evolution  a  Monistic  Conception.  The  standpoint 
of  the  reciprocity  of  the  environment  is  a  revision  along 
the  lines  of  a  monistic  interpretation,  of  the  usual  dual- 
istic  conceptions  of  Evolution,  such  as  those  of  Spencer. 
The  latter  present  a  development  in  the  history  of  thought 
analogous  to  that  of  Cartesianism.  This  was  an  attempt 
at  an  unbiased  and  critical  re-construction  of  the  condi- 
tions of  knowledge.  Nevertheless,  while  its  method  was 
critical  and  cautious  with  doubt,  it  slipped  too  hastily 
into  the  ready-made  antithesis  of  mind  and  matter.  Its  in- 
herited attitude  was  in  truth,  uncritically  dualistic,  and, 
consequently,  it  could  not  solve  the  issues  it  had  raised, 
but  had  to  bequeath  to  philosophy,  the  problem  of  the 
psycho-physical  interaction.  The  evolutionary  reconstruc- 
tion similarly  began  by  cutting  the  essential  unity  and 
completeness  of  life  and  its  phases,  and  then  it  tried  to 
take  the  sum  of  the  parts.  It  pictured  a  given  environ- 
ment of  uniform  nature  which  it  then  attached  to  develop- 
ing life.  This  diremption  was  undoubtedly  necessary  for 
purposes  of  lucidity  in  order  to  clear  the  ground  and  estab- 
lish the  method  itself.  In  order  to  vindicate  the  univer- 
sality of  its  application,  the  procedure  had  to  be  rigidly 
exact,  even  if  its  strictly  scientific  methodology  turned  it 
over-much  towards  the  mechanical  and  the  external, 


The  Biological  Situation  and  Interests  37 

descriptive  aspect.     A  logic  founded  on  the  inwardness  of 
life  could  afford  to  wait. 

26.  Dualism,  Anthropomorphic;  Monism,  Biocentric. 
But  does  not  a  merely  descriptive  account  of  evolution 
miss  the  inward  intention  of  life?  Apparently  it  would 
seem  to  imply  an  anthropocentric  instead  of  a  purely 
biocentric  conception.  It  projects  our  humanistic  envir- 
onment into  all  life;  it  settles  the  earlier  forms  of  life  in 
much  too  developed  a  world — our  own  world  in  fact.  Do 
we  not,  thereby,  miss  the  real  intention  of  life?  The  very 
description  of  the  evolutionary  life-process  may  mean  the 
introduction  of  teleology  against  our  own  intent.  To 
say  that  life  passes  from  the  incoherent  to  the  coherent,  the 
indefinite  to  the  definite,  the  homogeneous  to  the  hetero-. 
geneous,  (Cf.  Herbert  Spencer,  First  Principles,  p.  351), 
is  to  argue  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  world  of  definitely 
coherent  heterogeneity.  It  is  the  standpoint  of  purpose 
on  a  flat  plane  of  environment.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
reciprocity  of  internal-external  at  any  stage  of  evolution, 
may  have  all  the  coherence,  definiteness,  and  heterogeneity 
that  life  demands  and  requires.  Life  is  not  seeking  to 
displace  the  amoeba  with  a  higher  group.  It  expresses 
itself  with  equal  success  in  all  the  organic  stages,  and  the 
maintenance  of  a  mutual  economy  of  organized  life  is 
the  perfect  success  which  sums  up  its  total  and  uniform 
successes.  The  reciprocal,  monistic  interpretation  of  evo- 
lution is  by  no  means  opposed  to  teleology.  But  instead 
of  imposing  a  teleology  based  on  the  externality  of  our 
own  environment  and  so  taking  environment  itself  out  of 
evolution,  it  allows  life  to  suggest  its  own  teleology.  Life 
dichotomizes  into  internal-external  and  utters  a  peculiar 


38  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

intention  in  all  the  environments  that  it  raises.  It  builds 
many  concentric  worlds  until,  somehow,  it  finally  attains 
the  world  of  self-consciousness  that  knowingly  encircles 
them  all.  (Cf.  Herman  H.  Home,  Idealism  in  Educa- 
tion, p.  3).  But  whether  lowest  or  highest,  it  is  a  real 
constructive  unity,  a  true  mutuality  of  inward  and  out- 
ward, of  self  and  not-self,  with  the  latter  bent  to  the  lines 
of  the  former.  At  last  in  the  self-consciousness  of  man, 
this  dichotomy  may  be  studied  as  the  me  and  the  not- 
me. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  RISE  OF  THE  THOUGHT-SITUATION  WITH  ITS  VALUES 

27.  Life-Processes  Become  Experience.  We  are  now 
ready  to  return  to  our  datum,  of  the  thought  situation  or 
experience.  The  latter  term  may  henceforth  be  used 
freely  because  it  now  receives  an  inward,  as  well  as  an 
outward  connotation.  The  biological  situation  in  every 
one  of  its  phases  may  be  termed  a  general  or  over-exper- 
ience related  to  life  itself  in  general.  (Cf.  §  3).  With  the 
fact  of  self-consciousness,  however,  the  internal  aspect  be- 
comes definitely  and  deliberately  constructive.  There  is  a 
self-regulation  of  experience  in  a  very  large  measure,  in- 
stead of  a  general  over- regulation.  Intelligent  judgment 
supersedes  instinct  and,  therefore,  values  take  the  place 
of  instinctive  interests.  It  is  true  that  the  latter  still  have 
their  large  place  as  part  of  the  biological  inheritance  and 
as  part  of  the  life-impulse  which  is,  by  no  means,  all  given 
over  to  intellection.  Nevertheless,  these  instinctive  inter- 
ests become  values  when  man  idealizes  them  by  justifying 
them  to  himself.  Man  reconstructs  his  own  not-me  or 
environment  as  a  reflection  of  himself,  in  the  mould  of 
his  mind.  The  world  is  ''himself  writ  large."  He  is  in 
his  world  as  its  biggest  component.  But  this  world  is  not 
one  of  pale  reflection  or  appearance.  It  is  a  living,  cease- 
lessly active  world,  pulsating  with  the  life  and  thought 
that  are  in  man.  Its  objectivity  is  given  in  experience  and 
not  as  a  thing-in-itself  outside  experience.  Objectivity  and 

39 


40  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

subjectivity  still  follow  the  analogy  of  environment  and 
organism,  of  external-internal,  and  are  reciprocal  moments 
of  experience  and  not  the  thing  and  its  photographic  copy. 
In  fact,  there  are  no  two  opposed  mediums  of  physical 
and  psychical  to  raise  an  insurmountable  objection  to  the 
action  of  the  photographic  process  that  requires  both  orig- 
inal and  copy  to  occupy  the  same  atmospheric  medium. 
Such  a  dualism  would  place  the  point  of  departure  of  the 
argument  in  a  ready-made  intellectual,  moral,  and  social 
world.  It  would  be  descriptive  of  psychological  processes 
rather  than  of  the  fundamental  process  of  an  experiential 
logic.  It  is  the  method  of  monistic  construction  illustrated 
in  the  biological  process  and  in  the  reciprocal  evolution  of 
externality  or  environment,  that  such  a  logic  will  reveal. 
It  will  be  "an  account  of  the  various  typical  functions  or 
situations  of  experience  in  their  determining  relations  to 
one  another."  (John  Dewey,  Studies  in  Logical  Theory, 

p.  19). 

28.  In  Self-Consciousness  Instinct  Becomes  Intelli- 
gence. Experience  is,  then,  genetically  the  emergence  of 
the  life-process  into  a  situation  of  self-consciousness.  How 
that  comes  about, — whether  in  an  intelligible,  constitutive, 
thought-world  that  precipitates  experience  in  order  to  ob- 
jectify and  realize  itself ;  or  whether  in  a  clash  of  a  men- 
tal thing-in-itself  with  a  non-mental  thing-in-itself ;  or 
whether  as  an  evolutionary  psychic  ascent  occurring  ab- 
ruptly, or  occurring  in  a  direct,  uninterrupted  series,— 
does  not  concern  our  investigation  because  we  are  dealing 
with  the  logical  situation  in  actu.  Life  still  expresses 
itself  in  activity.  But  this  activity  is  no  longer  an  over- 
experience,  a  general  will-to-live.  It  has  become  a  self- 


The  Rise  of  Thought-Situation  with  its  Values     41 

will,  self-directed  by  an  ego.  Instinct  is,  on  the  whole, 
displaced  by  intelligence,  so  that  experience  may  be  viewed 
as  intellectualized  will,  or  energized  intellect.  (Cf.  Chas. 
G.  Shaw,  The  Ego  and  its  Place  in  the  World,  p.  289). 
The  mutuality  of  inward-outward  which  constitutes  ex- 
perience now  discovers  that  the  life  which  is  at  the  in- 
tersection of  these  axes  of  co-ordination  has  bloomed  forth 
from  an  impersonal  center  of  reference  into  a  "me."  At 
the  same  time,  the  direct,  instinctive,  and  invariable  re- 
action produced  by  sentiency  has  been  transformed  into  an 
indirect  and  mostly  reflective  process.  The  antithesis  of 
pleasure  and  pain  is  now  an  indefinitely  varied  feeling- 
tone  in  a  gamut  of  emotions.  The  life-process,  having 
turned  upon  itself,  realizing  its  own  workings,  apprehend- 
ing its  own  ends,  is  now  an  intellectual  faculty  of  idealiz- 
ing and  relating.  The  ideal  content  is  first:  the  rough 
unorganized  stuff  of  intellectual  experience,  of  personal 
environment.  Thereupon  there  must  follow  in  a  logical 
succession,  judgments  of  simultaneity,  succession,  and  an- 
ticipation, and  time-forms  are  the  result.  Substantives 
joined  to  predicates  by  temporally  variable  copulas,  now 
rise  to  form  an  experience-content.  Bergson  contrasts 
homo  sapiens  with  homo  faber  and  emphasizing  the  latter 
makes  intelligence  the  tool-making  function,  "the  faculty 
of  manufacturing  artificial  objects,  especially  tools  to 
make  tools."  (Creative  Evolution,  tr.  Mitchell,  p.  139). 
But  is  not  the  homo  faber  really  the  instrumentality  of  the 
homo  sapiens?  The  tool,  though  it  may  be  experiment- 
ally evolved,  is  an  actualized  ideal,  a  realization  of  a  de- 
siderated function.  The  desideration  itself  points  to  an 
idealized  end. 


42  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

29.  The  Reciprocal  Genesis  of  the  Elements  of  the 
Thought-Situation.  However,  in  all  this  far  cry  up  to 
intelligent  experience,  the  skeleton-form  of  the  biological 
situation  still  holds.  In  this,  the  highest  phase,  that  of 
logical  judgments,  as  in  all  the  other  phases  of  life  that 
conception  cannot  reproduce  point  by  point,  there  is  no 
world  of  objects  that  is  given  to  be  copied  or  duplicated 
in  experience.  If  experience  is  photographic,  it  is  repro- 
ductive of  its  past  situations,  but  not  of  objects  outside 
itself.  Its  world  of  objects  is  given  in  the  environment 
that  it  finds  in  the  reciprocity  of  internal-external  and 
which  now  comes  as  a  series  of  logical  judgments.  Each 
and  every  object  is  a  center  of  interest  or  at  least  has  a 
genetic  interest-character.  The  equilibration  of  conflict 
in  the  harmonization  that  is  constructive  of  things  is  a 
process  of  ideation.  The  temporalistic  form  makes  pos- 
sible a  present,  or  ideal  beginning,  and  an  invariable  suc- 
cession. It  thus  gives  fixation  to  the  point.  (Cf.  Chas. 
C.  Everett,  Fichte's  Science  of  Knowledge,  pp.  22yff., 
231).  The  sensuous  judgment,  which  is  the  material  of 
experience  (a  genetic  inheritance  of  the  race  sunk  in  the 
sub-conscious,  therefore  apparently  passive  and  automat- 
ic) immediately  adds  the  spatial  point  to  the  temporal 
point.  A  series  of  spatial  points  thus  is  initiated.  The 
temporal  line — before  and  after — yields  the  spatial  line 
which  is  just  as  well  "before  and  after."  Spatiality  pro- 
ceeds to  planes  or  surfaces  in  the  mutual  intersection  of 
lines,  and  to  solidity  in  the  mutual  intersection  of  planes. 
The  psychologist  may  demur  and  claim  that  this  process 
refers  only  to  a  perceptual  copying  by  a  gradual  filling-in 
of  dots  and  lines.  But  the  logic  of  the  genesis  of  experi- 


The  Rise  of  Thought-Situation  with  its  Values     43 

ence  does  not  know  of  life's  having  to  go  outside  of  itself 
to  the  purely  and  unrelatedly  physical,  in  order  to  for- 
mulate itself.  The  percept,  as  such,  is  only  an  individual- 
ized point  of  reference.  It  is  a  conceptual  world,  per- 
fectly uniform  for  purposes  of  intercommunication  and 
action,  that  the  race  possesses.  If  a  material  world  is  in- 
sisted upon,  it  is  more  in  line  with  the  evolution  of  the 
environment,  to  explain  it  as  life  turning  outward  (des- 
cribing matter  in  terms  of  mind)  rather  than  as  an  un- 
knowable with  a  mysterious  affinity  for  consciousness.  Ob- 
jectivity is  the  obverse  side  of  subjectivity.  Both  are  the 
reciprocal  moments  of  equilibration  that  has  now  attained 
intellectuality.  Objectivity  is  the  product  of  the  move- 
ment of  judgment  as  the  latter  is  vitalized  by  the  inter- 
ests of  its  conceptual  environment.  It  is  the  reciprocity 
of  experience.  It  is  construction  or  creation,  rather  than 
reproduction.  As  ideational  and  conceptual,  it  is  true 
self-creation. 

30.  Experience  Constructed  of  Things  and  Relations. 
Experience  is  made  of  typical  situations  that  eventuate 
in  a  geometrically  progressive  environment  of  things  or 
objects  and  of  relations  among  things  constituting  laws  or 
principles,  and,  lastly,  of  tentative  judgments  that  serve  as 
an  experimental  introduction  or  as  a  temporary  scaffold- 
ing to  the  completed  product.  Relations,  however,  do 
not  arise  between  static  ready-made  things  which  antici- 
pate relations;  the  thing  as  intelligible  in  experience  is 
rather  in  itself  an  equilibrium  of  relations.  They  are  not 
mentality  spinning  itself  out  of  itself,  but  they  include  in 
the  conjunction  in  which  they  are  spelled  out,  the  logical 
apprehension  of  conscious  intellect  and  the  non-mental 


44  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

activities  which  form  the  raw  material  of  the  universal 
environment.  Things  are  the  mutual  arrest  of  forces 
which  have  assumed  spatiality,  a  conjunctive  balancing  in 
the  ceaseless  activity  of  the  me  and  the  not-me.  Hypo- 
thesis and  law  both  refer  to  the  real  action  of  forces  in 
relation,  the  former  to  the  investigatory  stage,  the  latter 
to  the  verification  illustrated  in  actual  conjunction. 
Things,  laws,  hypotheses,  are  equally  real,  equally  objec- 
tive ;  although  the  reality  of  the  last,  being  of  an  adjunc- 
tive  character,  is  by  its  nature  temporary.  So  that  there 
is  not  in  things  any  backward  limit  of  relations  or  judg- 
ments, but  experience  is  constituted  of  judgments.  Reality 
is  not  man-made ;  it  is  evolutionary  in  life,  but  its  formu- 
lation is  humanistic.  Man's  environment  is  the  real  and 
truth  is  in  relation  to  his  criterion  of  thought. 

31.  The  Thought-Situation  Like  a  Wave.  The 
thought-situation  may  be  compared  to  a  wave  that  rises 
and  falls  because  of  the  blowing  of  the  wind.  There  is  in 
the  sea  a  motor  cause  that  makes  it  rise  above  the  surface 
current  and  then  sink  back  within  it  again.  The  cause 
or  solicitation  of  the  thought-situation,  however,  is  within 
itself.  "The  nature  of  thought-activity  is  correlative  with 
thought-content  from  the  standpoint  of  their  generating 
conditions  in  the  movement  of  experience."  (John  Dewey, 
Studies  in  Logical  Theory,  p.  70).  It  both  incites  itself 
and  controls  its  own  movement ;  if  there  is  a  division  of 
cause  and  development,  and  resultant  or  effect,  it  is  a 
purely  theoretical  differentiation  of  mutually  dependent 
aspects  or  moments  of  realization.  The  cause  of  thought- 
movement  is  an  end  that  must  be  harmonized  with  the 
rest  of  experience,  which  is  always  forward-looking.  But 


The  Rise  of  Thought-Situation  with  its  Values     45 

that  end  in  the  act  of  realizing  itself  is  also  the  movement, 
and  in  the  completed  realization  it  is  the  effect  or  object 
of  the  thought-situation.  (Cf.  Ibid.  pp.  61,  81).  Every 
experience  is  thus  a  "deed-thought,"  conduct  that  is  idea- 
tional  or  cognition  that  is  volitional.  The  end  as  the 
motive  at  both  termini  has  passed  from  an  interest  that 
was  potential  to  one  that  is  now  actualized  in  a  thought- 
complex  of  intellect  and  feeling  and  firmly  framed  in  the 
rest  of  experience.  There  has  been  a  process  of  unifica- 
tion. It  is  a  true  thought-situation,  because  unlike  the 
instinctive  biological  situation  which  reacts  passively  to 
the  ends  of  a  vital  over-experience,  it  has  selected  its  end 
from  a  context  of  thought  or  ideas  and  actively  extended 
that  context.  This  context  is  not  the  environment  of 
instinct,  but  the  broad  intellectual  environment  whose 
theoretical  limit  is  the  totality  of  experience.  The  end 
has  been  operative  throughout;  first  it  directed  the  atten- 
tion and  then  it  was  selective  of  the  apperceptional  group ; 
finally  it  was  self-resolved  as  a  problem  of  experience  in 
equilibration  with  the  general  continuity  of  experience. 
The  end  has  had  the  activistic  significance  of  an  aim  that 
must  be  satisfied.  The  satisfaction  was  that  of  a  conscious 
life-interest  in  direct  personal  experience ;  it  was  an  intel- 
lectual satisfaction  with  an  under-current  of  emotion.  Pro- 
gressing in  experience,  the  intellectual  sea  of  environment 
has  a  shore  line  which  is  constantly  shifting  with  the 
waves  of  the  thought-situation  and  giving  place  to  other 
lines  more  inland. 

32.  Every  Situation  Co-ordinated  by  Ends  Plus  Values. 
The  end  has  been  described  as  the  motive  or  energizing 
force  of  consciousness,  of  subjectivity-in-objectivity.  It 


46  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

exhibits  itself  likewise  as  the  instrumentality  of  the 
thought-movement.  In  the  latter  phase,  life  is  ever  re- 
vealing its  character  of  activity.  The  activity  is  reflective, 
deliberative, — a  process  of  judgment.  Now  the  end  as 
instrumentality,  as  a  process  of  self-evolution  in  reference 
to  the  reciprocity  of  its  environment,  is  the  self-evolution 
of  truth  in  relation  to  experience.  (Cf.  Wm.  James, 
Pragmatism,  p.  202).  It  gives  us  the  world  of  relation. 
But  considered  as  the  end  per  se,  as  a  life-interest  that  has 
become  conscious  of  itself,  as  the  idealized  effect  that  is 
the  cause  of  the  thought-movement,  it  is  value.  The 
value-element  points  to  the  self-anticipation,  to  the  isola- 
tion of  the  ideal  and  the  intro-energizing  of  intellectual 
forces.  But  it  can  take  its  place  in  the  world  of  worth 
only  if  actualized  in  a  co-ordination  of  relations.  These 
in  their  turn,  bring  about  the-  completed  value.  Thus 
the  end  is  both  value  and  relation,  depending  upon  whether 
experience  is  regarded  from  the  point  of  view  of  its  ideal 
aims  or  its  working-tools.  Intelligence  as  the  tool-making 
capacity  that  builds  relations,  must  follow  from  intelli- 
gence as  the  isolation  and  differentiation  of  aims.  In  fine, 
the  world  of  truths  is  founded  upon  and  is  energized  by 
the  world  of  values.  Relation  and  worth  are  the  two  fac- 
tors that  co-ordinate  every  situation.  They  are  the  land- 
marks by  which  intelligence  knows  that  is  traveling  along 
the  path  of  the  reciprocal,  inward-outward  environment. 
33.  Instinct  Knows  Interests  but  not  Values.  The 
reverse  characterization  of  the  merely  instinctive  situation 
follows  as  a  corollary.  The  fact  of  isolation  is  concep- 
tual. Therefore,  when  only  instinct  energizes,  there  is 
no  value-element  and  consequently  no  world  of  relations. 


The  Rise  of  Thought-Situation  with  its  Values     47 

The  simple  life-situation  idealizes  no  end  and  so  it  reaches 
neither  worth  nor  truth.  Value  is  of  an  ideal  structure 
and  is  conceivable  only  by  the  operation  of  intelligence. 


CHAPTER  IV 

VALUATION   AND   ITS   CONDITIONS 

34.  What  is  Value?     Value  has  been  shown  as  the  end 
in  thought,  as  the  chief  contributor  to  the  dynamism  of 
thinking.     Now  it  may  be  asked:     What  is  the  end  typ- 
ically? or  in  other  words:     What  is  value?    It  is  an  ideal, 
created  by  cognition;    it  is  motor,  actualized  by  will;    it 
is  need  or  desire,  energized  by  feeling.     It  is  thus  a  com- 
plex of  idealized  desire.      'The  value  of  a  thing  is  in  its 
desirability."      (Chas.  G.  Shaw,  The  Value  and  Dignity 
of  Human  Life,  p.  324).     A  worth  is  objective-subjec- 
tive, a  reciprocity,  a  mutuality  of  reference  in  experience. 
In  its  essence  it  is  an  inner  self-retroactive  realization. 
While  it  belongs  indefeasibly  to  the  thought-situation  as  a 
whole,  it  emphasizes  the  reaction  to  experience  rather  than 
the  action  of  experience.    Since  it  belongs  to  the  context  of 
experience,  it  cannot  escape  the  sphere  of  relations,  and  so 
certain  objects  of  the  all-inclusive  relational  world  may  be 
grouped   as  having  values  in  and   for  themselves.     But 
these  do  not  anticipate  experience  or  desirability  with  an 
irreducible  value  element,  any  more  than  things  anticipate 
relations.     The  world  of  worth  arises  with  thought  or 
experience. 

35.  How  Value  Differs  from  Sentient  Interests.     How 
does  idealized  desire  differ  from  the  sentiency  of  pleasure 
and  pain?     It  is  related  to  sentiency,  but  the  intellectual 
capacity  of  idealization  is  constructive  of  an  infinitely  un- 
limited environment,  both  individual  and  social.     There- 

48 


Valuation  and  its  Conditions  49 

fore,  sentiency  must  make  room  for  feeling  that  is  in- 
finitely variable;    it  must  give  way  to  creative  emotion. 
Satisfaction  in  view  of   ideal  desires  may  be  a  reversal 
of  the  verdict  of  the  biological  "yes"  or  "no,"  and  pleas- 
ure may  be  idealized  into  happiness  and  joy.     Pleasure 
and  pain  act  with  an  invariable,  jerky,  mechanical,  re- 
sponse, and  are  capable  at  best  of  building  up  a  presenta- 
tive  world,  an  environment  of  immediate  and  simple  inter- 
ests.    With  intellectuality,  a  tremendously  unique,  incom- 
parable, environment,  has  made  its  appearance.     Here  is 
re-presentation  that  refuses  to  be  bound.To  limit  that  en- 
vironment is  so  self-contradictory,  that  the  very  thought 
of  limitation  becomes  a  relation  of  extension.     The  bio- 
logical situation  is  strictly  circumscribed  by  the  limited 
vital   demands    of    instinct.     The    humanistic   world    of 
worths  is  as  infinite  as  its  temporal  and  spatial  forms  and 
as  the   rational  apprehension  of  the  universe  that  may 
extend  to  the  non-empirical  or  transcendental.     In  this 
•  re-presentation  that  refuses  to  acknowledge  any  limitation, 
there  is  indeed  desire  urging  towards  evident  interest,  but 
it  is  not  the  primitive  urging  of  pleasure  and  pain.    The 
interest  is  such  that  it  can  achieve  satisfaction  only  in  the 
realization  of  an  end  or  dynamic  value  that  is  properly 
and  ideally  fixed  in  the  larger  conceptual  environment. 
The  valuation  process  is  the  adjustive  adaptation  of  the  in- 
finitely extended  environment  of  self-consciousness.     It  is 
a  reciprocal  product  of  man  and  his  world.     "It  is  a  rela- 
tion between  subject  and  object  rather  than  a  character- 
istic function  of  the  object  itself."     (Chas.  G.  Shaw,  The 
Value  and  Dignity  of  Human  Life,  p.  324).     In  a  word, 
the  idealized  desire  is  as  different  from  pleasure  and  pain 


5O  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

as  the  ideal  ends  that  constitute  the  warp  and  the  woof 
of  the  humanistic  self-made  or  poetical  world,  exceed  the 
simple,  primitive,  demands  of  instinctive  life. 

36.  History  Advances  by  Ideal  Ends.  The  hedonistic 
school  in  ethics  in  attempting  to  erect  pleasure  as  the  uni- 
versal standard  has  failed  to  appreciate  the  impassible  gulf 
between  biology  and  history — between  life  as  such  and  life 
that  has  attained  to  culture.  Both  Spencer,  the  biological 
utilitarian,  and  J.  S.  Mill,  the  economic  utilitarian,  have 
overlooked  the  evolution  of  the  environment  itself,  from 
perceptual  to  conceptual.  In  transferring  the  standards  of 
the  former  to  the  latter,  the  utilitarian  is  forced  against 
his  will  to  give  them  an  ideal  transformation.  Pleasure 
becomes  "utility"  or  "greatest  good"  or  "the  general 
good," — all  of  which  are  aims  ideal  and  remote.  Even 
the  introduction  of  a  qualitative  distinction  among  pleas- 
ures, means  idealization  and  remoteness.  The  ideal  envir- 
onment is  thus  acknowledged  perforce,  but  the  utilitarian 
fails  to  realize  the  unique  import  of  man  in  his  new  envir- 
onment. He  still  hedges  him  in  with  the  primal  sensuous 
limitation,  refusing  to  allow  him  any  freedom  except  such 
as  he  might  have  by  analogy  with  the  perceptual  experi- 
ence of  the  original  life-situation.  Intellect  is,  then,  only 
a  refinement  of  instinct,  powerless  to  improvise.  The 
dynamism  of  sentiency  would  constrain  development  along 
the  lines  of  ready-made  values,  allowing  intelligence  only 
its  instrumental  character,  but  destroying  any  ambitions 
towards  self-expression  in  the  choice  of  ends.  Such  a 
world  would  condemn  as  merely  ornamental,  if  not  as  use- 
less baggage,  most  of  those  sentiments  that  we  consider 
inseparable  from  our  real  selves.  Intelligence  might  well 


Valuation  and  its  Conditions  51 

bemoan  such  iron-bound  helplessness,  and  realizing  the 
abjectness  of  its  innate  servitude,  might  decide  to  renounce 
itself.  Such  is,  indeed,  the  upshot  of  an  intellect  that  is 
self-deceived  in  the  service  of  an  irrational  will-to-live,  in 
the  pessimistic  system  of  Schopenhauer.  But  the  change 
from  biology  to  history  whose  import  the  utilitarian  has 
failed  to  grasp,  consists  exactly  in  free  self-creations,  in 
unforseeable  improvisations  of  intelligence.  It  is  the  pure- 
ly biological  state  that  "repeats  itself,"  not  the  historical. 
Biology  needs  only  to  utilize  its  faculty  of  instinct  which 
meets  every  situation  with  instruments  already  organized. 
History  requires  "the  faculty  of  making  and  using  unor- 
ganized instruments,"  (Bergson,  Creative  Evolution,  tr. 
Mitchell,  p.  140),  which  is  intelligence.  For  there  has 
been  a  change  from  the  dynamism  of  sentiency  to  that  of 
idealized  desire  or  value,  which  is  big  enough  to  occupy 
and  organize  the  ideal  environment.  History  does  not 
repeat  itself,  but  is  the  free  development  of  experience. 
It  is  thought-content,  where  value  is  logically  constructive. 
Sentiency,  then,  is  biology,  but  history  requires  valuation. 
37.  The  Contradiction  of  non-Intrinsic  Values.  But 
it  may  very  properly  be  objected  that  valuation  as  an  iso- 
lating activity  aiming  at  harmonization  in  a  progressive 
contexture  of  thought-situations  is  a  mere  intellectual  see- 
saw. The  isolation  of  an  end  may  mean  nothing  else  than 
a  pretext  of  instinctive  life  determined  on  an  equilibra- 
tion that  now  requires  intelligence  in  order  to  "organize  a 
machine."  Value,  then,  may  be  nothing  more  than  another 
kind  of  relation,  and  its  localization  and  functioning  at  the 
termini  of  the  thought-situation,  nothing  more  than  acci- 
dental. The  resolution  of  the  thought-situation  would 


52  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

completely  dissipate  value  as  value,  and  the  residuum 
would  be  a  relation  purely  and  strictly  formal,  capable  of 
instrumental  functioning,  but  in  no  sense  deliberately  and 
qualitatively  discriminated  as  an  ideal  aim.  The  dynamic 
ideal  interests  fixed  in  the  orbit  of  a  restless  constellation 
that  is  unceasingly  enlarging  its  path  of  revolution,  appar- 
ently prove  to  be  an  illusion.  Then  with  self-conscious^ 
ness,  as  with  the  entire  panorama  of  life,  there  is  only  co- 
adjutive  adaptation  to  the  forces  of  the  environment  that 
life  may  continue.  Only  instead  of  instinctive  activity 
incited  blindly  in  its  individual  manifestations  and  tending 
towards  a  kind  of  over-experience,  here  the  complexity 
of  problems  forces  to  intelligence.  (It  might  indeed  be 
pointed  out  that  this  very  complexity  is  already  condi- 
tioned by  an  intelligence  that  is  reciprocally  creative  of  its 
environment,  but  the  formal  biological  logician  does  not 
see  any  abrupt  leap  or  change  in  the  evolution  of  the  envir- 
onment). Organized  machines  must  be  manufactured, 
tools  must  be  improvised  and  intelligence  obligingly  steps 
in  to  do  the  work.  But  it  modestly  follows  the  "vital  im- 
petus," contenting  itself  with  the  humble  role  of  instru- 
ment, uncomplainingly  drudging  to  solve  problems  that 
are  handed  down  to  it,  ready-made.  (Cf.  Bergson,  Cre- 
ative Evolution,  tr.  Mitchell,  pp.  52,  87,  145).  Although 
there  is  reciprocity,  and  the  environment  is  an  externality- 
internality  being  full  of  machines  originally  unorganized 
that  the  intelligence  has  assembled  and  organized,  and  thus 
being  dependent  upon  the  intellect  for  its  progress,  never- 
theless the  adaptation  as  in  the  purely  biological  situation 
is  essentially  a  passive  one.  For  intellect,  as  such,  has 
stepped  in  only  where  the  original  vital  activity  has  been 


Valuation  and  its  Conditions  53 

blocked.  "Representation  is  stopped  up  by  action." 
(Bergson,  Creative  Evolution,  tr.  Mitchell,  p.  144).  It 
is  so  to  say,  "plugged  activity."  So  long  as  its  object  or  aim 
is  given  to  it  by  something  else,  self-consciousness  reflects 
something  else.  Its  isolation  of  value  is  self-deceiving,  for 
it  has  had  no  autonomous  choice  in  the  preference.  It 
steps  back  into  the  place  of  an  observer  of  experience  or 
at  most,  into  that  of  a  laboratory  assistant  of  experience. 
There  may  be  creation,  but  there  is  no  self-creation.  The 
reciprocal  environment,  despite  its  indefinite  ideal  exten- 
sion, is  still  the  instinctively  limited,  determined,  inward- 
outward.  There  is  no  difference,  except  as  to  exactness  of 
process  on  the  one  hand,  and  clarity  and  control  of  pro- 
cedure on  the  other,  between  instinct  and  intelligence. 
The  former  may  be  said  to  act  with  objective  intelligence; 
the  latter  is  unable  to  impose  any  original  demands  of  its 
own.  Its  values  are  not  really  subjective-objective,  but  as 
far  as  its  preferences  are  concerned,  all  are  equally  and 
uniformly  objective.  The  objection  is  thus  fully  sustained 
that  we  do  not  explain  the  self-reflection  and  self-crea- 
tiveness  of  man's  world  as  building  up  a  perfect  and  abso- 
lutely evolving  environment;  that  we  do  not  account 
for  the  ideally  enmeshing  thought-situation,  by  a  system 
of  values  that  turn  out  to  be  only  momentarily  specialized 
relations. 

38.  Self-Conscious  Evolution  Demands  Self-Selected 
Values.  In  the  attainment  of  intellect,  the  evolutionary 
reciprocity  of  life  and  environment  has  finally  turned  upon 
itself,  and  become  intro-active.  (Cf.  Herman  H.  Home, 
Idealism  in  Education,  p.  3).  Its  operations  indicate  that 
life  has  now,  in  some  measure,  become  the  active  arbiter 


54  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

of  its  environment,  by  means  of  conscious,  free,  idealizing, 
activity.  Life,  at  last,  has  developed  the  over-balancing 
differential  of  activity  over  passivity  that  completes  its 
evolutionary  independence.  It  has  liberated  itself,  thereby 
finding  itself  in  its  fully  developing  environment.  Life's 
movements  now  require  intellect  that  is  not  only  clarify- 
ing and  controlling  and  guiding,  but  initiating  and  creat- 
ing as  well.  Fully  developed  life  is  not  sundered,  like 
a  helpless  slave,  from  its  own  self-initiated  ends.  So  that 
the  life  that  has  reached  intellect  by  no  means  has  attain- 
ed its  rightful  stature  in  a  valuation-process  that  is  con- 
fined to  the  psychological  or  the  formally  logical.  An 
intellect  of  the  latter  kind  would  really  be  futile,  working 
on  the  dead  level  of  a  monotonous  horizontal  value-plane. 
It  should  not  properly  be  called  philosophic,  for  philosophy 
interests  itself  in  goals  and  totalities  and  qualitative  inter- 
pretations of  experience.  But  if  it  were  philosophic,  it 
might  soon  discover  the  necessity  of  renunciation  in  the 
darkness  of  a  world  of  fate. 

39.  Intelligence  Must  Set  its  Problems  as  Well  as 
Solve  Them.  It  is  evident  that  valuation  must  receive  a 
qualitative  aspect  before  man  really  can  come  into  his 
world.  No  evenly-balanced,  objectively  progressive  val- 
ue-serial will  account  for  the  evolution  of  his  ideal  en- 
vironment. The  life-interest  as  it  manifests  itself  in  in- 
tellection, is  more  than  ideally  representative ;  it  is  ideally 
constructive.  It  is  framed  in  its  environment,  which  is 
its  ever-changing,  developing  experience,  for,  indeed,  life 
never  goes  out  of  its  respective  environment  to  discover 
the  ends  of  its  activity.  The  fundamental  and  radical 
distinction  between  the  course  of  instinctive  environment 


Valuation  and  its  Conditions  55 

and  that  of  intelligent  environment  is  just  this:  the 
former  has  a  single  set  of  problems;  and  the  latter,  a 
double  or  complete  set  of  problems.  The  single  set  con- 
sists of  problems  of  instrumentality,  of  means  to  realize 
given  ends.  The  complete  set  consists  of  problems  of 
ends  as  well  as  of  means.  Intelligence  not  only  solves 
problems,  but  it  solves  its  own.  It  places  them.  For 
the  ideal  environment  to  develop  in  its  complete  evolu- 
tion, as  unlimited  as  thinking  itself,  it  is  necessary  that 
self-consciousness  should  possess  a  degree  of  freedom  or 
autonomy.  There  would  be  no  conscious  reciprocity  if 
ideal  preferences  were  impossible,  if  intellect  did  not  func- 
tion with  some  will  of  its  own.  Value  as  dynamic  must 
be  "a  relation  between  subject  and  object  rather  than  a 
characteristic  function  of  the  object  itself."  (Chas.  G. 
Shaw,  The  Value  and  Dignity  of  Human  Life,  p.  324). 
The  coefficient  of  qualification  must  develop  in  a  conscious, 
creative,  experience.  Value  is  idealized  desire,  throbbing 
with  the  force  of  self.  Finally,  it  is  in  the  varied  activity 
made  possible  by  ideal  values  indefinitely  diversified,  that 
the  evolutionary  process  attains  its  aim  of  a  completely 
developed  and  completely  corresponding  intensive  and 
extensive  development. 

40.  The  Adjustment  of  Intelligence  to  its  Reciprocal 
Environment.  Thus  the  continuum  of  a  truly  humanistic 
experience  could  not  possibly  come  about  on  the  basis  of 
purely  formal  values,  which,  indeed,  are  mere  relations. 
Life  is  purposive  activity  focusing  on  the  adjustment  and 
re-adjustment  of  the  reciprocal  environment.  The  intel- 
lectual adjustment  is  an  adaptation  with  reference  to  ends 
that  are  ideal.  But  the  logical  values  are  differentiated 


56  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

among  themselves  according  to  a  qualitative  gradation; 
qualitative  distinctions  are  simultaneously  introduced  into 
the  circle  of  relations  in  order  to  function  in  the  develop- 
ing inward-outward  world.  For  man  constructs  his  recip- 
rocal environment  in  order  that  he  may  live  in  it.  He 
forms  an  environment  of  ideal  aims  and  he  lives  at  all 
times  in  the  company  of  his  ideals.  The  equilibration  of 
ends  in  the  thought-situation  is  something  more  than  log- 
ical see-saw.  It  is  not  alone  the  intellect  serving  and 
enlightening  itself  in  an  act  of  clarification;  it  is  also 
ideal  satisfaction,  the  intellect  serving  the  will  that  has 
selected  the  end.  The  interest  in  the  end  is  more  impor- 
tant and  more  permanent  than  a  simple  logical  resolution 
of  judgments.  The  simplest  value  is  not  only  an  "ideal," 
but  it  is  a  "desire"  having  its  roots  deep  in  the  experiental 
complex  of  deed-thoughts.  The  merely  formal  value 
would  not  function  because  it  could  not  attract  attention 
to  itself  and  create  a  situation  except  by  an  act  of  will  also, 
which  then  gives  it  a  subjective-objective  significance. 

41.  Ideals  Become  Permanent  Qualitative  Values. 
Values  therefore  possess  a  graded  internal  significance  for 
self-conscious  life;  they  are  at  once  ideally  isolable,  they 
possess  an  ideal  meaning-in-itself  as  the  permanent  resi- 
duum of  previous  experience.  The  judgment  of  value 
having  once  been  made,  a  subjective  attitude  is  immedi- 
ately fixed  in  consciousness.  This  attitude  is  equivalent 
to  a  qualitative  apprehension.  While  it  is  not  implied  that 
the  original  judgment  is  permanent  or  absolute,  the 
attitude  that  has  been  established  functions  in  a  fixed  way. 
It  does  mean  a  characteristic  subjective-objective  relation- 
ship in  experience.  It  has  furnished  a  mould  in  which 


Valuation  and  its  Conditions  57 

t 

future  thought  activity  is  cast.  An  association  has  been 
established  that  has  its  roots  deep  down  in  the  self-adap- 
tive movements  of  life,  now  going  on  in  the  form  of  self- 
consciousness.  The  association  is  not  in  itself  directly  pro- 
ductive of  formal  reconstruction  of  experience — that  is 
the  work  of  intelligence  handling  and  rearranging  its 
relational  groups.  But  while  life  has  been  clothed  with 
intellect  and  moves  with  insight  among  its  relations,  the 
subjective-objective  attitude  theoretically  tied  to  a  rela- 
tion, becomes  a  definite  value  existing  independently  in  a 
qualitative  grouping.  A  value,  variable  qualitatively  ac- 
cording to  quantitative  extension  of  experience,  but  never 
abnegating  its  independent  constancy,  has  been  evolved  as 
a  tentative  end.  This  end  is  the  motive-power  of  the 
thought-situation  functioning  both  as  generating  antece- 
dent and  selfward-director.  Evolution  now  having  turn- 
ed upon  itself,  and  consciousness  being  both  the  actor  and 
the  mould  of  activity  in  the  subjective-objective  reciprocal 
construction  of  its  environment,  the  end  functions  as  a 
self-urged  impulse.  Viewed  as  motive-power,  it  devel- 
ops as  a  multiple  of  intelligence  in  the  acts  of  will,  in  other 
words,  as  a  motive.  Thus  value  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  intension  of  experience  is  a  motive  really  express- 
ing intention  or  autonomy.  From  the  point  of  view  of 
extension,  it  is  a  dynamism  energizing  the  movement  of 
the  thought-situation.  Experience,  must  also  formulate 
itself  as  at  least  two-dimensional,  vertical-horizontal,  qual- 
itative-quantitative, value-relational. 

42.  The  Thought-Situation  is  the  Interplay  of  Value 
and  Relation.  The  thought-situation  is  then  the  inter- 
play of  value  and  relation  and  this  also  is  the  continuous 


58  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

resolution  of  the  thought-situation  in  the  harmonizations 
producing  experience.  The  will  acts  with  the  intellect 
in  organizing  the  thought-situation  and  articulating  the 
ends  of  life  in  a  significantly  deepening  ideal  environment. 
Value  has  been  the  stone  that  has  cast  itself  into  the 
water;  and  relations,  the  resulting  concentric  ripples.  But 
the  stone  being  self-active,  instead  of  sinking  has  swished 
the  water  into  a  vortex.  The  vortex  retains  its  self-impul- 
sion and  its  form,  but  its  content  is  ever  changing.  So  life 
in  intellectu  acts  freely  and  intelligently  according  to  its 
attitude  of  subjective  preferences  or  motives.  Its  method 
is  activity  by  processes  of  idealization,  and  so  it  utilizes 
and  metamorphoses  its  tentative  ends  in  a  duplication  and 
reduplication  of  experience.  While  the  tentative  means 
will  always  be  tentative,  that  is,  experimental  and  secon- 
dary, expanding  or  contracting  the  tentative  end,  the  lat- 
ter always  retains  its  independent  integrity  as  an  experi- 
ence-vortex. The  value-making  process  of  isolation  hav- 
ing by  an  act  of  will  corresponding  to  intelligent  enlight- 
enment established  an  action-mould,  functions  thereafter 
in  the  thought-situation  as  valuation  of  values  and  recon- 
structive, unifying  organization  of  relations.  The  former 
is  the  generating,  the  departure,  the  movement ;  the  latter 
is  the  intellectualizing  of  the  will.  So  that  the  thought- 
situation  is  not  only  a  judgment  of  quantitative  structural 
relations,  a  procedure  of  formal  logic,  but  also  at  the  same 
time  a  judgment  of  the  qualitative  value  of  the  effected 
equilibration.  Qualitative  value  has  saved  it  from  being 
a  logical  see-saw.  Successive  thought-situations  are  ser- 
ially grouped  in  the  evolution  of  the  ideal  reciprocal  en- 
vironment by  functioning  as  clarifications  of  value;  the 


Valuation  and  its  Conditions  59 

relations  as  they  are  formed  are  progressively  articulated 
by  their  value-coefficient.  Experience  is  all  the  time  re- 
weaving  the  context  of  its  ideal  attitudes.  Its  moment  of 
isolation  has  relation  as  its  object,  but  the  relation  is  again 
absorbed  or  annulled  by  an  act  of  will  that  ideally  desires 
isolation.  The  re-isolation  of  isolations  is  productive  of 
progressive  re-conjunction  of  relations.  Experience  is  a 
continuum  of  comparisons  or  valuations  of  value  simultan- 
eously with  inter-relation  of  relations.  It  is  the  infinitely 
changing  points  of  intersection  of  the  circle  of  values  and 
circle  of  relations,  the  infinite  points  of  whose  revolving 
circumferences  never  coalesce  but  once,  each  of  these  cir- 
cles being  ceaselessly  modifiable  and  re-creative  at  every 
contact.  The  isolation  and  the  re-combination  are  the 
respective  moments  that  indicate  the  changeability  and 
becoming  of  experience,  while  idealized  desire,  capable  of 
functioning  completely  as  both  end  and  means,  assures 
the  progressive  evolution  of  self  amidst  a  developing  self- 
created  environment.  The  will  and  the  intellect  have 
acted  reciprocally,  and  value  and  relation  are  interlocked. 
There  is  no  backward  beginning  to  this  mutual  activity; 
both  judgments  of  value  and  judgments  of  relation,  and 
their  factorable  though  unsunderable  combination,  are  the 
very  structure  of  experience  and  coeval  with  it.  Experi- 
ence is  not  an  unforseeable  adventure  in  a  dark  wilderness, 
but  it  is  the  self  travelling  in  its  own  country,  carrying  its 
own  tent-stakes  and  setting  up  its  own  abodes. 

43.  Value  Contrasted  with  Relation.  Experience  thus 
has  been  discovered  as  a  reciprocity, — on  the  one  hand 
intelligent  will  or  volitional  intellect,  and  on  the  other,  an 
environment  ideally  evolving.  The  ego  is  in  the  thick  of 


60  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

experience,  its  status  and  evolution  are  inseparable  from 
experience.  The  self-revealed  method  of  experience  is  a 
dichotomy,  the  analysis  of  a  given  multiple  whose  recip- 
rocal factors  are  value  and  relation.  It  is  the  mind  that  is 
acting  with  these  as  aids  in  its  dual  form  of  judgment. 
If  they  are  to  be  contrasted,  the  value-judgment  may  be 
said  to  set  the  pace,  while  the  relation-judgment  follows. 
The  former  is  comparatively  independent;  it  proposes 
the  end.  The  latter  is  dependent,  and  works  out  the 
means.  The  former  is  the  summary  of  a  manifold  of  pre- 
vious experience  and  is  therefore  a  complex  of  all  the  fac- 
ulties, the  self  pulling  its  environment  and  thereby  pulling 
or  rather  pushing  itself.  The  latter  is  instrumental  only, 
and  is  therefore  essentially  an  intellectual  judgment  or 
evaluation.  Worth  is  the  exercising  of  force  or  energy, 
the  active  conditioning  of  crises  in  life's  evolutionary  ac- 
tivity. It  differs  from  the  causation  of  instinctive  inter- 
ests in  the  variety  of  its  ends,  in  their  ideal  status  and  in 
their  ideal  actualization  or  equilibration.  It  is  a  real 
value,  self-selected  with  reference  to  the  reciprocal  en- 
vironment, and  not  a  vitalistic  interest  of  the  species  shap- 
ing end  and  means.  The  harmonization  is  the  business  of 
the  individual  self.  If  the  biological  situation  involves 
creation  because  its  expressions  and  organizations  are  un- 
forseeable,  then  the  thought-situation  implicates  self-crea- 
tion. While  it  is  true  that  its  momentarily  changing 
world  knows  principle  and  law,  and  so  is  not  unforsee- 
able,  its  fulcrum  of  value  is  freely  willed  and  wielded  by 
self.  It  presents  real  self-activity  in  the  ideal  evolution 
of  the  environment,  the  continuance  of  the  evolutionary 
process  of  the  universe  in  ideal  re-actions  and  re-con- 


Valuation  and  its  Conditions  61 

structions. 

44.  Value  and  the  Self-Creation  of  Freedom.  This 
development  beyond  the  presentative  existent  is  entirely 
the  free  prerogative  of  the  ego.  Freedom  is  self-creation, 
the  conscious  and  influential  interference  of  the  me,  in  the 
experiential  synthesis  of  the  me  and  the  not-me,  the  iden- 
tification of  the  self  by  the  self  in  the  combination  with 
its  opposite.  As  applied  in  valuation,  it  possesses  a  grow- 
ing and  progressive  status.  It  means  an  intensification  of 
life,  a  more  and  more  intelligent  refinement  of  will,  an 
ever-larger  participation  in  the  universe,  an  expanding 
knowledge  of  self.  It  is  the  ever-clearer  theoretical  dif- 
ferentiation between  the  me  and  the  not-me,  simultane- 
ously with  the  ever-clearer  practical  or  active  identifica- 
tion of  the  me  and  the  not-me.  It  is  not  freedom  from 
the  laws  of  nature,  which  would  mean  irresponsibility  or 
life  in  fairy-land.  These  very  laws  express  permanent 
elements  of  the  ego's  participation  in  nature.  They  are 
its  own  harmonization  formulable  in  logical  relations. 
They  are  part  of  the  adaptation  that  forms  the  growing 
reciprocal  environment.  To  be  free  from  them  is  to  be 
free  from  self — an  absurd  desire.  The  essential  in  real 
freedom  is  creativeness  of  experience,  that  it  may  be  a  de- 
cisive factor  in  progressive  harmonization  of  mental  situ- 
ations. But  the  harmonization  to  function  socially  and 
objectively,  to  become  apperceptive  material  as  part  of  a 
common  fund,  will  have  to  exist  abstracted  from  any  one's 
particular  experience,  in  some  independent  and  permanent 
relational  form.  Our  experience  is  free,  but  not  all  our 
experiences  or  experiential  elements.  The  laws  of  neces- 
sity are  well  authenticated,  instrumental  hypotheses  to  be 


62  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

', 

utilized  by  freedom  in  its  onward  creative  evolutionary 
task  of  infusing  intension  into  extension. 

45.  Value  Compared  with  Relation.  The  two  inter- 
secting, mutually  co-operative  judgment  groups  may  be 
compared  as  well  as  contrasted.  Both  kinds  of  judgments 
refer  to,  and  deal  with,  the  content  of  experience  rather 
than  its  form.  Although  the  value-judgment  has  been 
spoken  of  as  a  mould,  it  is  not  an  empty  or  passive  mould, 
but  rather  the  moulded  thought-conduct  itself,  the  life- 
norm  that  advances  experience.  Although  furthermore, 
the  relation- judgment  is  instrumental,  it  is  content  that 
it  re-arranges.  It  deepens  or  it  diverts  the  thought-mould 
and  re-constructs  the  norm.  Moreover,  from  the  fact 
that  both  deal  with  content,  a  further  and  ultimate  char- 
acteristic will  similarly  describe  the  nature  and  the  move- 
ment of  both.  This  will  genetically  and  definitively  co- 
ordinate the  values  of  the  value-series,  as  well  as  organize 
definite  inter-relations.  It  will  explain  just  how  the  de- 
veloping value-world  proceeds  while  involving  itself  in  a 
developing  relation-world. 


CHAPTER  V 

VALUATION  AND  SELF-AFFIRMATION 

46.  The  Recurring  Problem  of  Value-content. 
The  characteristic  by  whose  aid  we  shall  endeavor  to  trace 
the  changing  value-relation  content  of  life,  is  the  undu- 
lating or  wave-like  movement  of  the  thought-situations. 
Judgments  of  whatever  kind,  (whether  revaluation  of 
value,  re-relation  of  relation,  or  the  common  interlacing 
of  both)  aim  for  a  synthesis  of  re-related  judgments.  The 
component  judgment  itself  is  a  comparison  of  concepts  by 
affirmation  or  denial.  Since  the  concepts  are  originally 
residua  of  judgments,  this  component  judgment  is  a  real 
synthesis;  it  is,  however,  an  analysis  also,  referring  or 
denying  a  predicate  to  a  subject.  The  component  judg- 
ments enter  into  wider  groups  forming  syllogisms.  The 
grouping  is  a  synthesis  as  was  expressed  above,  but  it  is 
no  less  an  analysis,  for  a  subject  finds  itself  limited  by  a 
predicate.  So  that  every  synthesis  is  really  an  analysis, 
and  every  analysis  is  really  a  synthesis.  (Cf.  Chas.  C. 
Everett,  Fichte's  Science  of  Knowledge,  p.  103).  The 
synthesis  expressed  in  a  simple  mathematical  equation,  for 
example,  is  really  an  analysis,  for  the  identification  im- 
plies that  ideally,  at  least,  the  two  members  are  capable  of 
being  considered  apart.  If,  however,  it  is  not  a  case 
of  identification  but  an  analysis  resulting  in  a  judgment  of 
greater  and  less,  then  the  very  analysis  implies  a  synthesis 
of  the  two  members  to  make  the  differentiation  possible. 
In  general,  the  analysis  expressed  in  the  proposition  calls 

63 


64  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

for  the  synthesis  re-constructed  in  the  syllogism,  but  the 
major  premise  which  is  now  the  chief  synthesis  finds  itself 
in  its  capacity  of  analysis  in  absolute  need  of  another  syl- 
logistic synthesis.  Here  is  the  movement,  the  undulating 
aspect  of  the  mutually  involved  thought-content.  The 
analysis  is  no  sooner  complete  than  it  rises  high  into  a 
synthesis,  but  the  next  instant  the  synthesis  sinks  into  an 
analysis  only  to  rise  again  into  another  synthesis.  The 
analysis  is  the  trough  of  the  wave,  and  the  synthesis  its 
crest;  the  incessant  heaving  forces  trough  to  swell  into 
crest,  and  crest  to  drop  into  trough,  in  a  progressive  undu- 
lation. The  cause  of  the  waves  is  ocean  and  wind ;  the 
water  furnishes  the  indispensable  material  or  medium, 
while  the  wind  lashes  it  into  movement.  The  undula- 
tions of  analysis-synthesis  are  the  activity  of  thought  lash- 
ing its  own  content.  The  content  is  now  analysis  and 
now  synthesis,  as  water  passes  forward  from  wave  to 
wave.  We  see  the  sea  of  thought  amidst  the  heaving 
of  its  billows,  its  collisions,  its  vortices.  How  did  this 
content  which  thought  has  spread  into  ten  thousand  waves, 
originally  come  to  be  there?  Is  there  not  an  analysis- 
synthesis  in  which  they  were  all  originally  implicated? 
Otherwise,  how  can  they  get  started  and  what  would  they 
be?  The  rationalist  or  intuitionist  may  look  far  beyond 
and  seem  to  discern  innate  concepts  or  intuitional  moral- 
ity. The  empiricist  may  confine  himself  to  an  enjoyment 
of  the  actual  scene.  But  the  difficulty  of  an  adequate  ac- 
count of  the  thought-content  and  its  values  still  remains. 

47.  No  First  Value  in  Experience.  Experience  is  self- 
creative  since  its  judgments  are  novel.  But  it  is  not  self- 
generative  of  the  totality  of  its  elements  and  its  creation 


Valuation  and  Self-Affirmation  65 

is  rather  re-construction.  The  very  first  relation  implies 
relation,  so  that  there  is  no  first  relation.  Value  already 
implies  value.  If  it  is  not  possible  to  see  how  experience 
first  started,  if  such  a  demand  is  really  tantamount  to  the 
self-contradiction  of  lifting  experience  above  experience 
to  contrast  it  with  an  external  material,  while  all  the  time 
we  are  really  landed  in  experience,  is  it  not  possible  to  see 
how  experience  really  accounts  for  its  own  analytic-syn- 
thetic demands? 

48.  Analysis-Synthesis    Reaches    Out    to    Problems    of 
Reality.     The    logic    of    experience   thus    introduces    the 
epistemological  problem,  and,  in  a  further  sense,  the  prob- 
lem of  reality.     How  does  the  contexture  of  value  and  re- 
lation judgments,  which  is  a  process  of  idealization,  ob- 
tain its  content  and  its  development?     The  analytic-syn- 
thetic process  is  not  mere  subjectivity,  but  consciousness 
itself  in  the  reciprocity  of  environment.     There  is  a  single 
evolution,  the  evolution  of  the  environment  coincidentally 
with  the  evolution  of  the  self.     The  intelligence,  more- 
over, bears  close  reference  to  the  very  nature  of  reality 
itself.     But  we  have  limited  our  discussion  and  the  onto- 
logical  problem  is  not  within  the  sphere  of  our  present 
investigation.      (Cf.  §  8). 

49.  Intelligence  is  an  Actual  Datum.     We  have  en- 
deavored to  show  that  reciprocity  belongs  to  every  stage 
of  evolution.     Every  environment,  on  the  one  hand,   is 
a  reciprocity,  a  precipitate;   every  organism,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  a  resultant  of  life  and  environment.     We  cannot 
then  look  for  the  absolute  evolution  of  the  world,  except 
as  a  precipitate  where  ideals  impose  the  characteristic.     It 
is  our  world,  our  experience,  and  we  cannot  separate  intel- 


66  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

ligence  from  the  world,  even  theoretically.  If  our  recon- 
structions of  the  evolutionary  environment  as  reciprocal 
with  life  are  symbolically  true  only,  in  the  case  of  the 
lower  forms,  so  that  it  may  be  claimed  that  we  do  not  un- 
derstand the  real  inwardness  of  life,  our  self-reconstructed 
environment  is  absolutely  true  because  it  is  truth  itself.  It 
is  not  proper  to  trace  the  evolution  of  intelligence  out  of 
that  which  is  not  intelligence,  for  evolution  invariably 
dichotomizes  into  intelligence  as  one  of  its  factors.  We 
cannot  look  for  the  evolution  of  evolution.  We  cannot 
look  for  any  pre-experiential  data,  but  must  examine  the 
analysis-synthesis  complex  in  its  situation  of  actual  expe- 
rience, and  there  seek  its  content. 

50.  The  Metaphysical  Difference  Between  the  Biolog- 
ical and  Thought-Situations.  It  will  be  instructive  to 
draw  a  metaphysical  differentiation  between  the  biological 
situation  and  the  thought-situation,  between  the  work  of 
instinct  and  that  of  intellect.  The  former  situation  re- 
ceives its  content  from  without,  its  adjustive  machines  are 
already  organized  for  it ;  the  urge  of  instinct  is  formative 
rather  than  creative.  Its  experience-precipitate  makes  ev- 
ident its  universal,  instinctive,  will-to-live.  Its  individual 
manifestations  are  finite  and  exhaustible.  Its  life-mate- 
rial, being  given  from  without,  it  is  conditioned  from 
without  and  functions  dependently  only.  As  an  experi- 
ence, a  "something  or  other,"  it  depends  on  an  experience 
outside  it  and  over  it.  If  a  certain  totality  of  vital  rela- 
tionships fails  to  be  reached,  the  organism  or  species  suc- 
cumbs. It  can  never  quite  supply  this  totality  from  itself, 
because  it  cannot  turn  inward  for  the  material  and  condi- 
tions of  its  dependence.  The  evolution  of  the  environ- 


Valuation  and  Self -Affirmation  67 

ment  in  the  advancing  phases  of  the  biological  situation,  is 
accomplished  when  life  withdraws  as  it  were,  from  one 
unsuccessful  manifestation,  to  take  advantage  of  another 
where  instinct  is  more  adaptively  organized. 

51.  Intelligence  is  Independent.  Continuing  from  this 
point  of  view,  we  discover  that  intelligence  is  the  will- 
to-live  that  has  attained  an  absolutely  permanent  mani- 
festation. It  is  not  fair  to  consider  the  intellect  as  the 
servant  of  the  will,  because  it  organizes  that  will.  It 
conditions  its  ends  and  organizes  its  means  with  the  ma- 
chinery of  will  as  reciprocal  to  its  aims.  Life  now  has 
attained  one  absolute  experience  which  finds  all  its  parts 
in  its  own  progressive  procedure.  Evolution  has  reached 
its  final  characteristic  environment  with  the  thought-situ- 
ation as  its  unit.  Judgment,  as  deliberative  adaptation 
instead  of  instinctive,  now  adjusts  itself  to  itself.  Ex- 
perience is  an  uninterrupted  continuum,  and  life's  reciproc- 
ity with  the  environment  is  perfect,  for  it  finds  within 
itself  the  perfect  control  of  all  the  material  and  content 
that  it  uses.  As  a  "something  or  other"  it  is  a  dependent, 
but  its  dependence  proves  to  be  upon  itself.  Intelligence 
has  discovered  itself  as  perfectly  independent,  both  as  to 
activity  and  as  to  idealized  content.  Analysis-synthesis 
is  the  spontaneous  activity  of  an  infinite  consciousness  that 
extends  itself  every  time  it  would  seek  to  limit  itself.  (Cf. 
Wm.  T.  Harris,  Hegel's  Logic,  p.  204).  However  we 
seek  to  bound  experience  by  something  else,  we  still  find 
ourselves  in  the  analytic-synthetic  process  of  experience. 
Knowledge  is  thus  the  success  of  evolution.  In  instinct, 
life  has  been  groping,  but,  in  intelligence,  it  has  recog- 
nized and  known  itself  and  its  infinite  destiny.  The  log- 


68  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

ical  problem  thus  dissolves  into  the  epistemological  and 
ontological. 

52.  The  Ego  the  Source  and  Aim  of  Analysis-Synthesis. 
In  man,  something  has  at  last  been  awakened  that  seems 
to  make  possible  every  potential  development.  The 
dichotomy  of  life  is  no  longer  a  factoring  into  movements 
of  action  and  reaction,  but  into  an  all-inclusive  self  and 
not-self,  into  a  conditioner  of  experience  amidst  its  condi- 
tions. The  ego  in  Fichtean  manner,  posits  itself  as  the 
condition  of  experience.  But  in  positing  itself,  it  already 
has  posited  an  opposite  in  positive,  constructive,  form. 
However,  instead  of  opposing  itself  to  the  non-ego,  the 
ego  identifies  itself  with  the  non-ego,  so  that  the  division 
is  not  really  limitation  as  Fichte  teaches,  but  the  reciprocal 
movement  of  completion  and  fulfillment.  Every  analysis- 
synthesis  is  a  discovery  of  the  me  in  the  not-me.  The 
world  is  my  ideal.  The  Cartesian  Cogito,  ergo  sunt  may 
be  interpreted  to  mean  that  I  discover  my  identity  and  my 
willing  when  I  think.  But  when  I  think,  I  have  a  pur- 
pose, I  aim  at  an  object,  my  thinking  is  life-impulse  or 
desire,  and  therefore  I  have  really  discovered  myself  as 
life  become  subjective  with  reference  to  an  environment 
that  has  become  objective.  The  subjective  is  meaningless 
without  the  objective  which  it  conditions,  and  conversely 
the  objective  conditions  the  activity  of  the  subjective. 
The  self,  then,  discovers  itself  in  its  environment  as  sub- 
jective-objective, in  other  words,  as  experience  and  evolu- 
tion. It  is  the  supreme  co-ordination  of  evolution.  Every 
analysis-synthesis  finds  in  it,  its  final  point  of  origin,  and 
to  it  we  must  look  for  the  organized  content.  It  does  not, 
by  any  means,  will  the  world  as  its  fiat,  condemning  it  to 


Valuation  and  Self -Affirmation  69 

a  lawless  relativism,  but  it  imposes  itself  in  a  creatively 
intelligible  manner  upon  the  flux  of  elements  and  forces. 
(Cf.  Chas.  G.  Shaw,  The  Ego  and  its  Place  in  the  World, 

P-  399). 

53.   The    Temporal    Element    of    Self -Positing.     The 

self  thus  has  been  posited  as  operative  in  an  environment, 
not  all  the  elements  of  which  have  been  contributed  by 
itself.  The  environment  is  ceaselessly  implicated  in  the 
evolution  of  the  self.  Life  moves  in  the  self  ideally  with 
deliberate  reference  to  previous  movement,  yielding  an 
ideal  "complication"  or  true  history.  Experience  is  his- 
tory. The  self  thus  has  posited  itself  in  the  form  of  suc- 
cession or  time ;  its  entire  self-apprehension  in  its  natural 
surroundings,  involves  a  self-positing  in  time.  The  posit- 
ing has  been  in  actu,  in  movement  and  change.  The 
world  of  things  and  events  is  constructed  of  ideal  points 
whose  necessary  fixation  in  order  to  form  these  aggre- 
gations, is  the  work  of  the  temporal.  Time  creates  an 
artificial  now,  and  makes  it  also  a  here,  by  creating  a  be- 
ginning for  a  series  of  points  and  thus  organizing  the  work 
of  judgment.  This  may  be  illustrated  by  the  ordinary 
psychology  of  perception.  As  the  primal  condition  of  the 
self,  the  temporal  partakes  of  the  nature  of  the  self,  and 
has  the  form  of  infinity.  For  the  self  as  a  dependent, 
depends  only  on  itself  and  never  can  escape  outside  its 
thought ;  likewise  time  can  be  limited  only  by  time,  so 
that  to  limit  it  is  to  extend  it.  (Cf.  Wm.  T.  Harris, 
Hegel's  Logic,  p.  204).  Evolution  that  has  attained  the 
phase  of  ideal  environment  continues  to  evolve  infinitely 
in  infinite  time.  Duration  is  the  form  of  ideal  environ- 
ment or  self-creation. 


70  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

54.  Self  the    Ultimate  Source   of   Qualitative   Experi- 
ence.    The  temporal  gives  the  intellect  a  new  and  specific 
definition,  as  that  whose  constructive  activities  of  judg- 
ments are  posited  in  time.     The  self  is  posited  as  the  ter- 
minus a  quo  (in  addition  to  a  given  specific  antecedent)  of 
judgments.     As  its  characteristic  work  is  idealization,  that 
is,  the  setting  of  further  ends  to  be  solved  by  thought,  it 
is  also   (in  addition  to  the  specific  object)    the  terminus 
ad  quern.     The  logical  involution  of  analysis-synthesis,  the 
interdependence  that  seems  to  create  a  vicious  circle,  finds 
in  the  temporalizing  self  its  point  of  origin  or  rest.     The 
self  is  thus  a  fundamental  or  supreme  value  according  to 
which  ends  are  posited,  organized,  and  co-ordinated.  Time 
is  its  instrumental  form  of  judgment,  \vorking  out  the 
means.     Every  end  or  aim  is  an  analysis-synthesis  whose 
final  synthetic  aim  can  only  be  in  the  self.     To  it  belong 
the  most  closely  narrowed  hypotheses  of  both  value  and  re- 
lation.    But  both  ends  and  means,  values  and  relations, 
constitute  the  qualitative  structure  of  experience.     In  a 
word,  the  self  acting  in  time  means  the  development  of 
an   interactive,   value-relational  world,   and   the  paradox 
of  analysis-synthesis  seems  to  be  solved. 

55.  The  P re-Positing  Understanding  and  the  Positing 
Self.     Now  that  the  ultimate  ground  and  source  of  the 
undulatory  movement  of  thought  has  been  discovered  in 
a  temporalized  self,  the  question  still  revolves  on  the  ap- 
parent circular  movement  of  the  analysis-synthesis.     Why 
is  it  that  the  judgment  complex  of  experience,  points  back 
to  the  self,  neither  for  its  structural  relations,  nor  as  the 
fountain-head  of  value?     Although  it  is  the  source,  it  does 
not  seem  to  be  the  source.  The  answer  is  that  in  the  every- 


Valuation  and  Self -Affirmation  71 

day  business  of  life,  the  intellect  consciously  moves  only 
among  its  adjustive  judgments.  It  is  theoretical  or  rela- 
tional not  for  love  of  pure  theory  but  only  in  so  far  as 
it  is  practically  and  immediately  purposive.  Ordinary  ex- 
perience deliberately  confines  its  idealization  to  the  an- 
alysis-synthesis complexes,  keeping  in  the  background  of 
its  consciousness  the  posited  value-relation  substrate  of 
self.  It  is  not  interested  in  the  substrate  of  experience,  but 
only  in  the  qualifications  of  experience.  It  is  the  state  of 
understanding  and  is  opposed  to  the  self-conscious  totality 
or  total  self-consciousness  which  the  fully  conscious  in- 
tellect comprises.  The  complete  intellect  is  the  meta- 
physical reason  or  will  as  well  as  the  logical-psychological 
understanding.  This  latter  is  the  stage  of  reflection  called 
by  Hegel,  the  positing.  The  stage  of  the  understanding 
is  the  pre-positing  or  pre-supposing.  "Let  one  of  these 
phases  be  unconscious,  and  the  other  a  conscious  one  and 
we  have  the  stage  of  insight  known  as  the  understanding, 
which  presupposes  being  as  a  substrate  and  not  as  a  self- 
relation  or  positing  activity."  (Wm.  T.  Harris,  HegeVs 
Logic,  p.  320).  In  fine,  ordinary  experience  proceeds  by 
analytic-synthetic  recombination  of  complexes  which  are 
somehow  already  there. 

56.  The  Understanding  and  Reason  as  the  Theoretical 
and  Practical  Selves.  We  have  seen  that  reflection  re- 
covers the  positing  of  the  self  as  an  ultimate,  a  self-rela- 
tion, a  fundamental  value,  and  as  the  immediate  ground  of 
the  thought-undulation.  The  undulation  itself  which  is 
the  movement  of  understanding,  is  a  process  of  mediate- 
ness,  dependence,  and  the  interposition  of  other  factors. 
Understanding  always  discovers  itself  in  its  relations  or 


72  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

differentiations,  which  imply  reference  to  something  else. 
This  pre-positing  aspect  of  thought  which  regards  differ- 
ences only  and  seeks  to  fuse  them  into  a  higher  retro- 
active synthesis,  and  finds  its  work  ever  productive  of 
differences  only,  may  be  called  the  theoretical  side  of  the 
intellect.  It  seems  to  confine  its  reach  to  formal  syn- 
theses, without  a  practical  regard  for  values  emanating 
from  the  self,  that  would  release  it  from  the  circle  of 
theory.  But  the  understanding  is  an  incomplete  phase  of 
thought.  It  must  become  positing  or  completely  self-con- 
scious, in  order  that  the  theoretical  and  the  practical  may 
proceed  hand-in-hand,  and  that  the  practical  may  organize 
the  theoretical  differentiation  and  dependence  on  a  posi- 
tive basis  of  independence.  The  positing  phase  brings 
back  the  identity  of  experience,  the  pointing  back  of  the 
elsewhere-pointing  relations  towards  an  inward  source, 
and  the  permanence  of  the  intelligent  activity.  It  raises 
into  the  pre-positing  consciousness  those  qualitative  as- 
pects of  evolution  that  confer  a  directive  value  coefficient 
upon  the  relational  phases  of  the  thought-continuum.  The 
understanding  is  not  merely  enhanced,  but  it  is  actualized 
and  guided  by  the  reason.  The  ideas  of  the  reason  that 
direct  ideal  ends  are  not  simple  conveniences,  but  may  be 
traced  in  the  very  basic  constitution  of  experience.  Rea- 
son functions  of  itself  as  value-directive,  and  in  the  un- 
derstanding as  relational.  In  both  phases,  the  self  is 
revealed  in  reciprocal  evolution  with  an  ideal  environment. 
57.  Intelligence  in  Subject-Objectivity.  It  is  then 
from  two  points  of  view  that  the  dichotomy  of  self  and 
environment  or  the  ego  in  the  continuance  of  self-positing 
is  seen  to  be  necessary.  On  the  one  hand,  from  the  ap- 


Valuation  and  S elf-Affirmation  73 

proach  of  the  self  to  the  environment  or  the  viewpoint 
of  introspective  reason,  and  on  the  other,  from  the  ap- 
proach of  the  environment  to  the  self,  or  the  viewpoint  of 
evolutionary  reason.  (Cf.  §  40).  But  are  not  the  two 
viewpoints  really  different  aspects  of  one?  For  is  not  ex- 
perience auto-centric,  the  reciprocity  of  self-consciousness, 
so  that  taking  either  division  of  the  dichotomy,  we  are  led 
to  expect  the  other?  Analysis-synthesis  finally  discovers 
the  constructive  ego  in  the  duality  of  subject-objectivity. 
The  dichotomy,  however,  should  always  recall  the  essen- 
tial unity  of  experience. 

58.  The  Biological  Situation  Knows  no  Free  Positing. 
We  may  now  observe  from  the  viewpoint  of  evolutionary 
reason  how  radical  is  the  transformation  from  the  purely 
biological  situation  to  the  thought-situation.  The  former 
knows  no  free  positing,  its  dichotomy  only  reveals  the  life 
in  the  species,  the  formative  and  reacting,  but  not  the 
controlling  element.  There  is  no  morality  necessary  or 
possible,  because  the  environment  is  not  constituted  of 
ideals;  the  will-to-live  splinters  into  vital  impulses.  In- 
terests never  develop  into  values  since  every  beginning  is 
instinctive  repetition;  succession  not  being  retained  in 
judgments  it  cannot  indicate  a  temporal  relation.  The 
interruption  of  succession  which  is  inevitable  except  in  a 
consciousness  that  has  posited  itself  and  idealizes  its  judg- 
ments,' makes  impossible  the  transition  from  eventhood 
into  time.  All  the  interests  being  given  without  qual- 
itative preference,  there  is  no  need  of  morality  or  willing 
or  time.  The  supreme  interest  is  continuance,  and  all  the 
others  receive  from  this  a  quantitative  character  only. 
Right  and  wrong  never  can  be  anything  else  but  individual 


74  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

pleasure  or  pain,  for  these  mean  anabolism  or  catabolism. 
Life's  aim  is  still  fulfilled  in  the  victory  of  the  stronger 
and  the  augmenting  of  its  range  of  environment  to  in- 
clude the  weaker,  for  the  aim  of  continuance  being  quan- 
titative knows  no  indefeasibility  of  individuals  or  species. 
59.  Life's  Realization  in  the  Value-Positing  Ego.  With 
the  discovery  or  self-announcement  of  the  ego  in  the 
thought-situation,  life's  quantitative  aim  of  continuance 
halts  and  turns  and  becomes  henceforth  irrevocably  quali- 
tative. The  environment  is  now  ideal,  in  other  words, 
a  development  in  terms  of  self ;  there  can  be  no  more  clash 
of  environments  except  a  qualitative  struggle  of  ideas 
(with  what  this  implies  in  a  practical  way),  in  other 
words,  extension  must  be  accompanied  by  intension.  The 
ego  realizes  that  it  never  can  be  displaced ;  it  knows  its 
indefeasibility.  Its  motives  become  touched  by  joy  and 
sorrow  as  well  as  by  pleasure  and  pain.  It  posits  itself 
not  alone  as  the  motor  element  in  an  endless  logical  succes- 
sion of  judgments,  but  as  a  motive  also,  as  a  willing  of 
experience  for  itself.  It  is  its  own  original  idealized  de- 
sire, basing  all  other  values  upon  itself  as  permanent 
actuating  value.  It  is  thus  in  the  humanistic  world  that 
the  practical  becomes  the  qualitative  and  autonomous,  and 
the  will  takes  the  aspect  of  a  practical  reason.  The  right 
and  the  wrong  are  referred  back  to  the  posited  self  in  its 
idealizing  capacity  of  reconstructing  a  reciprocal  environ- 
ment. They  express  motivation  according  to  idealized 
ends;  they  describe  qualitative  values  that  have  been  be- 
stowed by  the  independent  positing  of  the  self.  They 
thus  correspond  to  the  free  willing  of  free  acts  and  con- 
note a  certain  progressiveness  or  unprogressiveness  in  ex- 


Valuation  and  Self-Affirmation  75 

perience.  It  is  thus  by  an  act  of  the  will  that  the  rela- 
tions of  logical  experience  receive  a  moral  qualification, 
for  morality  is  nothing  if  not  autonomous.  Every  thought- 
situation,  then,  involves  its  ideal  attitude,  which  qualifies 
value  and  has  a  free  moral  character.  In  a  word,  the  self- 
discovery  of  the  will  has  disclosed  the  moral  characteristic 
of  the  constructive  worths  of  experience. 


CHAPTER  VI 

FREEDOM,    VALUE,    AND    HABIT 

60.  The  Moral  Dilemma.  Now  since  the  plain  com- 
mon sense  of  mankind  is  pre-positing,  moving  about  in  the 
circle  of  judgments  with  uncritical  consciousness  of  self, 
can  it  really  be  maintained  that  morality  is  thus  construc- 
tive of  experience?  For  morality  involves  the  free  deci- 
sion of  the  will  according  to  a  value  that  is  directly  con- 
ferred by  the  self.  Freedom  of  choice  means  self-appreci- 
ative initiation  of  action,  motivation  by  an  end  that  is 
symbolic  to  the  self.  But  does  not  plain  common  sense 
think  its  judgments  and  direct  its  environment  by  the 
social  conscience  or  Sittlichkeit?  'The  citizen  is  gov- 
erned only  to  a  small  extent  by  law  and  legality  on  the 
one  hand,  and  by  the  dictates  of  the  individual  conscience 
on  the  other.  It  is  the  more  extensive  system  of  Sitt- 
lichkeit  which  plays  the  predominant  role." 
"By  Sittlichkeit  is  meant  the  social  habit  of  mind  and 
action,  underlying  social  customs,  the  instinctive  sense  of 
social  obligation  which  is  the  foundation  of  society." 
(Morton  Prince,  The  Unconscious,  p.  308)  (note).  Is 
it  true  then  that  the  moral  character  of  experience  is  sub- 
lated  by  the  fact  that  we  thus  act  through  habit,  that  we 
are  content  to  remain  unconscious  of  the  logical  roots  of 
value  in  the  self,  that  we  proceed  uncritically  with  the 
pre-suppositions  of  the  understanding  instead  of  always 
living  in  the  complete  and  adequate  movement  of  the 


Freedom,  Value,  and  Habit  77 

reason  ?  Here  we  are  face  to  face  with  the  moral  dilem- 
ma of  Kant  that  forces  ethics  into  rigorism.  Kant  would 
maintain  that  morality  demands  such  perfect  purity  in 
the  maxims  of  our  conduct,  that  the  idea  of  duty  must 
always  be  present  to  determine  the  will.  So  that  were 
inclination  or  social  habit  the  springs  of  my  action,  my 
goodness  would  be  only  emotional  or  external.  Its  strict 
legality  does  not  make  it  characteristically  moral.  Ac- 
cording to  this  seeming  paradox,  our  difficulty  is :  Is 
Morality  then  as  commonly  expressed  in  qualitative  dif- 
ferences of  value,  really  a  fact  in  the  structure  of  human 
experience?  For  we  have  emphasized  the  intensification, 
as  well  as  the  extension  of  the  ideal  environment,  which 
calls  for  the  real  consciousness  of  freedom. 

61.  Psychology  Maintains  Autonomy.  The  needless- 
ness  of  this  moral  dilemma  may  be  proved  by  the  facts  of 
social  psychology.  Fichte  defines  Sittlichkeit  as  "those 
principles  of  conduct  which  regulate  people  in  their  rela- 
tions to  each  other,  and  have  become  matter  of  habit  and 
second  nature  at  the  stage  of  culture  reached,  and  of  which 
therefore,  we  are  not  explicitly  conscious."  (Morton 
Prince,  TheUnconscious,  p.  308)  (note).  Habit  is  the  econ- 
omy of  consciousness  allowing  it  free  scope  for  further 
idealized  extension-intension  of  environment.  If  we  are 
not  "explicitly  conscious"  of  the  value  elements  in  the 
habitual  principles  of  conduct,  we  are  at  least  implicitly 
conscious  of  them.  For  when  an  exception  or  an  inter- 
ruption occurs,  habit  at  once  awakens  its  proper  ideal  asso- 
ciations. The  external  conduct  in  question  that  has  been 
hastily  condemned  as  legal,  is  re-examined  in  the  light  of 
moral  values.  Consciousness  is  just  as  able  and  just  as 


78  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

ready  to  defend  its  habitual  conduct  viewed  as  ethical 
value,  as  it  is  to  defend  the  actions  that  it  is  actually  initi- 
ating. The  qualitative  aspect  of  value  is  continuous  in 
both  kinds  of  action,  so  long  as  the  self  continues  its  nor- 
mal idealizing  activity.  External  and  internal  applied  to 
conduct  can  then  be  treated  as  mere  psychological  differ- 
ences, and  legal  and  moral,  as  differences  of  social  and 
personal  points  of  view.  The  organic  combination  of  the 
moral  with  the  legal,  gives  the  personal  evolution  of  free- 
dom. The  external  authority  has  furnished  merely  a 
theatre  of  becoming  to  the  moral  self.  'That  which  was 
external  authority  becomes  freedom  when  one  discovers  its 
identity  with  his  own  inborn  rationality."  (Wm.  T. 
Harris,  Hegel's  Logic,  p.  18).  The  legal  is  the  form  of 
value,  the  moral  adds  the  content  by  the  free  internalizing 
of  the  legal.  This  is  the  process  of  the  development  of  the 
autonomous  individual  amidst  the  institutions  of  society. 
In  a  word,  although  common  sense  and  ordinary  activity, 
are  pre-positing,  they  have  in  reserve  the  critical  attitude 
of  self-positing  that  is  generative  of  value,  and  that  reveals 
the  free,  evolutionary  activity  of  the  individual. 

62.  The  Contexture  of  Evolutionary  Experience. 
Taking  stock  of  our  deductions:  Something  has  been 
assumed  all  along  as  the  basis  of  a  moral  contexture  of 
experience.  This  is  the  underlying  hypothesis  of  the  self- 
recognition  of  the  self  as  the  criterion  of  efficient  values. 
Pre-positing  experience  is  directed  by  beliefs  which  ordin- 
arily do  not  rise  into  the  full  clarity  of  critical  apprehen- 
sion, but  there  is  also  present  in  consciousness  the  value- 
positing  that  creates  ethical  theory.  By  freely  willing 
itself,  the  self  comes  into  its  prerogatives,  escaping  from 


Freedom,   Value,  and  Habit  79 

the  thraldom  of  unreflective  imitative  conduct,  where  ideal 
concepts  are  no  more  than  borrowed  images  because  not 
self-constructed.  Only  then,  truly,  do  values  and  motives 
assert  themselves  in  the  upbuilding  of  a  truly  reciprocal 
environment,  not  as  mere  stimuli  characteristic  of  external 
objects,  but  as  a  monistic  relationship  between  a  subject 
and  its  objects.  Ethics  and  natural  laws  both  weave  the 
contexture  of  experience;  in  the  evolutionary  process, 
value  and  relation  are  interlaced.  Values  are  the  motives 
and  ends.  They  confer  upon  the  analytic-synthetic  process 
a  logical  plus  an  extra-logical  character  that  together  make 
possible  the  thought-situation  in  an  actual  intimacy  of 
experience.  They  represent  the  presence  of  a  rounded, 
unitary  self  where  intellect  is  inextricably  united  to  will. 
They  belong  also  to  the  complex  of  emotions  that  springs 
up  in  this  union.  They  bring  joy  of  achievement,  or  sor- 
row of  disappointment.  It  is  by  their  means  that  life 
is  saved  from  the  endless  monotony  of  just  quantitative 
repetition  and  quantitative  extension.  They  arise  when 
life  turns  upon  itself  in  intelligent  realization  of  the  aims 
of  its  course ;  to  this  course,  they  offer  quality  and  dignity 
and  subjective  intensification.  Values  never  become  such 
by  virtue  of  terminal  positions  in  the  thought-situation. 
If  they  did,  they  would  be  relations  temporarily  differen- 
tiated from  their  fellows,  in  order  to  serve  as  logical  ful- 
crums.  Conversely,  rather,  it  is  the  relations  that  have 
to  consult  their  requirements.  Experience  as  a  value- 
procession  displays  the  moral  and  dynamic  power  of  the 
self.  Such  is  the  activity  that  constructs  a  reciprocal  ideal 
environment. 


CHAPTER  VII 

SELF-POSITING    IN    A    MORAL    CRISIS,    AND    THE    MOOD    OF 

WANT 

» 

63.  A  Deeper  View  of  Intrinsic  Value.  Our  discus- 
sion must  consider  at  this  point  whether  it  really  has 
solved  the  contradiction  of  value-upon-occasion,  of  rela- 
tion masquerading  as  value,  and  whether  we  have  escaped 
from  the  dilemma  of  values  that  are  qualitatively  of  the 
same  kind  as  relations.  Is  not  the  self-positing  that  func- 
tions as  the  fountain-head  and  motive-force  of  experience 
an  occurrence  that  just  happens,  a  grand  occurrence  it  is 
true,  but  still  a  mere  logical  and  psychological  occur- 
rence? If  so,  are  we  not  still  in  the  formal  dialectic  of 
analysis-synthesis,  without  having  filled  the  desideratum  of 
real  content  in  experience,  and  have  we  not  thus  reduced 
the  moral  quality  of  the  value-creative  self,  to  the  zero 
point?  May  we  not  complain  with  Stirner,  "Am  I  that 
which  is  within  me?"  It  is  true,  moreover,  that  we  have 
made  the  practical  co-equal  with  the  theoretical,  but  have 
we  necessarily  escaped  the  "eternal  recurrence"  of  Niet- 
sche?  Is  the  practical,  the  moral  per  se?  We  may  even 
find  the  ego  in  the  thick  of  activity  freely  exercising  its 
idealizing  capacity,  but  dragged  along  by  a  universal  ac- 
tivity, that  to  it,  means  determinism,  so  that  its  valuation, 
as  subjective-objective  activity  and  result,  turns  out  to  be 
a  morality  that  is  self-deceiving,  a  mere  pretext  for  general 
activity,  and  futile  to  introduce  real  autonomous  value 

80 


Self -Positing  in  a  Moral  Crisis,  and  Mood  of  Want  8 1 

into  the  texture  of  evolution.  Furthermore,  ends  that 
further  preferred  activity  need  not  necessarily  take  the 
form  of  qualitative  morality;  their  social  permanence, 
even,  may  be  usefulness  or  economy.  Finally,  what  is  to 
prevent  the  individual  self  that  has  been  disclosed  by  the 
dichotomous  analysis  of  experience,  from  supinely  sur- 
rendering its  will,  rejecting  its  freedom,  and  contracting 
its  sphere  to  purely  biological  interests?  For  if  evolution 
is  autonomously  possible,  then  involution  is  also  an  alter- 
native. 

64.  Self-Positing  in  a  Moral  Crisis  Gives  Real  Value. 
Evidently  the  positing  of  the  ego  as  the  mere  psychological 
and  logical  antecedent  of  the  flux  of  pre-positing  analysis- 
synthesis  will  not  reveal  to  us  the  real  qualitative  criterion 
of  value  that  is  creatively  evolving  the  ideal  environment. 
There  must  be  a  positing  of  self  that  means  self-affirma- 
tion, self-assertion,  and  self-willing  by  the  individual  as 
individual;  no  general  self-positing  forced  upon  the  indi- 
vidual by  the  contexture  of  experience  can  create  values. 
The  /  must  will  itself  in  itself  and  for  itself.  It  must 
elevate  itself  into  self-consciousness  above  its  temporal 
genesis  and  above  its  intro-active  and  social  environment. 
It  must  will  itself  deliberately  and  indefeasibly  in  a  moral 
crisis  that  brings  about  the  transition  from  its  potential 
self  to  its  actual  self,  and  creates  its  individuality  amidst 
its  own  reciprocal  ideal  environment.  The  self  must  will 
itself  for  the  sake  of  its  own  ends  in  an  objectively  ideal 
world,  creatively  idealizing  the  latter's  evolutionary  aims, 
and  establishing  their  qualitative  significance  by  its  free 
and  active  preference.  It  must  realize  its  indefeasibility 
as  supreme  value  and  thus  attain  the  full  stature  of  intel- 


82  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

lect.  It  will  then  know  itself  as  infinitely  modifiable  by 
its  self-conferred  qualifications  of  reciprocal  experience. 
It  will  feel  its  power  as  evolutionary  activity,  freely  acting 
to  create  endless  modifications,  capable  of  every  degree  of 
appreciation,  every  point  of  intensification.  It  will  thus 
be  promotive  of  a  real  infinity  of  experience — one  that  is 
infinitely  intensive  as  well  as  infinitely  extensive,  an  evolu- 
tion of  two  dimensions.  In  fine,  it  is  in  the  moral  free- 
dom and  moral  causation  of  the  individual,  that  we  must 
look  for  the  real  and  absolute  evolution  of  experience, 
for  the  infinite  qualitative  increase  of  ideal  environment. 
65.  The  Requirements  of  Such  Self -Positing.  How 
then  does  the  self  posit  itself  and  simultaneously  undergo 
a  moral  crisis  that  comes  from  a  perfect,  autonomous,  will- 
ing of  self,  thereby  conferring  real,  transforming,  extra- 
formal,  qualitative  values  upon  the  thought-situations  of 
experience,  and  truly  introducing" the  moral  factor  into  the 
continuum  of  the  ideal  evolutionary  environment?  How 
does  the  self  declare  its  independence  of  the  social  imagin- 
ation, whose  images  are  copies  of  ideals  and  not  the 
ideals  themselves,  and  therefore  to  the  individual  deter- 
ministic and  heteronomous?  How,  furthermore,  does  the 
self  posit  itself  as  creative  and  progressive  rather  than 
as  destructive  in  the  reciprocity  of  environment?  How 
finally  does  the  indefeasible  self,  absolutely  autonomous, 
posit  as  a  unique  individual,  a  moral  law  that  is  formative 
of  the  scale  of  values  in  a  society  of  individuals,  so  that 
there  is  one,  and  only  one  law  that  may  have  infinite  ap- 
plications according  to  the  infinity  of  possible  conditions? 
An  investigation  by  the  method  of  dichotomy  more  pro- 
foundly applied  and  the  consequent  implications  of  exper- 


Self-Positing  in  a  Moral  Crisis,  and  Mood  of  Want  83 

fence  in  its  aspects  of  environment  and  intelligence,  will 
give  us  a  true  account  of  the  finally  determining  self- 
positing  of  the  self. 

66.  Want  and  Prophecy  Work  Towards  Real  Values. 
The  clew  will  be  found  in  that  ceaseless  activity  of  the 
internality  that  forms  the  very  self-expression  of  life.  Al- 
ready in  the  purely  biological  situation,  the  internal  man- 
ifests itself  as  activity.  There  is  no  absolute  rest  in  na- 
ture and  literally  to  be  is  to  act.  Intelligence  to  a  certain 
extent  is  funded  by  instinct  and  its  processes  and  primarily 
manifests  itself  in  a  status  of  activity.  But  intelligence 
already  has  transformed  instinctive  activity  into  a  time- 
series,  it  has  manifested  itself  as  consciously  directive,  as 
organizer  of  analyses-syntheses,  as  satisfied  or  dissatisfied 
with  its  self-constituted  system  of  relations.  With  the 
awakening  from  the  biological  heritage  that  overlaps  the 
social  environment,  the  potential  intelligence  posits  its 
reality;  it  no  longer  passively  manifests  itself  as  a  reac- 
tion in  environment,  but  it  positively  and  actively  indi- 
cates its  presence  in  the  free  continuance  of  a  reciprocal 
environment.  For  intellect  has  appeared  and  posited  it- 
self as  reason  with  a  characteristic  mood,  the  mood  of  in- 
sufficiency and  want.  Thought  is  an  endless  agitated 
heaving  of  waves,  each  one  of  which  seeks  to  melt  into  its 
other  or  fulfillment,  only  to  find  that  the  mood  of  dis- 
satisfaction has  been  intensified  by  its  other,  and  so  it  is 
doomed  to  disappointment.  Intelligence  cannot  rest  from 
the  creation  of  these  self-manufactured  ideals,  because  it 
knows  that  while  its  dissatisfaction  is  of  its  own  making, 
its  satisfaction  also  can  come  only  from  itself.  Intelli- 
gence thus  posits  itself  in  an  evolutionary  time-series  with 


84  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

the  unique  burden  or  problem  of  actual  wants  and  poten- 
tial satisfaction.  The  reaction  to  a  mood  of  want  that  is 
increasingly  disappointed  must  be  a  progressive  intensifica- 
tion of  ideals.  (Cf.  Chas.  G  Shaw,  The  Ego  and  its 
Place  in  the  World,  pp.  17,  508).  Out  of  man's  suffer- 
ing and  sorrow  has  come  much  of  his  enlarging  world.  The 
self  has  not  coolly  and  calmly  posited  itself  amidst  evolu- 
tionary development,  acting  impersonally  and  reconstruct- 
ing, according  to  its  talents,  in  ways  that  matter  not.  On 
the  contrary,  the  self  posits  itself  in  a  world  that  is  pecu- 
liarly its  own,  from  which  it  cannot  and  will  not  escape,  a 
truly  human  world  of  ideal  wants  and  ideal  satisfactions. 
In  other  words,  the  purely  logical,  psychological,  self-over- 
arching of  analysis-synthesis  is  still  mere  biological  instru- 
mentality and  does  not  disclose  the  unique  nature  and  ac- 
tivity of  the  independently  idealizing,  value-seeking  self. 
But  with  its  mood  of  want,  the  self  both  seeks  and  obtains, 
as  well  as  imposes,  the  extra-logical  immediacy  and  in- 
timacy of  content  that  possesses  a  standardizing  isolable 
value,  and  that  analysis-synthesis  only  schematizes,  after  it 
is  thus  created.  Its  dissatisfaction  with  the  content  at 
hand,  makes  the  self  posit  itself  as  infinitely  prophetic. 
Every  ideal  is  a  prophecy  of  satisfaction  and  joy,  arising 
out  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  present  ideal.  It  is  thus  that 
values  proceeding  out  of  intelligent  self-assertion,  have  be- 
come idealized  desires.  They  reflect  a  deepening  moral 
intent  because  prophetically  correlated  with  a  supreme 
ideal  of  selfhood  or  Reason  that  has  eventuated  in  the 
want-composite  of  feeling-intellect-will.  Thus  in  the 
dichotomy  that  reveals  intelligence,  there  is  a  display  of 
unique  characteristic  capacity,  that  proves  the  completed 


Self -Positing  in  a  Moral  Crisis,  and  Mood  of  Want  85 

evolutionary  advance  of  experience.     The  environment  is 
now  perfect  because  it  is  infinitely  perfecting  itself. 

67.  Plastic  Material  for  Revaluation  is  the  Fulfillment 
of  the  Biological  Situation.  There  is  no  prophecy  in  the 
actors  of  the  purely  biological  situation,  for  here  satisfac- 
tion is  a  unit,  a  fixed  quantity,  and  never  becomes  dis- 
satisfaction. There  is  no  progressive  unifying  of  situa- 
tions by  an  ideal  synthetic  bond ;  each  is  practically  a 
closed  system.  While  the  situation  may  develop  a  com- 
plexity of  action  and  reaction  in  certain  species  and  appear 
objectively  intelligent,  even  operating  with  the  psychical 
apparatus  of  perceptual  images  and  anticipation,  yet  there 
is  no  continuum  of  experience.  The  specific  response  may 
be  a  complication,  factoring  instinct  into  already  organized 
instrumentalities  of  organic  memory.  But  there  is  no 
uninterrupted  and  remorseless  succession  of  idealizations, 
and,  consequently,  no  consciousness  of  time.  Life  seems 
simply  to  be  manifesting  itself  and  maintaining  itself, 
and  functioning  in  a  temporary  environment  that  is  to  dis- 
solve in  the  perfected  environment  of  intelligence.  The 
dissolution  is  not  a  disappearance,  but  a  ballasting  or  sta- 
bilizing of  the  ideal  environment  in  experience.  Intelli- 
gence posits  itself  in  time,  prophetically  constructing  an 
ideal  world  amidst  a  content  of  experience,  that  apparently 
possesses  no  point  of  beginning,  whose  ideal  successions 
urged  by  the  restlessness  of  ideal  wants  are  always  out- 
stripping themselves  and  always  in  a  state  of  dissatisfac- 
tion. The  beginninglessness  is  really  the  heritage  of  con- 
tent, due  to  the  biological,  which  now  enters  into  a  series 
of  temporal  idealizations.  Intelligence  with  its  wants  be- 
comes infinitely  self-expansive;  every  re-combination  is  a 


86  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

new  ideal  satisfaction-dissatisfaction,  a  new  want  that 
never  has  existed  before.  In  fine,  the  immediate  content 
of  experience  is  both  found  and  created  by  the  hungering 
and  thirsting  intelligence. 

68.  The  Biological  Situation  Anticipates  the  Thought- 
Situation.  Thus  the  biological  situation  has  realized  its 
purpose  as  an  anticipation  of  the  thought-situation  where 
life  is  revealed  in  its  fullest  potentialities  and  capabilities. 
It  has  functioned  as  life-maintenance  and  stability ;  it 
functions  permanently  in  a  mutual  economy  demanded  by 
the  over-experience  of  nature.  The  over-experience  is 
now  recognized  as  having  accomplished  its  purpose  in  be- 
coming part  and  parcel  of  humanistic  experience.  Its 
relative  temporariness  has  been  destroyed  as  well  as  realiz- 
ed when  its  inheritance  became  temporal  material  in  ideal- 
izing intelligence.  The  infinite  content  of  ideal  wants  is 
already  stabilized  in  a  system  of  interests  that  have  sig- 
nified no  interruption  to  evolutionary  development.  The 
whole  scheme  of  evolution  is  co-ordinated  in  the  economy 
of  nature,  which  indeed  is  chiefly  economy  as  related  to  the 
ego,  to  man.  Evolutionary  experience  does  not  end  with 
an  attitude  of  logical  formality,  but  it  brings  with  it  cease- 
lessly oncoming  values  of  the  very  nature  of  the  self,  that 
ever  tend  to  still  its  hunger  for  content. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE    FULFILLMENT    BY    IDEALIZING    WILL 

69.  Intellect  Must  Be  Supplemented.     Now  the  prob- 
lem must  be  considered,  how  does  the  intellect  transform 
the  empirical  whose  last  word  seems  to  be  dissatisfaction 
into  a  real  value-series  whose  elements  are  purposive  and 
moralistic,  for  it  is  evident  that  the  satisfaction  of  wants  is 
only   relative   to   the   satisfaction   of   underlying   supreme 
want?     Unity  is  the  method  and  aim  of  analytic-synthetic 
idealizations.     The  ideal  of  this  unity,  the  intellect  never 
can  attain,  for  every  unified  thought-situation  immediately 
reveals  a  pluralistic  character,  requiring  further  unifica- 
tion.   The  logic  of  intellectual  operation  per  se  is  restrict- 
ed to  the  sorrow  of  unfulfilled  want.     The  logical  rest- 
lessness of  experience  seems  to  impose  a  fate  on  the  self 
that  dooms  it  to  endless  activity,   but  whose  qualitative 
values  are  still  not  of  the  ego's  willing.     How  does  the 
self  use  its  talents  to  escape  from  the  limitations  of  itself 
to   become  really   and   truly   free,  joyously  proposing  its 
autonomous  ends,   and   unmistakably  infusing  value  into 
its  own  ideals  and  then  into  the  texture  of  the  reciprocal 
ideal  experiential  environment. 

70.  Self  as  non-T  emporalistic  over  against  an  Ideal  of 
Totality.     Value  has  been  shown  to  be  the  product  of 
isolation.     (Cf.  §  42).     The  ego  establishes  the  supreme 
value   of   experience   and   saves   itself   and   its   happiness, 
bringing  peace  to  its  mood  of  w^ant  by  a  final  and  supreme 
act  of  isolation.     In  this  supreme  moment,  the  self  posits 


Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

itself  as  will.  (Cf.  Chas.  G.  Shaw,  The  Ego  and  its 
Place  in  the  World,  p.  341).  The  process  is  as  follows: 
The  intellect  has  discovered  itself  ceaselessly  operative  in 
a  temporal  world.  The  temporal  succession  brings  a  cer- 
tain empirical  enlightenment  only,  that  is  always  prophet- 
ically pointing  towards  something  else.  The  temporal 
flows  remorselessly  and  unceasingly.  I  am  not  satisfied 
with  my  present  environment,  my  experience  of  to-day. 
I  am  not  that  which  I  am,  but  that  which  I  can  be.  The 
intellect  thus  negates  its  present  status  for  a  more  positive 
assertiveness.  But  its  positive  assertiveness  turns  out  to  be 
another  self-negation.  The  intellectual  positing  of  the 
self  is  thus  a  negation  of  the  self,  amidst  the  negation  of 
the  reciprocal  environment  of  experience.  Then  just  as 
the  temporary  of  the  biological  situation  is  negatived  as 
to  its  own  independence  becoming  a  phase  of  the  temporal 
of  experience,  so  the  temporal  itself  is  negatived  to  become 
a  phase,  a  phase  in  time,  of  the  timeless  totality.  The 
ceaseless  movement  of  analysis-synthesis  is  negatived  by  a 
unity  that  is  vainly  sought  amidst  the  plurality,  but  that  is 
self-willed  in  order  to  satisfy  the  ego's  imperious  mood  of 
want.  There  is  a  reciprocity  of  supreme,  isolating,  total- 
izing act,  on  the  one  hand,  and  totality  itself,  on  the  other 
hand,  and  the  sorrow  is  transformed  by  an  inward  joy. 
It  is  the  will  that  has  acted,  wresting  a  supreme  totalizing 
value  for  its  own  sake  and  for  the  sake  of  its  experience. 
The  intellect  knows  no  way  out  and  its  monism  is  method- 
ological rather  than  real.  The  supreme  negation  of  the 
temporal  by  an  act  of  will  establishes  the  complete  depen- 
dence of  the  logical  upon  the  self  and,  reciprocally,  the 
dependence  of  the  ideal  environment  upon  the  non-tern- 


The  Fulfillment  by  Idealizing  Will  89 

poral  totality.  It  is  a  moral  attitude  of  free  co-ordinative 
evaluation,  that  makes  all  the  differences,  the  pluralities, 
the  logical  negations,  refer  back  to  self,  these  manifesting 
its  essence  and  clothed  by  it  with  positive  and  uniting  tem- 
poral values.  Finally,  it  must  be  realized  that  the  self 
has  not  willed  the  totality  and  imposed  its  values,  by  way 
of  extension  of  experience  only.  This  might  still  be  re- 
nunciation and  acquiescence  and  a  freedom  that  is  self- 
deceiving.  It  is  the  intensification  or  intension  of  experi- 
ence that  has  chiefly  been  willed.  Nothing  could  be  more 
contradictory  to  such  an  outlook  for  experience  than  the 
introduction  of  an  all-powerful,  relentless,  objective  or 
impersonal  will-of-things.  The  world  of  value,  perforce 
must  be  founded  upon  an  interpretation  of  evolution  as  in- 
tension-extension. 

71.  The  Constructive  Fulfillment  of  the  Mood  of 
Want.  The  supreme  positing  of  self  under  the  aspect  of 
the  totality  is  a  response  to  a  supreme  want  that  longs 
truly  to  evaluate  the  continuum  of  life's  activities,  and 
so  its  insistent  characteristic  must  be  a  positive,  dynamic, 
willing  of  its  humanistic  experience  or  ideal  environment. 
The  self  has  de-temporalized  its  experience,  opposing  itself 
to  its  temporal,  experiential  series.  This  opposition  as  the 
supreme  negation  of  the  formal  intellectual  phase  is  also 
at  the  next  ideal  moment  the  self-positing  of  experience, 
this  time  with  reference  to  the  totality  of  universal  evo- 
lution, and  the  worth-transformed  return  of  the  tem- 
poral. The  self  has  discovered  itself  in  an  evolution 
where  its  purposes  are  really  significant,  and  identical  with 
the  purposes  of  a  totality.  The  sorrow  of  intellect  in  the 
disappointments  of  the  ever-changing  situations  of  exper- 


9O  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

ience,  gives  place  to  joy  of  will  as  their  respective  purposes 
stand  self-revealed.  The  eternal  restlessness  is  enlight- 
ened by  the  principle  of  totality,  and  happiness  is  infinitely 
extended  through  the  intensive  joy  of  self-achievement  and 
free  self-realization. 

72.  Moments  of  Self-Positing  Lead  to  Culture  and 
Religion.  The  three  moments  or  aspects  of  the  dichotomy 
of  intelligent  evolutionary  experience,  revealing  the  self 
constructively  posited  amidst  its  experience  are,  then,  as 
follows:  the  intellectual  positing  which  comes  first,  is  en- 
lightenment and  purposive  activity  revealing  the  creative- 
ness  of  the  self  in  empirical  movement.  But  the  purpose 
is  not  yet  self-purpose,  and  the  creativeness  not  yet  self- 
creativeness.  The  movement  is,  therefore,  not  really  self- 
movement;  intelligence  sorrowfully  and  even  rebelliously 
feels  its  instrumental  character  serving  ends  not  of  its 
own  making.  Secondly,  the  will  posits  the  negation  of 
the  entire  intellectual  complex.  But  this,  thirdly,  is  the 
positive  self-positing  in  the  name  of  a  non-empirical  to- 
tality. The  enlightened  and  aroused  will  makes  the 
whole  of  the  reason  self-active.  It  now  is  aware  that  the 
intellectual  movement  is  only  the  pre-positing  series  be- 
longing to  the  understanding,  and  that  all  experience  in 
time  is  actually  the  positing  of  the  self  by  the  self.  The 
indefeasible  character  of  the  reason  consists  in  this  to- 
talizing, volitional  capacity,  that  confers  upon  experience, 
in  both  an  individual  and  social  reference,  a  dynamic  and 
objective  value-series.  Volitional  totalizing  dirempts  the 
positing  nature  of  the  self,  from  its  pre-positing  functions. 
This  diremption  posits  the  self  as  non-empirical,  intelligi- 
ble, noumenal.  It  likewise  posits  a  totality  that  is  nou- 


The  Fulfillment  by  Idealizing  Will  9* 

menal.  The  timeless,  as  summarized  in  the  Platonic 
trinity  of  the  Good,  the  True,  and  the  Beautiful,  are  re- 
alizable or  exemplifiable  in  time.  The  diremption  of  the 
self  from  the  totality  of  its  attitudes  in  experience,  is  cul- 
ture, the  "despatializing  of  the  ego,"  (Chas.  G.  Shaw, 
The  Ego  and  its  Place  in  the  World,  pp.  97,  407) ,  and  we 
may  add  its  detemporalizing  also.  It  is  likewise  religion 
because  it  is  a  unifying  practical  attitude  towards  the  to- 
tality of  all  that  is  possible.  The  ego  must  become  cul- 
tural and  religious ;  it  must  will  its  religion  before  it  can 
attain  a  true  scale  of  values  making  possible  the  construc- 
tion of  experience,  the  upbuilding  of  an  ideal  intensive-ex- 
tensive environment.  This  experience  is  the  qualitative, 
two-dimensional  infinitude  where  the  ends  or  the  mile- 
stones are  values.  It  is  inconceivable  without  autono- 
mous, indefeasible  selfhood. 

73.  The  Happiness  of  Indefeasible  Self -Realization. 
Having  accomplished  its  supreme  act  of  isolation  in  the 
noumenal  positing  of  self,  thus  discovering  its  final  source 
of  value,  the  intelligence  now  discovers  fountains  of  joy 
in  the  ceaseless  combinations  and  re-combinations  of  ex- 
perience now  apprehended  as  purposive.  It  has  found 
its  salvation  and  its  happiness  with  itself,  within  the  sav- 
ing grace  of  its  value-idealizations.  It  has  been  able  to 
make  an  interest  out  of  the  farthest  reach  of  the  non- 
empirical,  thereby  attaining  the  criterion  or  law  of  perfect 
valuation;  for  there  are  no  values  more  essentially  real, 
than  those  imposed  by  the  purposes  of  totality.  It  has 
received  the  joy  of  the  creative  task  of  formulating  and  ap- 
plying this  universal  law.  The  purposive  realization  of 
self,  in  harmony  with  the  infinitely  potential  realization 


92  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

of  the  totality,  is  now  its  problem.  An  infinite  qualitative 
ideal  thus  has  been  set  as  the  goal  of  extensive-intensive 
evolution.  If  the  valuation  process  of  ideal  evolutionary 
development  brings  sorrow  in  its  train,  it  is  no  longer  be- 
cause intellect  finds  itself  thwarted  by  aimless  and  hopeless 
extension,  but  rather  because  the  intensive  ideals  of  the 
will  find  themselves  thwarted.  But  when  the  struggle  is 
overcome,  joy  alternates  with  suffering  and  happiness  is 
more  complete.  For  true  happiness  is  made  up  of  joys, 
not  of  uniform  joy. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  CATEGORICAL  IMPERATIVE  AS  CULTURE  AND  RELIGION 

74.  The  Character  of  the  Law  of  Qualitative  Values. 
In  the  light  of  the  voluntary  positing  of  self  in  culture 
and  religion,  we  may  conclude  that  it  is  by  the  operation 
of  valuation  rather  than  by  that  of  logical  relations,  that 
the  self  proves  its  uniqueness,  its  superiority,  its  indefeas- 
ibility,  and  its  immeasurable  elevation  above  instinct.  It 
would  not,  then,  be  correct  to  say  that  the  thought- 
situation  is  a  development  with  commensurable  steps  out 
of  the  biological  situation.  The  latter  may  be  viewed  as  a 
forerunner,  a  funding  of  material  content.  It  can  be  de- 
scribed from  the  viewpoint  of  thought,  of  experience,  but 
the  converse  does  not  hold.  We  are  now  ready  to  frame 
the  criterion  or  law  that  shall  express  the  supreme  value 
and  that  shall  arrange  a  qualitative  scale  of  values.  We 
see  that  the  same  law  will  have  to  be  willed  by  all  moral 
beings,  because  each  individual  as  a  hankering,  prophetic 
will  realizes  his  indefeasible  self-creative  freedom  in  a 
noumenal  world,  that  is,  a  world  of  purpose  where  pur- 
poses themselves  are  totalized  by  a  grand  purpose.  Pur- 
posive evolution  implies  a  single  moral  norm.  But  al- 
though the  law  is  one,  its  applications,  its  value-conferring 
powers  are  as  indefinite  as  the  extension  of  experience, 
and  as  intensively  variable  as  the  self-regulated  conditions 
of  autonomy.  Its  exemplifications  are  as  infinite  as  the 
growth  of  the  ideal  environment,  and  therefore  in  its 

93 


94  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

potential  expressions,  the  law  is  as  full  of  variety  as  there 
are  manifolds  of  states  in  indefeasible  selves.  Lastly,  it 
follows  that  as  the  law  must  express  the  grand  purpose 
of  the  totality,  it  cannot  be  material  and  specific  in  its  own 
content.  Its  genesis  is  noumenal  and  so  it  cannot  be  a 
formulation  ontologically  from  experience,  but  rather  for 
experience.  It  must  be  a  form  of  universal  legislation. 
The  centralizing  creativeness  of  the  law  really  acts  to 
bestow  a  noumenal  conditioning  upon  experience.  At 
heart,  the  evolution  of  the  ideal  environment  is  thus  a 
noumenally  directed  continuation  of  the  process  of  life. 
In  fine,  we  have  come  upon  the  fundamental,  non-empiri- 
cal law  of  values  in  retracing  the  revelation  of  the  rounded 
self  in  the  reciprocity  of  its  potentially  infinite  and  glorious 
experience. 

75.  Kant's  Categorical  Imperative  from  a  Genetic  Ap- 
proach.    We  are  now  ready  from  a  genetic  approach  and 
an  evolutionary  standpoint  for  a  re-statement  of  Kant's 
categorical  imperative.     From  the  aspect  of  the  dichotomy 
that  reveals  the   reciprocity  of   intelligence  and  environ- 
ment, the  categorical,  imperative  character  of  this  law  lies 
in  the  fact  that  it  is  the  method  attained  by  life  that  is 
now  s'elf-directive   in   evolution,    intelligently   self-expres- 
sive with  the  imposition  of  values  in  experience.     It  is  the 
infinitely  important  furthering  of  purposes  that  stand  in- 
telligently self-revealed  through  cultural  and  religious  in- 
trospection.    As  autonomy  in  action,  it  is  not  necessarily 
rigoristic.     It  does  not  destroy  the  natural  inclinations  of 
the  self ;    on  the  contrary,  it  makes  possible  the  pleasure 
of  self-creative  conquests. 

76.  The  Re-statement   of  the   Categorical  Imperative. 


Categorical  Imperative  as  Culture  and  Religion       95 

The  dichotomy  of  experience  shows  the  ceaselessly  active 
self  in  the  midst  of  the  reciprocally  developing  environ- 
ment. The  noumenal  positing  of  the  self,  shows  the  intel- 
ligent will  over  against  the  totality  of  its  environment.  It 
also  shows  the  totality  as  a  supreme  ideal  and  the  ideal 
environment  of  experience  as  the  consequent  functioning 
of  the  supreme  norm.  The  self-positing  of  the  ego  is  the 
source  of  value,  and  the  working  out  of  its  self-imposed 
law  orientates  all  the  values  of  life.  The  categorically  im- 
perative law  takes  two  forms  according  to  the  ideally 
separated  moments  of  the  dichotomy,  a  form  that  relates 
to  the  self  and  a  form  that  relates  to  the  totality.  Both 
forms  are  dynamic  and  can  be  separated  only  to  be  re- 
united in  the  reciprocity  of  environment.  As  purely  intro- 
spective analysis,  the  categorical  imperative  expresses  the 
indefeasibility  of  the  autonomous  individual: 

So  act  as  to  treat  humanity,  whether  in 
thine  own  person  or  in  that  of  any  other,  in 
every  case  as  an  end,  never  as  a  means  only. 

As  adding  the  prospective  environment,  the  categorical 
imperative  expresses  the  indefeasibility  of  universal  con- 
duct or  activity,  for  only  such  will  realize  the  purposes 
of  the  totality: 

Act  so  that  the  maxim  of  thy  will  can 
always,  at  the  same  time,  hold  good  as  a 
principle  of  universal  legislation. 

The  two  forms  in  unison  show  the  self  as  realizing  its 


96  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

own  purposes  in  self-orientation;  in  isolation  from  and 
combination  with  experience ;  in  autonomous  application 
of  a  scale  of  values.  The  completed  categorical  impera- 
tive is  also  a  program  for  the  absolute  evolutionary  poten- 
tiality of  the  self.  For  while  the  supreme  value  is  thus 
made  equivalent  to  a  fixed  fundamental  immovable  sense 
of  values,  and  to  an  indefeasible  platform  of  values,  the 
specific  formulations  of  universal  legislation  are  subject 
to  revision  and  amendment  with  the  growth  of  intellectual 
enlightenment.  The  will  wills  to  follow  the  intellect ;  the 
clash  of  ideals  in  the  realms  of  theory  and  practice  may 
still  go  on.  But  it  insists  that  the  intellect  should  regard 
the  noumenal  law  that  its  own  extremest  idealization  has 
established.  The  field  of  evolution  is  a  "kingdom  of 
ends" ;  these  ends  may  be  temporal  and  therefore  change- 
able. But  the  kingdom  itself  is  the  grand  end  absolutely 
stable  and  unchanging. 

77.  The  Categorical  Imperative  Solves  the  Contradic- 
tion of  Extrinsic  Values.  With  the  recognition  of  the 
categorical  imperative  as  the  norm  of  quality  and  worth, 
we  have  solved  definitely  the  dilemma  or  contradiction 
of  the  qualitative  that  may  turn  out  to  b'e  a  temporarily 
masquerading  quantitative.  Values  are  recognized  in 
their  true  character.  They  are  not  such  merely  by  virtue 
or  their  position  in  the  logical  structure,  but  they  neces- 
sarily account  for  the  structure  itself  constituting  with 
relations  actual  phases  in  experience.  The  intelligence  has 
now  undergone  a  moral  crisis.  A  supreme  law  of  value, 
directly  and  immediately  reflecting  the  intelligence,  has 
been  willed  as  a  norm  irrespective  of  empirical  relations, 
and  experience  is  now  functional  of  the  volitional  positing 


Categorical  Imperative  as  Culture  and  Religion       97 

of  self.  The  pluralities  of  existence  that  exhibit  the 
analytic-synthetic  process  of  thought,  cannot  now  appear 
as  the  cause  of  irrepressive  annoyance.  They  come  because 
their  value  has  been  willed,  and  they  are  satisfying  in  their 
time  and  place.  The  unsatisfying,  onward-reaching, 
prophetic  nature  of  the  intellect  has  turned  out  to  be  sat- 
isfying because  all  the  prophecies  now  relate  to  a  prophecy 
that  has  been  fulfilled.  The  vicious  circle  of  recurrent 
unities  has  been  broken.  The  endless  idealizations  in 
time,  are  finally  supported  by  the  ideal  of  a  detemporalized 
conditioning.  The  unities  no  longer  act  as  disappearing 
points  in  the  circle  of  experience,  but  each  one  functions 
simultaneously  as  subjective  value  and  as  analytic  relation- 
al plurality.  The  totality  has  become  a  retroactive  ideal, 
and  so  the  non-empirical  has  essentially  and  prophetically 
become  part  of  experience.  Lastly,  experience  as  a  grand 
summation  will  ever  remain  an  infinite  and  inspiring 
ideal. 

78.  The  Categorical  Imperative  Provides  the  Recip- 
rocity of  Culture  and  Religion.  Furthermore,  as  the 
values  of  experience' are  willed  from  the  two  dichotomous 
points  of  view  of  the  self  and  the  environment,  they  reveal 
the  culture  of  the  self  and  the  religion  of  the  self.  (Cf. 
Chas.  G.  Shaw,  The  Ego  and  its  Place  in  the  World,  pp. 
510,  517  and  passim).  The  first  form  of  the  categorical 
imperative  emphasizing  the  de-temporalized  aspect  of  self 
is  the  expression  of  the  spirit  of  man,  or  the  mood  of 
culture.  The  other  form  emphasizing  the  totality  and 
directive  of  destiny  fulfills  the  soul's  most  imperious  wants 
and  is  the  mood  of  religion.  In  the  completed  form,  cul- 
ture and  religion  are  reciprocal  moods  of  the  self,  outlin- 


98  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

ing  the  method  of  intelligence  in  its  construction  of  the 
world.  The  self  is  conscious  of  its  ability  to  manage  ex- 
perience, but  it  further  realizes  its  co-operative  dependence 
upon  a  common  destiny. 

79.  Perfect  Autonomy  Found  in  Culture  and  Relig- 
ion.    True  freedom  is  obtained  in  culture  and   religion. 
For  without  the  grand  and  final  isolation  of  personality 
amidst  its  kingdom  of  ends,  it  is  impossible  to  escape  from 
values  as  economic,  that  is,  as  masquerading  quantitative 
relations.     If  supreme  values  are  merely  willed  within  the 
empirical  circle,  they  are  willed  in  a  kind  of  moral  des- 
peration, a  purpose  being  forced  upon  experience,  a  belief 
being  created  post  facto.    Values  that  simply  clarify  past 
action  do  not  necessarily  control  it,  or  account  for  it.    The 
initiative  is  still  external  to  the  self,  which  has  not  awak- 
ened to  true  freedom,  or  willed  .its  experience.     Passive 
values  even  where  the  self  interprets  them  as  such,  do  not 
rise  from  economic  to  moral,  because  there  is  no  self-crea- 
tion about  them.  But  culture  wills  personality  as  supreme 
value,  and  as  the  subject  of  experience.     It  is  this  subject 
that  finds  a  predicate  for  itself  in  the  evolutionary  pro- 
cess.    It  discovers  in  its  intelligence  the  possibility  of  an 
infinite  environment.     In  the  discovery  of  this  environ- 
ment, the  self  passes  on  to  religion. 

80.  The  Final  Support  of  Value  is  the  Religious  Mood. 
The  self-willing  of  culture  after  all,  has  been  the  momen- 
tary negation  of  experience  in  space  and  time,  but  it  has 
not  been  negation  merely.    The  obverse  phase  is  the  nega- 
tion of  the  negation  in  the  affirmative,  that  is,  the  all- 
reflecting  positing  of  the  self  in  that  infinite  expansion  of 
experience  that  is  the  true  reciprocity  of  the  self.     The 


Categorical  Imperative  as  Culture  and  Religion       99 

affirmative  self-positing  that  discovers  the  final  destiny,  is 
a  self-revelation  of  universal  purpose  amidst  a  personal 
attitude  of  self-legislation.  Value  identifies  itself  with  the 
morality  of  universal  purpose.  Morality  bases  itself  upon 
voluntary  conviction  and  belief,  and  becomes  in  its  essence, 
an  expression  of  the  totalizing  religious  sentiment.  Relig- 
ion is  found  just  in  this  attitude  towards  a  final  totality  of 
all  that  is.  The  categorical  imperative  entering  at  last 
as  the  criterion  of  value,  into  all  the  values  that  create 
the  humanistic  world,  is  founded  upon  a  religious  assump- 
tion of  freedom.  Its  autonomy  is  a  deliberate  declaration 
of  independence  from  all  heteronomy  of  space-and-time 
forms  and  conditions.  Not  one  of  these  can  by  itself  ful- 
fill the  inward  moral  want,  although  each  may  bear  upon 
and  influence  its  satisfaction.  The  kingdom  of  ends  that 
is  infinitely  tending  to  satisfy  the  absolute  want  of  the  self, 
in  the  terms  of  religious  inspiration  and  history  and 
achievement,  is  the  kingdom  of  Heaven. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE   MORAL   CRISIS   IN    ITS    SOCIAL   GENESIS 

81.  The    Ego    and    Experience.     We    have    seen    that 
evolution  is  the  development  of  a  unique  cultural  environ- 
ment, the  construction  of  a  reciprocal  world  in  accord- 
ance with  a  system  of  values  founded  on  supreme  value. 
It  is  a  free,  indefinitely  continuable  series  of  worths  re- 
flecting   personality    with    its    hopes    and    fears.       The 
primevally  blind  impulse  of  life  has  become  self-realized 
and  self-enlightened  in  the  ego.     It  is  now  understand- 
ingly  and  emotionally  interested  in  its  self-expression.     Its 
action  is  not  so  much  reaction  as  real  action,  or  perhaps 
selfward    reaction,    capable    of    exercising    a    balance    of 
power,  manifesting  real  freedom   in  a  social  experience. 
Evolution  is  the  drama  of  intelligence  which   in  the  to- 
tality has  willed  a  religious  climax.     The  dramatic  pre- 
sentation is  that  of  culture.    The  unities  of  time  and  place 
direct  the  unfolding.     As  one  of  the  primary  aims  of  ex- 
perience,   the    thought-situation    has    a    cultural-religious 
character;    as  the  secondary  proximate  aim  of  equilibra- 
tion, or  what  is  the  same,  as  the  instrumentality  of  expe- 
rience,  it   is   cultural-scientific. 

82.  Culture  and  Religion    Come  from   Social   Experi- 
ence.    However,    the   categorical    imperative    that   makes 
possible  an  attitude  towards  experience  as  purposive  and 
as   total,   and   that  opens   the   view   of   the  evolutionary 
drama,  although  it  must  posit  supreme  isolation  as  express- 

100 


The  Moral  Crisis  in  its  Social  Genesis  101 

ing  supreme  value,  nevertheless  forbids  any  isolated,  un- 
social dramas.  Its  application  immediately  becomes  con- 
tent of  universal  legislation,  and  so  is  necessarily  social. 
The  noumenal  positing  of  self  is  a  truly  religious  act, 
placing  the  personality  en  rapport  with  a  maximum  of 
experience  where  purpose  may  be  read.  This  hankering 
after  destiny  is  essentially  social  thinking;  it  is  the  con- 
tinuance of  thought-interchange  and  thought-communion; 
it  is  the  realization  that  a  universal  aim  is  possessed  and 
must  be  attained,  in  common.  The  categorical  imperative 
becomes  a  religious  institution,  and,  like  all  such,  is  essen- 
tially social  thinking  and  behavior.  The  relationship, 
furthermore,  of  the  respective  individualized  dramas,  is 
that  of  indefeasibly  co-operative  units.  Not  only  is  the 
self  indefeasible,  but  its  very  outlook  of  infinite  extension- 
intension  of  experience  makes  it  recognize  the  indefeasibil- 
ity  of  selves.  Disinterested  self-valuation  free  from  the 
complications  of  economic  situations,  motivated  by  the  hol- 
iness of  personality,  calls  for  the  furtherance  of  the  non- 
empirical  aims  by  a  plurality  of  personalities.  While  men 
have  discovered  that  they  possess  the  same  destiny  and  the 
same  law,  and  must  follow  the  same  universal  legislation, 
they  also  have  discovered  that  the  idealizations  possible  in 
experience  are  infinitely  varied.  They  may  make  their 
indefeasibility  good  by  an  individualized  process  of  an- 
alysis whose  aim  is  a  social  synthesis  which  again  is  thrown 
back  into  an  individual  analysis.  The  undulation  may 
be  compared  to  that  of  the  purely  logical  process,  except 
that  there  is  here  an  interchange  of  individual  and  social, 
and  that  the  mood  is  a  deepening  prolongation  of  the 
peace  that  has  followed  the  moral  crisis.  (Cf.  §  71), 


IO2  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

There  is  all  the  room  necessary  for  the  holy  and  inspiring 
egoism  of  the  super-personality.  In  a  word,  the  isolation 
of  values  that  builds  the  thought-situation,  and  that  rises 
towards  clarification  in  an  equilibration  process,  is  not  a 
personal,  individual  harmonization  alone,  but  just  as  well, 
a  social  harmonization.  Not  that  others  must  be  just  as 
satisfied  as  myself, — they  may  indeed  be  very  much  dis- 
satisfied with  the  harmonization  that  I  have  brought 
about.  But  my  values,  to  have  meaning,  must  have  social 
axes  of  reference,  must  be  applicable  to  the  social  destiny 
where  I  build  autonomously  according  to  my  talents.  The 
thought-situation  is,  then,  an  angle  or  a  viewpoint  in  the 
living  contexture  of  the  larger  social  experience.  My 
values  are  also  social  worths,  and  I  can  no  more  frame 
an  abstract,  egotistically  isolated  system  of  values,  than 
I  can  frame  for  myself  an  isolated  system  of  intellectual 
relationships.  Either  case  would  remove  me  from  the 
general  trend  of  the  evolutionary  development  of  expe- 
rience. 

83.  The  History  of  Value  Content.  How  values  pass 
back  and  forth  in  the  larger  experience,  how  they  are 
accepted  and  actualized  by  the  individual  from  their  social 
situation  where  their  moral  characteristic  is  so  far  poten- 
tial, is  as  much  a  matter  of  psychology  as  it  is  of  ethics. 
The  individual  is  born  into  the  kingdom  of  ends,  which 
men  are  laboring  to  attain,  just  as  he  is  born  into  all  its 
agencies  in  the  shape  of  his  intellectual  equipment,  for  the 
carrying  out  of  these  ends.  In  other  words,  he  finds  him- 
self already  part  of  an  evolutionary  development  moti- 
vated by  values  and  adjusted  by  relations.  He  finds  him- 
self first  in  the  easy  process  of  mental  equilibration  by 


The  Moral  Crisis  in  its  Social  Genesis  103 

means  of  imitative  mental  images  rather  than  self-respon- 
sible ideals;  in  the  condition  of  living  by  that  all-embrac- 
ing social  imagination,  which  has  indeed  been  recom- 
mended by  some  sociologists  as  the  infallible  guide  to  con- 
duct. He  naturally  has  made  the  incontrovertible  dis- 
covery that  a  system  of  isolated  values  would  be  almost 
as  absurd  as  a  system  of  isolated  relations.  He  acts 
through  imitation,  Sittllchkeit,  legality,  rather  than 
through  the  application  of  the  categorical  imperative  as 
the  moral  norm.  While  psychology  describes  the  mental 
genesis  of  values,  ethics  will  supplement  the  account  by 
pointing  to  a  moral  crisis  that  makes  for  a  personal  inter- 
pretation and  appreciation  of  values  by  a  self-identification 
of  personality  and  experience  with  supreme  value,  and  the 
voluntary  cultural  and  religious  positing  of  the  categorical 
imperative.  It  can,  then,  show  that  the  stage  of  evolution 
by  semi-automatic  images  instead  of  by  ideals  bearing 
a  value  coefficient  is  just  preparatory,  a  matter  of  ac- 
tion-habituation  and  natural  economy.  The  original  atti- 
tude that  values  are  not  problems  is  discovered  to  have 
been  a  temporary  assumption  when  autonomy  asserts  itself. 
84.  The  Rise  of  Value  through  Revaluation.  We 
have  spoken  already  of  the  stabilizing  function  and  the 
heritage  of  material  that  is  given  from  the  biological  sit- 
uation. (Cf.  §  67).  The  background  of  the  moral  cri- 
sis which  arises  in  experience  and  bestows  a  metaphysical 
transformation  upon  it,  requires  completion  by  means  of 
the  introduction  of  the  social  situation.  The  complexity 
of  the  factors  of  the  thought-situation  bears  in  its  compo- 
sition the  instinctive  life-processes  and  many  other  ele- 
ments derived  from  the  biological  situation.  Biological 


IO4  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

interests,  dating  upwards  from  the  crude  will-to-live,  be- 
come for  intelligence  organized  values,  their  very  pre- 
ponderance during  the  early  stages  of  the  growth  of  intel- 
lect in  the  individual  making  for  the  basal  life-establish- 
ment of  humanity.  Now,  just  as  values  originate  from  the 
interests  of  full  life,  so  the  theoretical  self-apprehension 
of  values,  the  moral  crisis,  originates  in  a  situation  of  social 
interests  that  is  forced  upon  the  individual  by  the  environ- 
ment of  a  larger  experience.  Action  which  is  the  sine  qua 
non  of  life,  would  be  impossible  on  the  basis  of  pure  theory 
from  the  beginning.  As  conscious  life  starts  with  unques- 
tioned interests,  so  intelligent  life  must  start  with  un- 
questioned values.  The  theory  of  the  complete  moral 
experience,  namely  the  categorical  imperative,  springs  up 
from  amidst  the  course  of  action.  It  is  the  grammar  of 
action,  although  it  differs  from  grammar  in  its  autonomous 
prescriptive  right.  But  grammar  is  an  after-thought ;  men 
must  speak,  using  terms  expressive  of  many  interests, 
before  the  rationalizing  stage  is  attained  that  seeks  to 
account  for  the  structure  and  variations  of  words  and 
sentences.  The  evolution  of  intelligence  in  its  reciprocal 
environment  as  it  develops  according  to  values,  is  to  be 
noted  and  grasped  as  the  ideal  re-creation  and  infinitely 
continuous  intension-extension  of  given  data.  The  view 
of  totality  once  it  has  been  attained,  reveals  the  real  sig- 
nificance of  these  data,  but  the  intellect  has  reached  its 
self-positing  judgment  in  the  midst  of  its  activity,  while 
experimenting  with  values  at  hand.  The  thought-situ- 
ations of  the  individual  are  thus  raised  on  the  pedestal  of 
the  social  which,  in  turn,  stands  on  the  base  of  the  biologi- 
cal. 


The  Moral  Crisis  in  its  Social  Genesis  105 

85.  Freedom  of  Valuation  Through  the  Independence 
of  a  Moral  Crisis.     Intelligence  is  truly  born  as  reason 
when  the  individual  becomes  independent  as  will,  taking 
charge  of  the  evaluating  progression  of  evolution.     Per- 
sonality recognizing  itself  as  self-creative  in  experience,  is 
manifested  with  the  coming  of  the  moral  crisis.    The  cate- 
gorical imperative  having  been  discovered  and  self-reveal- 
ed to  satisfy  a  dominating  mood  of  want,  becomes  the  axis 
of    reference,    co-ordinating   all   values.      The   individual 
may  now  re-enter  without  danger,  the  bond  of  the  non- 
personal,   generalized,  moral  valuations  of  society.     For 
he  may   retain  his   perfect  independence,   conscious  that, 
after  all  is  said  and  done,  he  is  always  expressing  his  auton- 
omy.    He  is  aware  that  social  progress  can  come  only  by 
the  synthesis  of  his  personal  contribution,  as  the  offspring 
of  his  freedom. 

86.  Moral   Independence   and   Adolescence.     It    prob- 
ably will  be   accepted   by   all,    regardless   of   any   special 
theory  of  values,  that  the  moral  crisis  forms  part  of  the 
special  psychology  of  adolescence.     It,  is  in  this  period  that 
the  moral  attitude  becomes  critical,  that  intellectual  inde- 
pendence commences  to  assert  itself,  and  that  the  hunger 
for  values  makes  itself  inwardly  felt  as  an  acute  want. 
The  work  that  falls  to  the  mental  life  is  the  critical  clari- 
fication, so  far  as  limited   experience  can  allow,   of  the 
ready-made  material  of  values  hitherto  accepted  without 
examination.     The  task  is  one  of  reconstruction, — an  in- 
ward evaluation  of  values,  a  deepening  or  intensification 
of  the  general  evolutionary  advancement  of  adjustment  to 
ideals.     It  is  while  engaged  in  this  task  of  insight  that  the 
self  finds  itself.    Self-positing  does  not  precede  experience 


106  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

but  occurs  in  the  midst  of  it.  It  is,  in  reality,  the  criti- 
cal and  theoretical  apprehension  of  life's  intelligible  con- 
tent under  the  aspect  of  worth.  What  originally  may 
have  been  the  ego's  by  the  doubtful  right  of  imitative  men- 
tal images,  is  now  its  sure  possession  as  its  very  own  ideal. 
87.  Absence  of  Self -Positing,  a  Negative  Proof  of  Per- 
fect Freedom.  If  all  men  do  not  experience  the  moral 
crisis  which  is  a  transformation  in  life  that  comes  through 
gradual  enlightenment  of  the  will  rather  than  in  a  sudden 
moment  of  regeneration,  it  simply  proves  that  the  auton- 
omy of  will  is  so  perfect,  that  it  may  refuse  to  exercise  its 
freedom,  and  remain  heteronomous  for  an  indefinitely  long 
time  behind  other  free  beings.  But  it  is  extremely  doubt- 
ful if  there  is  any  intelligent  being  that  has  utterly 
abnegated  his  freedom.  The  moral  crisis  is  the  fruition  of 
a  growing  sense  of  values;  it  is  a  complete  "over-all"  val- 
uation. The  sense  of  values  is  already  evident,  when  it  is 
acknowledged  that  "the  good  is  better  than  the  bad,"  and 
in  the  presence  of  this  conviction,  the  hope  of  a  moral  crisis 
is  well  founded. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  NATURE  OF  CONSCIENCE 

88.  Conscience  the  Coalescence  of  Social  and  Individ- 
ual Worths.  As  the  social  and  the  individual  worlds 
coalesce  in  the  functional  activity  of  active  apperception, 
forming  a  time-space  world  of  relations  and  things,  so  that 
while  the  things  are  mine  and  the  relations  are  mine,  they 
are,  nevertheless,  also  general;  so,  in  like  manner,  the  so- 
cial and  the  individual  worlds  of  worth  coalesce  in  con- 
science. Conscience  is  the  moral  apperceptive  group ;  it 
is  the  psychological  and  subjective  complication  of  values 
functioning  almost  habitually  in  the  moral  life.  It  is  not 
the  sense  of  values  in  itself,  but  rather  the  gauge  showing 
the  incessant  motor  power  of  it.  As  a  moral  apperception, 
it  is  a  complex  of  value  judgments  funded  for  use  in  the 
interpretative  evolutionary  experience  of  the  individual. 
As  psychological,  it  represents  the  beliefs  that  are  favor- 
able to  action,  (Cf.  Ralph  B.  Perry,  Present  Philosoph- 
ical Tendencies,  p.  7 ) ,  often  based  upon  and  following 
tradition  when  its  outlook  has  to  do  with  the  more  so- 
cial aspect  of  values.  Furthermore,  it  most  often  oper- 
ates without  any  psychical  disturbance,  being  the  silent 
partner  of  the  ordinary  course  of  events  in  the  ordinary 
development  of  experience.  It  energizes  from  behind  the 
scenes,  dwelling  apart  from  the  illuminated  focus  of  con- 
sciousness. At  times,  its  action  seems  to  be  by  means  of 
imitative  mental  images  instead  of  ideals;  it  then  seems 

107 


io8  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

to  be  equivalent  to  social  instincts  rather  than  duty,  jus- 
tifying the  definition  by  Darwin  of  "a  wounded  social 
insinct."  Wherein  do  its  dignity  and  greatness  really 
consist  ? 

89.  Conscience  More  than  Psychological.     It  must  be 
noticed  that  the  functioning  of  conscience  is  however,  a 
great  deal  more  than  psychological.  It  is  always  "the  whole 
man,"  the  free  individual  who  is  acting,  and  he  has  simply 
handed  over  his  habitual  conduct  to  the  economy  of  psy- 
chological   processes.     This    is   done   just    in    order    that 
he  might   retain  his   intellectual   freedom   and   freshness. 
For  when  the  issue  involved  is  out  of  the  rut  of  the  or- 
dinary, conscience  sharply  rises  into  the  brilliant  focus  of 
consciousness  and  negates  the  action  until  its  value  has 
been  harmonized  with  the  general  scheme  of  values.    (Cf. 
§   61).      It  has  proved   the  presence  of  the  Self  as  the 
critic  that  has  set  the  problem  for  intelligence  to  solve. 
The  criticism  may  be  repudiated  in  the  light  of  conscience, 
but  the  outstanding  fact  remains  that  there  has  been  a 
moral  conflict,  that  personal  evaluation  is  always  present 
by  means  of  conscience.     Conduct  apparently  by  images 
is  really  guided  by  ideals  capable  of  being  re-formed  when- 
ever there  is  need.     Conscience  is,  then,  not  just  instinct 
social  or  intuitive,  but  it  is  the  ego  itself  in  the  inter-re- 
lated development  of  values,  setting  the  problems  and  the 
ends  of  experience,  and  making  possible  a  self-created  evo- 
lutionary environment. 

90.  Conscience  Expresses  the  Joy  of  Self-Creative  Ex- 
perience.    There  is   no  such   thing  as  conscience   in  the 
biological  situation  because  here  there  is  only  one  line  of 
reaction ;  theory  and  ideals  would  embarrass  and  inter- 


The  Nature  of  Conscience  109 

fere  with  the  organized  instinct.  But  in  the  thought-sit- 
uation, the  whole  scheme  of  evolution  has  become  the 
theory  and  the  ideal  of  intelligence ;  evolution  has  become 
self-conscious  and  self-creative  in  a  grand  scheme  of 
values.  The  ends  of  life  are  self-posited  and  are  a  subject 
of  grave  concern  to  the  intelligence.  Conscience  is  thus 
operative,  not  alone  as  theoretical  moral  apperception,  but 
also  as  the  joyous  self-willing  of  life's  activities  in  accord- 
ance with  the  preference  dating  from  the  moral  crisis. 
(Cf.  §  73).  It  is  really  the  entire  complex  of  con- 
sciousness, embodying  in  its  ideals  the  hopes,  the  fears, 
the  volitions,  etc.,  of  the  many-sided  self.  Success  is 
bound  up  with  gladness,  while  thwarting  or  defeat,  brings 
sorrow.  The  stings  of  conscience  are  provocative  of  real 
pain,  while  its  approval  means  the  happiness  of  perfect 
adaptation  to  the  ever-enlarging  ideal  environment.  Its 
voice  may  be  stilled  in  a  positive  or  in  a  negative  manner, 
that  is,  its  sharp  negative  criticism  may  have  been  funded 
intellectually  in  the  harmonization  that  has  created  a  new 
moral  apperception,  or  the  problematic  value  suggested  by 
its  criticism  may  have  been  repudiated  and  banished  from 
the  scheme  of  worths.  In  all  cases,  it  is  the  free  self  that 
has  registered  itself  in  the  dynamism  of  conscience. 

91.  Conscience  as  the  Self  Acting  Efficiently  and  Intui- 
tively. Conscience  is  sometimes  minimized,  especially  by 
utilitarian  schools  of  ethics,  when  they  point  out  its  plain 
psychological  genesis  in  the  life-history  of  the  individual. 
It  is  shown  to  be  originally  a  social  emotion  arising  from 
a  sense  of  harmony  with  the  external  environment,  etc. 
But  the  irrelevancy  of  the  psychological  criticism  and  its 
metaphysical  inadequacy  will  become  evident  when  the 


no  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

general,  social  background  of  the  moral  crisis  is  recalled. 
(Cf.  §  84).  The  individual  finds  himself,  that  is,  he 
discovers  his  individuality  by  reconstructing  the  world  of 
values.  His  experience  has  only  then  taken  the  form 
of  a  world  of  values  when  he  has  undergone  a  moral 
crisis  for  himself.  The  self  posits  its  supreme  value  amidst 
the  turmoil  and  confusion  of  the  values  that  it  must  inter- 
pret. When  it  formulates  its  moral  imperative  it  simul- 
taneously registers  its  ideal  desires,  its  values,  in  conscience 
which  thereafter  functions  in  the  name  of  the  autonomous 
self.  The  development  of  conscience  has  been  coeval  with 
the  development  of  the  moral  problem.  Its  activity  implies 
the  continuance,  the  intensification,  the  lastingness  of  that 
problem.  The  traditional  honor  that  belongs  to  it  is 
meant  for  the  moral  self.  Its  place  may  be  described  with 
the  same  words  that  Schliermache-r  formulates  the  law  of 
duty: 

Act  at  every  instant  with  all  thy  moral 
power,  and  aiming  at  thy  whole  moral 
problem.  (Cf.  Richard  Falckenberg,  His- 
tory of  Modern  Philosophy,  tr.  A.  C.  Arm- 
strong, p.  486). 

If  we  bear  in  mind  that  conscience  has  a  history  both 
psychological  and  ethical,  it  would  not  lead  to  ambiguity 
to  use  the  term  intuitional  of  its  activities.  Its  valuation 
is  ordinarily  immediate  and  out  of  sight  of  deliberative 
processes.  The  commonly  accepted  values,  such  as  home, 
country,  etc.,  function  at  once  as  ethical  energizers  of 
thought-situations.  In  fact,  these  concepts  do  not  seem 


The  Nature  of  Conscience  ill 

to  possess  any  genetic  value-development,  but  to  be  orig- 
inal moral  isolations  forming  the  content  of  the  categorical 
imperative.  But  when  they  are  apprehended  as  the 
promptings  and  teachings  of  conscience  (not  to  consci- 
ence) their  apparent  intuitional  character  finds  a  ready 
explanation  in  the  sacrosanct  character  bestowed  by  uni- 
versal experimentation  upon  certain  ways  of  experience. 
They  thus  rise  to  the  apparent  dignity  of  original  utter- 
ances of  conscience. 

92.  Conscience  as  the  Moral  Faculty.  The  develop- 
ment of  conscience  as  the  faculty  of  the  good  may  be  com- 
pared to  that  of  the  aesthetic  sense  as  the  faculty  of  the 
beautiful.  The  latter  like  the  former,  is  to  all  intents,  an 
intuitive  recognition.  In  the  presence  of  individual  in- 
stances of  its  expression,  its  genesis  if  there  is  any,  has  van- 
ished. Further,  if  every  step  of  its  history  could  be  re- 
traced psychologically,  there  would  still  be  no  exact  ac- 
counting for  its  preferences  and  verdicts.  We  would  have 
to  go  back  of  the  psychological  to  the  cultural  self-inter- 
pretation by  intelligence  of  its  aims  and  its  purposes.  We 
should  then  find  that  this  "disinterested  enjoyment  of  the 
beautiful,"  this  apprehension  of  the  "universal  without  the 
concept,"  (to  use  the  expressions  of  Kant)  is  but  the 
sensuous  enjoyment  of  a  symbolic  exemplification  of  all  the 
phases  of  the  representative  ideals  of  personality.  These 
ideals  are  values  within  the  purview  of  conscience  as  the 
moral  self.  The  aesthetic  faculty,  the  judgment  of  the 
beautiful,  is  really  under  the  dominion  of  conscience.  Both 
equally  register  the  moral  activity,  the  value-sense,  of  the 
experientially  active  self.  Their  similarity  is  along  the 
lines  of  their  co-adjutive  relation;  in  the  development 


112  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

of  experience,  they  function  as  phases  different  in  kind. 
The  aesthetic  situation  is  rather  the  phase  of  the  settled 
moral  conflict. 

93.  Psychological  Pleasure  and  Moral  Pleasure  in  Au- 
tonomous Activity.  We  already  have  endeavored  in  our 
discussion  of  the  genetic  and  social  structure  of  autonomy 
and  in  our  defence  of  inward  qualitative  possibilities  in 
action  by  Sittlichkeit,  or  traditional  custom,  to  obviate 
Kant's  moral  dilemma  that  would  withold  the  appella- 
tion of  duty  to  acts  performed  through  inclination  as  well. 
(Cf.  §  61).  In  the  approving  act  of  conscience,  we  have 
an  illustration  of  just  this  fact  of  duty  through  pleasure 
and  inclination.  When  the  particular  instance  is  more 
often  repeated,  the  feeling  becomes  a  diffused  pleasure,  a 
general  inclination.  The  degree  of  the  original  pleasure 
depended  on  the  magnitude  of  the  problem  and  the  inten- 
sity of  the  choice.  Conscience  in  its  practical  aspects,  is 
a  customary  "deed-thought,"  a  habit,  although  a  habit  vol- 
untary in  its  formation  and  in  its  possible  re-formation. 
In  common  with  all  habits  it  must  engender  an  element  of 
pleasure  by  its  very  repetition.  But  this  psychological 
pleasure  is  only  the  smallest  part  of  the  happiness  of  the 
moral  vocation,  which  is  indeed  a  moral  or  holy  pleasure. 
If  habitual  moral  action  is  pleasurable,  it  is  still  true  that 
the  pleasure  is  of  the  ego's  own  moral  creation  due  to  the 
successful  objectification  in  experience  of  its  ends  bearing 
the  coefficient  of  value.  Though  habitual  repetition 
economizes  the  reproduction  of  the  decision,  the  ideal  is 
always  potentially  present.  Conscience  is  always  ideally 
ready  to  break  or  to  revise  its  habit  and  to  surrender  its 
psychological  pleasure  for  the  higher  pleasure  of  the  will. 


The  Nature  of  Conscience  113 

94.  Summary.  Our  examination  of  experience  has  dis- 
covered an  evolutionary  world  of  ideal  environment,  a 
continuum  of  thought-situations  reciprocal  with  the  ac- 
tivity of  will.  The  ego  discovers  itself  amidst  an  unfold- 
ing reality  of  values  and  relations.  But  it  is  especially  in 
the  value  progression  of  evolution  that  it  discovers  itself 
in  the  act  of  writing  itself  large.  The  dimensions  of  ex- 
perience which  is  in  itself  a  dichotomy  of  ego  and  non- 
ego,  are  found  to  be  length  and  breadth  and  depth,  or 
extension  and  intension,  or  quantity  and  quality.  It  is 
the  qualitative  aspect  that  is  especially  responsible  for  the 
living  movement.  Here  are  found  the  significant  aims, 
always  with  a  basic  reference  towards  the  self.  In  the 
quantitative  aspect  are  found  the  plastic  instrumentalities 
of  experience.  The  relations  are  there,  ready  to  function 
as  material  in  the  thought-situation  created  by  value. 


CHAPTER  XII 

VALUE    AND    DEITY 

95.  Value  Postulates  Deity  as  a  Guarantee  and  a  Lim- 
it. As  Kant's  moral  philosophy  postulated  a  deity  who 
has  perfect  freedom,  while  the  freedom  of  human  per- 
sonalities is  in  the  process  of  perfection  towards  an  infinite 
accomplishment,  a  variable  infinitely  approaching  a  limit, 
so  the  positing  of  value  in  the  name  of  supreme  value,  con- 
ducts to  Deity  by  an  ontological  stepping  stone.  Kant's 
postulate  of  Deity  was  necessary  to  support  and  com- 
plete the  kingdom  of  ends  of  his  ethical  system,  especially 
to  heal  the  empirical  breach  between  happiness  and  duty. 
Likewise,  from  the  value-standpoint,  the  supreme  value 
of  the  totality  introducing  a  moral  co-ordination  into  em- 
pirical values  and  furnishing  an  orderly  progression  to- 
wards destiny,  is  really  meaningless  without  a  universal 
personality.  For  the  essence  of  value  has  been  shown  as 
its  inclination  towards  subjectivity,  and  its  ground  of  mo- 
tivation as  the  monistic  ideal  of  the  whole  of  reality. 
Value  is  threatened  with  the  dangers  of  solipsism,  of  a 
self-imposed  delusion,  of  a  moral  schematism  projected  in 
desperation,  of  a  disjointed  pluralism  of  moral  worlds, 
from  all  of  which  it  escapes  by  a  community  of  wills  em- 
bracing the  entirety  of  reality ;  by  a  moral  insight  into 
the  necessary  subjectivity  of  the  totality  that  constitutes 
the  ideal  of  the  absolute  evolution  of  experience.  The 
constructiveness  of  the  world  of  purpose  attained  by  the 

114 


Value  and  Deity  115 

will,  must  be  in  harmony  with  a  unified  universal  purpose 
that  assures  an  actual  value-character  to  reality  and  po- 
tential value-character  to  developing  experience.  The 
moral  crisis  is  thus  a  recognition  of  self  as  identical  in 
dignity  and  kind  with  universal  reason;  in  the  language 
of  religion,  it  is  the  consciousness  of  soul  and  of  God 
The  positing  of  the  totality  is  a  religious  act,  and  the  pro- 
jection of  intelligible  purpose  into  the  maximum  possi- 
bility can  have  reference  only  to  God.  From  the  point  of 
view  of  religion,  it  is  the  kingdom  of  Heaven  that  has  been 
posited,  as  remarked  above,  (Cf.  §  8o)f  implying,  of 
course,  absolute  dependence  on  God.  Thus  the  category 
of  value  supplies  a  moral-ontological  approach  to  Deity. 
It  is  the  argument  that  follows  from  the  essential  rationale 
of  experience,  and  makes  use  of  its  analogies  and  its  de- 
mands even  including  its  abstract  logical  demands.  It 
summarizes  and  is,  perhaps,  also  in  a  position  to  correct 
the  usual  theistic  arguments.  While  following  Kant's 
ontological  postulate  of  Deity  which  is  indeed  a  necessity 
for  every  system  of  reality  where  the  microcosm  is  enlarged 
to  obtain  the  macrocosm,  we  may  profitably  apply  his  dis- 
crimination between  the  rational  theistic  arguments  and 
the  moral  theistic  hypothesis.  (Cf.  Critique  of  Pure  Rea- 
so?i,  tr.  Meiklejohn,  Transcendental  Dialectic,  Book  II, 
Chapter  III,  Section  VII).  The  former  he  criticizes  on  the 
general  ground  of  anthropomorphism ;  they  apply  the 
analogy  of  psychological  categories  or  formal  intellectual- 
ism  to  universal  mind.  But  the  category  of  freedom 
which  is  universally  operative  regardless  of  the  nature  of 
the  content,  can  be  applied  to  God,  without  the  limitation 
of  the  exclusive  particularity  that  belongs  to  the  other 


n6  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

categories.  (Cf.  Ralph  B.  Perry,  Present  Philosophical 
Tendencies,  p.  128).  It  does  not  attempt  to  delimit  the 
nature  of  God's  experience  in  itself,  but  only  conducts  us  to 
it  as  a  universal  ground  of  value.  The  conception  of  God 
as  the  guarantee  of  value  in  the  universe,  obtained  by  a 
will  effort  is  a  moral  conception  on  the  analogy  of  Kant's 
postulate  of  an  all-powerful  moral  freedom  harmonizing 
the  various  aspects  of  reality.  It  does  not  conduct  us  to 
a  deus  ex  rnachina,  an  Aristotelian  personification  of  ab- 
stract form  or  a  Hegelian  logical  absolute.  Such  con- 
ceptions are  strictly  limited  to  the  mutual  functioning 
assigned  to  them  in  the  circle  of  an  ontological  context. 
They  are  mere  logical  summaries  projected  backwards  as 
original  causation,  and  because  of  their  derivation,  lacking 
the  element  of  freedom.  Value  however,  projects  person- 
ality into  the  cosmic  experience  in  the  recognition  that 
the  latter's  infinite  extension  is  exactly  commensurate  with 
and  amenable  to  the  process  of  infinite  intension  by  sub- 
jectivity human  and  divine. 

96.  The  Psychological  Ties  of  Value  Cannot  be  Trans- 
ferred to  Deity.  Following  a  similar  line  of  thought: 
Value  is  a  process  of  will,  whose  basis  is  metaphysical,  but 
whose  energized  activity  bespeaks  a  psychological  complex 
of  factors.  In  human  experience,  it  is  by  no  means  a 
simple  unity,  but  a  mixture;  its  treatment  as  ideal  desire 
(Cf.  §  34),  has  emphasized  its  complexity.  We  have  also 
inferred  that  the  ideal  desire  was  eventually  directed  to- 
wards a  totality,  where  there  was  hope  of  fulfillment. 
Value  becomes  the  method  of  making  right  as  a  case  in 
time  in  an  indefeasible  individual  way,  the  purposes  that 
belong  to  the  right,  regardless  of  time.  It  is,  therefore, 


Value  and  Deity  117 

obvious  that  we  cannot  without  contradiction  transfer  our 
category  of  value  in  its  experiential  form  of  a  mixed  com- 
plex, and  thereby  obtain  an  exact  conception  of  God.  We 
must  delete  the  psychological  and  then  we  shall  obtain  as 
a  remainder,  the  simple  of  free  and  moral,  that  is,  purpo- 
sive activity.  But  such  an  activity  is  unformulable  and 
transcendent,  just  because  our  experience  is  indubitably 
complex  and  psychological.  It  is  an  ideal,  like  the  perfect 
freedom  of  Kant,  but  is  clear  as  a  necessary  ontological 
postulate.  It  is  the  irreducible  guarantee  of  universal 
value  after  we  have  subtracted  all  that  is  irrelevant  as  be- 
longing to  our  ego-centric  world.  Furthermore,  the 
value  that  is  inherent  in  God's  creative  work  must  be  in 
the  nature  of  an  ideal  directed  absolutley  inward,  for  here 
personality  is  entirely  its  own  norm.  In  the  moral-on- 
tological  conception  of  God,  the  value  element  of  desire 
has  been  eliminated.  God's  ideals  are,  therefore,  his 
reals  and  his  purposes  are  simultaneously  realized  in  the 
experience-extension  that  is  evolution's  creative  opportu- 
nity. Man's  contact  which  these  purposes  is  by  means  of 
the  key  of  value  that  will  obtains,  which  does  not,  how- 
ever, otherwise  reveal  the  architectonic  of  the  universe. 
Worth,  then,  as  a  totalizing  system  discovers  a  God  who 
is  immanent  in  man's  creative  thinking.  But  God  is 
transcendent  as  to  his  own  creative  method,  for  person- 
ality in  its  uniqueness  from  the  viewpoint  of  constitutive 
analysis,  must  always  remain  transcendent. 

97.  The  Supreme  Experience  is  Given  as  to  Form  but 
not  as  to  Content.  Value  in  so  far  as  translatable  into 
terms  of  an  over-human  experience  or  will,  signifies  the 
pure  intelligent  activity  that  subtends  and  regards  the  uni- 


u8  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

verse.  It  may  still  be  described  as  ideal  because  this 
activity  is  not  chance,  but  intellectually  comprehensible 
post  facto.  The  factor  of  desire  is  eliminated,  as  the  ideal 
is  immanent,  not  prospective.  The  philosophy  of  value 
thus  reaches  its  conception  of  God,  by  a  hypostasis  of  ex- 
perience where  supreme  experience  realizes  the  combined 
ideals  of  perfect  value  and  perfect  freedom.  Like  Kant's 
postulate  of  freedom,  it  conducts  the  mind  to  the  noumen- 
al,  but  does  not  attempt  to  specify  the  logical  contexture 
thereof.  It  is  content  to  show  that  it  must  be  posited  as 
the  ground  of  universal  method  and  activity. 

98.  Value  as  Founded  on  a  Personal,  Religious  Rela- 
tionship.    The  self-assertion  or  moral  crisis  that  we  have 
described    as   the   activistic   self-positing   in   a   centralized 
scheme  of  worths,  is  thus  a  constructive  relation  not  only 
to  the  universe,  but  also  and  at  the  same  time,  to  God. 
We  have  called  it  the  fundamentally  religious  standpoint, 
that  of  co-operation  with  the  plans  and  aims  of  totality, 
realizing  the  kingdom  of  God,  etc.     Worth  is  thus  a  psy- 
cho-metaphysical complex,  a  synthesis  of  ideal-desire-activ- 
ity.    The  unity  of  the  complex  from  every  viewpoint,  is 
best  noted  in  its  religious  aspect. 

99.  God  and  Man  Co-operate  in  the  Extension-Inten- 
sion of  Experience.     Our  consciousness  in  its  moral  relig- 
ious career  wills  worth  and  seeks  to  realize  it  in  a  crea- 
tive fashion.     It  must  believe  that  its  willing  is  not  in 
vain.    What  then  is  the  bearing  of  our  value-seeking  activ- 
ity upon  the  pure  universal  activity  that  is  eternally  de- 
scriptive of  worth?     Is  man's  ideal  a  simple  echo,  and  his 
activity  mere  acquiescence,  so  that  at  best  he  would  dupli- 
cate what  could  just  as  well  go  on  without  him?     Or  is 


Value  and  Deity  119 

it  possible  for  man  to  counteract  the  universal  will,  mak- 
ing his  activity  in  every  sphere,  absolutely  free  and  abso- 
lutely creative?  Or,  finally,  does  the  universal  will  act 
only  as  man  wills,  reducing  itself  to  a  logical  postulate 
of  unity  deleted  of  all  real  life?  The  retention  of  both 
immanence  and  transcendence  with  respect  to  the  nature 
of  God  should  be  a  sufficient  reply  to  the  last  query,  which 
concerns  itself  with  his  actual  existent  character.  How- 
ever, we  must  still  differentiate  as  to  the  function  or 
place  of  universal  will  and  particular  wills.  The  delimit- 
ing distinction  follows  from  the  conception  of  the  bi-di- 
mensional  nature  of  experience  as  opposed  to  the  linear 
or  surface  conception.  Experience  which  tends  towards 
the  ideal  of  a  perfect  environment  reciprocal  to  perfect 
selves,  is  the  product  of  both  length  and  breadth,  of  exten- 
sion and  intension.  (The  spatial  figure  it  must  be  rec- 
ollected, is  only  a  symbol,  for  the  depth  of  experience  is 
entirely  mental,  while  its  extension  is  mediated  by  men- 
tality). The  activity  that  underlies  the  universe,  pro- 
vides indefinitely  for  the  extension  of  experience,  for  the 
elongation  of  the  environment.  The  idealizing  activity 
that  desires  value,  and  desiring  it,  discovers  its  latencies, 
its  beauties,  its  applications,  and  its  satisfactions;  that 
brings  to  the  offerings  and  opportunities  of  the  universe 
a  sense  of  want  that  justifies  and  fulfills  them,  in  a  word, 
the  indefeasible,  individual  soul,  provides  further  for  the 
intension  of  experience  adding  infinite  subjectivity  to  infin- 
ite objectivity.  The  development  of  the  perfect  exper- 
ience and  the  perfect  qualitative  environment  requires  both 
God  and  man.  The  latter's  co-operation  is  a  real,  inde- 
feasible, contribution.  He  may  consider  himself  a  true 


I2O  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

co-worker  with  a  God  who  hopefully  holds  out  to  him  a 
universal  destiny. 

IOO.  An  Illustration  from  the  Aesthetic  Field.  An 
illustration  might  be  adduced  from  the  realm  of  art.  The 
masterpiece  of  a  great  artist  is  the  expression  of  the  mes- 
sage of  a  great  soul.  So  far,  he  has  extended  the  spiritual 
world  by  a  great  idea.  But  during  the  course  of  the  his- 
tory of  this  masterpiece,  the  message  may  undergo  an  in- 
tensification in  the  world  of  culture,  to  the  extent  of  which 
it  will  always  be  impossible  to  assign  a  limit.  Its  creative 
influence  will  be  enjoyed  and  applied  by  every  one  who 
wills,  although,  of  course,  the  willing  is  a  necessary  con- 
dition. It  is  even  possible  that  history  never  will  know 
the  end  of  this  inward  intensive  power,  as  in  the  case  of 
ancient  Greek  art.  Thus  the  possibility  of  life  in  art- 
experience  is  the  immeasurably  deep  product  of  extension- 
intension.  Expanding  this  comparison,  we  may  imagine  a 
work  of  art  that  is  continually  renewing  itself  with  unex- 
pected beauties.  This  would  illustrate  the  continued 
extension  of  nature  that  science  reveals,  and  that  the  phil- 
osophy of  value  seeks  to  apprehend  and  interpret  as  the 
materials  for  the  intension  of  experience. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

VALUES,  ECONOMIC  AND  MORAL,  AND  THE  CONTINUITY  OF 

CULTURE 

1 01.  The   Differentiation   of    Values.     We   have   seen 
in  the  last  chapter  that  the  standpoint  of  worth  is  equiv- 
alent to  acting  under  the  aspect  of  eternity,  though  more 
in  the  Platonic  rather  than  the  Spinozistic  sense,  that  is, 
under  the  aspect  of  the  eternal,  potentially  expansive  reals. 
It  calls  for  the  acting  of  a  living,  indefeasible  part  in  the 
absolute  evolution  of  humanistic  experience,  and  results  in 
making  that  evolution  the  reciprocal  constructiveness  of 
personality  in  the  two-fold  forms  of  culture  and  religion. 
The  universal,  ceaseless,  inward  activity  which  is  life,  has 
become  self-conscious  in  intelligence,  knowing  itself  as  a 
process  under  the  aspect  of  worth,  constructing  an  envir- 
onment in  which  the  manifold  elements  stand  ready  to 
reveal  their  coefficients  of  value.     Taking  any  life,  any 
experience,  any  individual,  we  shall  be  able  to  differentiate 
the  different  kinds  of  values. 

102.  How    Values   Attain    the   Moral    Quale    in    the 
Individual.     The  individual's  motives,  and  so  his  life,  are 
explicable  by  values.    He  starts  his- career  amidst  the  social 
environment  by  recapitulating  the  cultural  history  of  the 
race.     (Cf.  Herman  H.  Home,  Idealism  in  Education,  p. 
46).     In  the  course  of  adjustment  to  environment  which 
is   the  evolutionary  task  of  life,   he   gradually  learns  to 
adjust  the  environment  likewise  to  himself.     This  is  the 
special  evolutionary  task  of  intelligence  and  involves  the 

121 


122  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

moral  crisis.  Before  this  comes,  the  individual  apparently 
is  acting  according  to  values  that  have  to  do  with  adapta- 
tion in  se,  and  are,  therefore,  not  inward  but  external 
only,  and  so,  hypothetical  or  economic  values.  But  all 
the  while  he  is  really  acting  according  to  the  urge  of  a 
want  that  corresponds  to  the  basic  needs  of  the  race.  The 
categorical  or  moral  values  of  the  race,  the  individual  at 
some  stage  of  his  career  either  adopts  or  rejects  by  a 
deliberate  choice;  by  a  totalizing  motive  or  purpose  of  life, 
that  imposes  from  within,  supra-economic  values  upon 
what  was  before  mere  adjustment,  and  makes  the  adaptive 
relation  a  self-action,  a  harmonization  of  life  and  environ- 
ment, with  the  ego.  When  worth  is  mere  action,  a  mere 
element  in  the  complex  of  a  thought-situation,  it  is  eco- 
nomic; when  it  is  my  thought  and  my  action,  it  attains 
a  moral  quale.  But  such  economic  values  preceding  the 
self-awakening  must  not  be  confused  with  the  silent  func- 
tioning of  conscience.  Here  in  the  latter,  the  moral  issue 
has  been  settled,  and  the  moral  quale  is  preserved  in  the 
background  of  consciousness.  The  energizing  value  may 
seem  to  be  external,  because  it  acts  so  immediately,  but 
it  was  originally  obtained  and  is  still  modifiable  by  an 
extension  of  the  moral  crisis,  and  its  immediacy  is  only 
the  facilitation  of  habit. 

103.  The  Cultural  Willing  of  Life.  We  must,  then, 
conclude  that  moral  values  are  possible  only  in  so  far  as 
there  exists  a  status  of  culture.  The  act  of  will  which 
indicates  the  real  presence  of  the  real  self,  is  a  cultural 
commencement  of  a  continuous  life  of  willing.  The  pres- 
ence of  the  self  as  the  unchangeable  postulate  underlying 
moral  values,  is  dichotomously  revealed  in  a  state  of  reci- 


Values,  Economic  and  Moral  123 

procfty  with  universal  ends,  and  culture  coalesces  with 
religion.  The  categorical  imperative  always  must  be 
maintained  in  such  a  situation  \vhose  characteristic  is  dis- 
interestedness. Its  self-positing  is  that  perfect  willing, 
where  freedom  is  pure  and  independent  of  the  restraint 
of  things  in  the  outlining  of  its  experience  and  where  the 
environment  is  adapted  to  the  self  as  its  instrument.  But 
culture  is  not  one  supreme  achievement.  It  is  rather  a 
growth,  and  like  racial  history,  it  must  pass  through  a 
struggle  for  the  refinement  of  its  ideals.  Then,  after  this 
preparatory  period,  it  becomes  the  method  of  the  quali- 
tative intensification  of  developing  experience.  The  moral 
crisis  indicates  that  the  method  has  been  accepted  by  the 
individual,  that  he  has  unified  its  standards  and  that  he 
has  definitely  committed  his  life  to  its  program  of  will- 
ing. It  is  now  the  inward  aspect  of  value  that  overbal- 
ances the  movement  of  thought-situation,  and  experience 
rises  to  the  dignity  of  freedom  and  morality. 

104.  The  Continuous  Self-Revision  of  Culture. 
Furthermore,  moral  values  not  only  require  a  condition 
of  culture,  but  further  impose  a  requirement  of  dynamic 
culture.  The  culture  must  be  that  of  personality  acting 
through  conscience,  and  the  place  of  the  latter  is  best  de- 
scribed in  Schliermacher's  conception  of  duty: 

Act  at  every  instant  with  all  thy  moral  power,  and  aim- 
ing at  thy  whole  moral  problem. 

In  other  words,  culture  cannot  rest  on  its  laurels  satisfied 
to  employ  a  standard  once  and  for  all  founded  on  a  past 
or  on  a  routine  present.  It  must  also  face  the  future, 


124  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

seeking  to  clarify  and  illustrate  the  content  of  its  universal 
and  totalizing  ideal.  It  must  recognize  that  morality  is 
not  the  problem  solved  except  as  to  the  method ;  that  it  is 
rather  the  problem  of  problems  that  cannot  be  perfectly 
solved  except  in  an  infinite  experience.  Kant  postulates 
"an  unlimited  continuation  of  our  existence  in  order  that 
by  constant  progress  in  goodness,  we  may  draw  nearer  in 
infinitum  to  the  ideal  of  holiness."  (Cf.  Richard  Falck- 
enberg,  History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  tr.  A.  C.  Arm- 
strong, p.  393).  The  establishment  of  a  rule  that  can  be 
applied  once  and  for  all  inclines  towards  philistinism, 
and  will  result  in  a  mere  conscientiousness  rather  than  in 
culture.  The  latter  remains  the  master  of  the  content  of 
its  rules  by  virtue  of  the  enlightenment  of  its  intellect  and 
the  deepening  of  its  whole  moral  problem.  Morality  is 
the  qualitative  aspect  of  evolution,  and  its  infinite  inten- 
sification testifies  to  the  infinitude  of  the  whole  of  experi- 
ence. In  a  word,  moral  values  depend  upon  a  two-fold 
or  bi-dimensional  moral  judgment.  This  must  be  first 
a  valuation  according  to  value,  and  then,  somewhere  in 
experience,  a  re-valuation  of  the  value.  It  is  thus  that  the 
self  manifests  itself  as  progressive  activity  and  develops 
the  ideal  environment  by  augmenting  the  contents  of  con- 
science. Culture  has  relieved  it  from  over-indulgence  in 
the  static  psychological  functioning  of  conscience,  in  order 
to  make  room  for  its  dynamic  and  creative  metaphysical 
functioning.  Experience  advances  not  alone  by  a  re-re- 
lation of  relations,  but  just  as  well  by  a  re-valuation  of 
values. 

105.  Arrested  Culture.     Culture  and  moral  values  not 
only  bestow  upon  freedom  a  creative  character,  but  make 


Values,  Economic  and  Moral  125 

I 

it  the  Weltanschauung'  of  the  race,  as  well  as  of  the  indi- 
vidual growing  in  intellectual  enlightenment.  It  has  its 
stages,  at  every  one  of  which  there  is  a  contemporaneous 
conscience.  Now  it  may  happen  that  the  individual 
chooses  to  interrupt  the  continuous  process  of  willing.  In 
that  case,  a  certain  temporary  phase  of  willing  becomes 
permanent  and  conscience  is  solidified.  The  valuation 
process  ceases  tending  towards  a  universalized  standard. 
The  moral  dynamic  tends  to  surrender  to  habituation.  A 
will  that  has  ceased  willing  may  easily  become  the  subject 
of  arrested  culture,  and  the  self-positing  amidst  totality 
may  revise  itself  in  favor  of  an  empirical  totality  and  thus 
with  an  absorbing  interest  in  mere  things  it  may  really 
become  heteronomous.  Unless  culture  is  exercised  con- 
tinuously, the  individual  is  not  making  a  full  use  of  his 
freedom,  and  his  contribution  to  the  totality  of  the  exten- 
sion-intension of  evolution,  may  fail  by  default.  Con- 
tinuous willing  is  the  price  of  moral  values  as  eternal 
vigilance  is  the  price  of  liberty. 

1 06.  Moral  Values  are  Cultural.  Values  may  thus 
be  comprised  under  two  general  types :  moral  and  cate- 
gorical, on  the  one  hand ;  and  economic  and  hypothetical 
on  the  other  hand.  The  former  is  the  thread  along  which 
are  strung  the  real  events  of  experience.  With  it,  the  ele- 
ment of  motive  is  paramount.  If  we  seek  to  identify  it, 
we  do  not  find  it  in  any  external  temporal-spatial  context 
of  life.  We  cannot  point  to  any  specific  thing  or  institu- 
tion and  discover  it  in  unquestioned  form.  We  must  look 
for  it  in  the  living  act.  Moral  value  cannot  be  identified 
until  the  action  is  studied  in  the  light  of  personality.  It 
does  not  belong  to  thing  or  idea  of  the  intellect  as  such. 


126  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

Because  it  is  the  pure  motive  of  an  indefeasible  person- 
ality, tending  in  an  indefeasible  act  towards  an  indefeasi- 
ble ideal,  it  is  uniquely  non-translatable,  non-interchange- 
able, and  independent.  It  is  then  only  as  a  living  actu- 
ality that  we  can  view  the  building  of  the  kingdom  of 
ends,  not  as  a  series  of  dead  results. 

107.  Economic  Values  are  Impersonally  Identifiable. 
The  values  that  can  readily  be  identified  in  things  or  in- 
stitutions or  events  as  such,  belong,  on  the  other  hand,  to 
the  economic  group.  Although  all  value  bears  a  refer- 
ence to  selves,  the  dependence  of  the  economic  value  has 
reached  such  a  degree  of  remoteness  that  it  can  be  studied 
impersonally  and  objectively.  Analysis  will  disclose  it  as 
a  factor  in  sociology,  economics,  statistics,  etc.  It  inheres 
very  definitely  in  the  material  of  the  social  life  whose  ele- 
ments it  co-ordinates.  It  inher-es  in  the  larger  world  of 
space  and  time  where  it  may  become  the  subject  matter  of 
the  mathematical  sciences.  Economic  worths  as  practical 
factors,  are  not  under  the  direct  control  of  autonomy. 
They  belong  to  the  world  of  natural  law  as  contrasted 
with  the  world  of  freedom.  They  are,  nevertheless,  the 
elements  to  which  the  self  must  accommodate  itself, 
among  which  it  must  work  out  its  freedom.  The  free 
act  is  created  de  novo  when  the  self  causes  a  moral  value 
to  impinge  against  an  economic,  thus  utilizing  the  given 
non-personal  material,  but  initiating  or  continuing  a  series 
of  its  own.  The  economic  values  are  otherwise  reduced 
also,  by  autonomy,  to  the  function  of  mere  factors  in  the 
process  of  analysis-synthesis.  So  far  as  the  moral  situa- 
tion is  concerned,  they  are  nothing  but  relations  of  another 
sort  transfigured  into  values  by  categories  of  utility.  The 


Values j  Econo?nic  and  Moral  127 

thought-situations  themselves  that  provoke  the  dichotomy 
of  self  and  ideal  environment  are  eventuated  by  values 
that  fall  under  the  moral  standard.  The  relation  then 
between  the  two  groups  of  values  is  that  of  aim  and  in- 
strument. 

108.  Ideas  and  Institutions  as  Plans  of  Action  May 
Possess  an  Absolute  Moral  Value.  But  are  there  not 
things,  institutions,  or  events  that  in  themselves  possess 
more  than  economic  value,  that  perhaps  possess  an  un- 
doubted moral  value?  If  intelligence  could  have  asked 
itself  that  question  at  the  beginning  of  its  evolution,  it 
would  perforce  have  had  to  answer  770.  But  "an  idea  is 
a  plan  of  action,"  action  being  basically  provocative  of 
thought,  and  the  course  of  their  history  has  very  clearly 
established  certain  ideas  as  programs  of  action  in  conson- 
ance with  the  moral  ideal.  Their  status  of  direct  ref- 
erence to  the  moral  postulate,  their  motivation  and  their 
end  in  personality,  both  have  conferred  upon  them  a  non- 
economic  coefficient  that  is  intuitively  recognized  as  a 
categorical  value.  To  this  class  belong  those  general 
ideas,  symbolizing  the  acceptance  of  the  moral  ideal,  which 
serve  as  moral  units  of  ever-growing  content  and  which 
men  always  have  used  as  landmarks.  The  augmenting 
of  the  content  of  the  moral  ideal  is  along  lines  of  volun- 
tary expression  and  re-expression  in  these  forms.  For 
illustrations  one  has  but  to  look  into  his  own  heart.  We 
might  also  mention  the  concepts  of  religion,  art,  and  so- 
cial life.  About  their  formal  aspect  there  is  no  dispute, 
that  is,  all  are  agreed  as  to  their  intrinsic  values,  although 
difference  of  opinion  arises  when  their  content  is  to  be 
filled  in. 


128  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

109.  Religious  Symbolism  Must  Find  Its  Meaning  in 
Absolute  Values.  It  is  evident  that  certain  ideas  as  plans 
of  action  possess  an  absolute  moral  value,  because  men 
have  agreed  to  their  status  as  moral  symbols.  A  symbol 
has  just  as  much  meaning  as  we  put  into  it,  neither  more 
nor  less.  There  are  certain  ideas  or  institutions  whose 
only  function  is  to  present  the  moral  ideals  of  the  king- 
dom of  ends.  To  this  class  belong  the  institutions  of 
religion,  socially  expressive  of  the  past  and  present  moral 
aspirations  of  the  race  and  aiming  to  make  the  individual 
posit  himself,  first  as  a  member  of  a  fellowship,  then,  as  a 
unique  moral  personality,  and,  finally,  as  an  indefeasible 
moral  factor  in  the  grand  affair  of  totality.  Such  insti- 
tutions functioning  originally  as  authority  have  also  become 
spirit  when  they  revealed  their  harmony  with  the  ideals 
of  the  self.  Meanwhile,  they  have  served  the  function  of 
orientating  the  self  and  directing  its  moral  potentialities 
in  the  direction  of  autonomy. 

no.  The  Historic  Method  of  Self-Positing  Has  Been 
Religion.  The  fact  that  the  symbols  and  the  institutions 
of  religion  cover  to  the  largest  extent  those  ideas  that  are 
inextricably  connected  with  the  highest  reach  of  the  per- 
sonal-environmental, ideal  plans  of  action;  with  the  prac- 
tical moral  program  of  life  on  which  all  thinking  men  are 
agreed,  is  no  mere  coincidence.  It  indicates  that  men  have 
gone  to  the  inspiration  of  their  religious  strivings  for  the 
fulfillment  of  the  moral  want,  of  the  craving  for  worth, 
that  personality  implies.  Religion  has  no  other  aim  than 
to  enlighten  the  will  in  the  continuous  succession  of  moral 
values,  holding  before  it  the  grand  end  of  purpose  in  a 
totality.  It  is  the  only  department  of  life  that  deals  solely 


Values ',  Economic  and  Moral  129 

with  these  non-economic  values  in  action,  and  it  must  be 
judged  by  a  correspondent  criterion.  Its  elements  cannot 
be  made  members  of  an  equation  in  which  they  are  bal- 
anced against  economic  values  or  against  relations.  It 
should  rather  be  considered  as  the  efficient  ally  or  reci- 
procity of  culture,  as  the  disinterested  interest  in  the  envir- 
onment that  creates  values  and  makes  experience  truly 
humanistic.  It  should  be  noted  also  that  art  likewise  deals 
with  many  of  the  same  sort  of  values,  since  its  cultural 
values  have  only  themselves  as  their  objects.  The  same 
self-positing  is  at  the  basis  of  both  movements,  but  while 
art  provides  more  for  the  joy  of  serene  self-expression, 
religion  predominates  in  the  progressive  constructiveness 
of  experience. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

VALUE  AS   PHILOSOPHY  AND  LIFE 

ill.  Value  Indicates  No  Sixth  Sense.  The  philosophy 
of  value  has  exalted  worth  to  a  place  of  unique  dignity  in 
the  final  evolution  of  life  and  the  construction  of  environ- 
ment. It  has  been  made  almost  a  partner  in  the  work  of 
intelligence  and  set  up  as  the  motive  power  of  personality. 
It  creates  that  standard  of  morality  that  makes  the  world 
of  experience  possess,  in  the  phrase  of  Samuel  Clarke,  an 
"objective  fitness."  It  would  seem  then  that  in  the  posit- 
ing activity  of  the  will  and  the  consequent  inherent  emo- 
tional registration  of  worth,  the  self  possessed  a  distinc- 
tive moral  sense.  But  the  concept  of  a  moral  sense  is  not 
without  its  ambiguity.  If  it  means  the  "sixth  sense"  of 
Hutcheson,  then  it  would  imply- a  pluralism  of  experience 
with  each  department  under  its  special  faculty.  Experi- 
ence is  unitary,  however;  it  is  a  monism  whose  interlocked 
factors  are  revealed  in  their  mutual  inter-action  only  by 
a  dichotomous  analysis.  It  is  discovered  as  the  functioning 
of  value,  which  is  the  whole  mind  acting  in  will,  just  as 
in  the  instrumental  functioning  of  relation,  it  is  the  whole 
mind  acting  in  intellect.  The  sense  of  values  can  be  called 
a  special  sense  only  in  the  way  that  the  sense  of  relations 
can  be  called  such.  The  thought-situation,  which  is  the 
unit  of  experience,  attains  its  equilibrization  or  harmony 
both  by  a  moral  and  by  a  strictly  logical  test.  The  think- 
ing-process means  living  and  developing.  It  is  conduct. 
It  is  better,  then,  to  consider  the  sense  of  values 
in  the  whole  light  of  personality  and  its  moral 

130 


Value  as  Philosophy  and  Life  131 

crisis,  rather  than  as  innate  endowment  that  acts  regard- 
less of  personal  history. 

112.  Value-Content  is  not  Final  or  Uniform.  Recall- 
ing that  the  will  posits  itself  as  the  basis  of  value  as 
well  as  its  abiding  method,  and  that  the  manifestations  of 
will  have  an  indefiniteness  of  variety,  we  shall  not  be  pre- 
pared to  find  in  the  judgment-content  of  any  stage  of  de- 
velopment, an  infallible  intuition  that  is  not  subject  to 
modification  or  evolution.  It  is  only  the  method  that  is 
final,  the  single  moral  hypothesis  joining  itself  to  the  va- 
rious intellectual  hypotheses,  or  in  other  words,  the  method 
producing  the  value-relation  construction  of  experience. 
Primitive  valuation  should  be  no  more  final  than  primitive 
intellection  generally.  If  we  are  prepared  to  look  for  a 
genesis  of  the  universally  honored  and  accepted  truths  that 
rule  in  society,  we  must  be  prepared  equally  for  a  genetic 
point  of  view  in  the  history  of  values.  A  glance  at  the 
contemporaneous  thought  of  any  period  of  the  world's 
history,  will  furnish  a  convincing  illustration.  Men  are 
everywhere  equally  devotees  of  religion ;  the  totality  is 
everywhere  present  in  their  attitude  towards  things.  They 
are  everywhere  equally  philosophers,  albeit  non-technical, 
seeking  to  harmonize  their  conceptions  of  the  All  with 
their  inward  reflection,  and  with  the  promptings  of  self- 
hood. Everywhere  they  seek  as  a-  fundamental  want,  to 
make  the  light  of  universal  harmonious  will,  or  reason,  or 
unity,  shine  in  and  through  their  individual  wills.  Thus 
they  lend  interpretation  to  experience  and  create  values. 
But  the  values  are  evolutionary  products,  and  how  differ- 
ent most  of  them  are,  in  different  ages,  countries 
and  climes.  Not  only  do  they  show  forth  different 


132  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

degrees  of  insight  as  far  as  any  single  value 
is  concerned,  but  their  very  formulation  differs  radically 
in  kind.  Thus  religion  and  philosophy  have  started  from 
two  opposite  poles  of  development  whose  basic  values  seem 
mutually  to  cancel  one  another.  The  Orient,  both  in  Chi- 
nese Taoism  and  in  the  various  forms  of  Hinduism,  pro- 
poses the  ideal  of  worklessness,  of  external  inactivity,  (Cf. 
Chas.  G.  Shaw,  The  Ego  and  its  Place  in  the  World,  p. 
500),  or  of  the  mystic  absorption  of  self  in  a  universal, 
non-conscious,  existence.  (Cf.  Wm.  T.  Harris,  Hegel's 
Logic,  p.  300).  The  Occident,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
usually  agreed  on  the  fundamental,  eternal  value  of  soul 
or  indefeasible  self,  and  on  salvation  by  activity  of  deeds  as 
well  as  of  thought.  The  various  systems  of  mysticism 
that  have  appeared  from  time  to  time  are  perhaps  the  sym- 
pathetic bond  that  points  to  whatever  intellectual  syn- 
thesis is  possible  between  East  and  West.  The  differences 
of  worth  or  ideal  desires  have  had  the  most  practical  and 
far-reaching  evolutionary  consequences,  as  a  comparative 
political  and  cultural  study  would  readily  prove.  In 
brief,  value  has  a  universal  formative  function  in  experi- 
ence. Its  apparent  spontaneity  in  ordinary  events  is  not 
an  infallible  sense  or  heritage,  but  rather  an  intuition  that 
belongs  to  personal  character.  From  the  individual  point 
of  view,  the  content  with  its  spontaneous  functioning  is 
the  intellectually  controlled  residuum  of  a  moral  crisis; 
and  from  the  social  and  religious  points  of  view,  this 
content  will  be  seen  to  be  controlled  by  the  varying  in- 
fluences that  enter  into  the  psychology  of  the  group. 

113.    The    Work    of   Self    in    Adapting    Environment. 
The  philosophy  of  value,  moreover,  plunges  us  right  into 


Value  as  Philosophy  and  Life  133 

the  thick  of  the  evolutionary  process  whose  uninterrupted 
cumulative  activity  eventuates  in  this  very  continuum  of 
our  experience.  Evolution  is  not  solely  a  story  of  the 
past;  it  is  not  a  genesis  to  be  studied  only  in  the  light  of  ac- 
complished end-results.  It  is  a  cosmic  development  whose 
contemporary  forms  in  any  period  are  the  temporary  stages 
of  that  development  clearly  marked  with  the  lines  of  a  uni- 
fying purpose.  The  essence  of  its  continuity  is  not  to  be 
sought  in  merely  organic  adaptations  of  external  structure, 
but  rather  in  the  positive  evolution  of  the  content  of  ex- 
perience; in  action  that  is  inward  and  purposive,  rather 
than  in  reaction  that  is  outward  and  adaptive.  The  field 
of  evolution  on  the  basis  of  worth  is,  therefore,  multiplied 
by  the  limitless  extent  of  human  consciousness.  In  the 
biological  situation,  evolutionary  evidences  have  to  be 
sought  with  the  aid  of  the  tools  and  the  technique  of 
science.  In  the  thought-situation,  they  will  have  to  be 
sought  with  the  aid  of  philosophical  reflection.  In  the 
former  case,  the  test  was  adaptation  to  environment ;  in 
the  latter,  the  test  is  rather  adaptation  in  a  self-constituted 
environment  or  adaptation  to  self.  The  environment  is 
the  environment  of  a  self,  and  the  self  reciprocally  is  a 
self  in  its  environment.  Experience  is  a  growth  and  a 
progression  along  the  lines  of  their  reciprocal  interactivity, 
of  which  the  self  striving  as  a  will  illuminated  by  intel- 
lect, is  the  mould.  The  application  of  wrorth  supplies  the 
impetus.  The  filling-in  with  content,  \vith  temporal 
meaning,  calls  for  the  free  and  joyous  obedience  of  the  self 
to  its  own  law,  which  is  the  law  of  its  development.  The 
joy  that  makes  unnecessary  the  stoic  fortitude  of  rigorism, 
rests  on  the  fundamental  fact  that  the  self  is  satisfying  its 


134  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

ever-present  dissatisfaction  and  want.  The  want  is  its 
underlying  prophetic  mood  which  eventuates  in  a  cate- 
gorical imperative  and  a  religio-cultural  standard.  The 
environment  of  man  becomes  actual  and  real  because 
his  intellect  needs  it,  because  he  desiderates  it  as  a  worth. 

114.  The  Indefensibility   and   Co-operation   of  Selves. 
Furthermore,  each  and  every  individual  self  can  be  esti- 
mated and  understood  only  in  the  reciprocity  of  its  envir- 
onment which  displays  it  in   the   living  act  of  self-aug- 
menting content.     Its  indefeasibility  is  the  fact  that  the 
evolutionary  drama  cannot  forego  its  contribution.     Ex- 
perience is  constructed  upon  culture  and  turned  towards 
religion.     The  former  directs  the  self  towards  itself;    the 
latter  directs  it  towards  its  aims,  postulating  co-operative 
contact  with  other  personalities.     There  is  a  qualitative 
differentiation  of  greater  and  lesser  selves,  ranging  from 
the   super-soul   that   really   directs   the  vast   currents   of 
thought,  down  to  the  unthinking.     The  evolution  of  the 
ideal  environment,  the  progressive  history  of  mankind,  is 
thus  at  basis  founded,  as  Fichte  would  maintain,  upon  the 
adaptation  of  the  self  to  other  selves. 

115.  The  Vindication  of  Intelligence.     By  our  placing 
evolution  in  its  farthest  and  purposive  reaches  within  the 
circle  of  intelligence,  it  not  only  receives  a  field  of  infinite 
progress,  but  we  have  vindicated  intelligence  itself.     For 
it   has   been   rescued    from   the   servile   function   of   mere 
psychical  apparatus.     The  merely  psychical  could  be  re- 
constructed by  an  analytic  and  quantitative  examination. 
Bergson  describes  the  genesis  of  the  intellect  as  the  instru- 
mental carrying  out  of  the  general  elan  vital,  by  means  of 
a  principle  of  "like  produces  like."     (Creative  Evolution, 


Value  as  Philosophy  and  Life  135 

tr.  Mitchell,  pp.  52,  160).  He  makes  intelligence  a 
nucleus  or  contraction  of  a  larger  impetus,  so  that  the 
activity  that  creates  evolution  is  really  unintelligible  and 
is  to  be  apprehended  only  by  a  kind  of  sympathetic  intui- 
tion akin  to  the  aesthetic.  (Ibid.,  pp.  177,  191).  The 
philosophy  of  worth,  however,  makes  the  instrumental 
functioning  only  an  aspect  of  the  intellect.  It  makes  will 
and  intellect  coeval,  and  both  of  them  the  agencies  of  a 
positing  metaphysical  self,  so  that  intelligence  posits  as 
well  as  settles  its  own  problems.  In  describing  an  envir- 
onment, it  immediately  thinks  of  the  self,  to  complete  the 
analysis. 

1 1 6.  Man  as  the  Master  of  Evolution.  The  intellect 
makes  man  the  master  of  evolution.  While  he  must  ever 
find  himself  in  the  midst  of  events  and  of  social  relations 
in  order  to  be  himself ;  while  the  dichotomy  that  reveals 
the  self  reveals  the  environment  also,  man  is,  neverthe- 
less, in  a  definite  sense  independent  of  his  environment. 
His  culture  gives  him  the  power  of  interpretation,  set- 
ting him  in  antithesis  to  his  ordinary  environment  by  enab- 
ling him  to  glimpse  the  grand  totality.  Worth  as  an  ideal 
reduces  the  significance  of  the  distinction  between  the 
empirical  and  the  non-empirical ;  the  latter  becomes  the 
inspiring  force  of  the  potential  future  that  is  within  the 
purview  of  experience.  Personality  truly  becomes  the 
centrum  from  which  radiate  the  continuous  value-coeffi- 
cients of  a  qualitative  series.  Worth  thus  transfers  the 
center  of  gravity  in  evolution  from  things  and  events  to 
self,  which  may  then  say,  "Events  are  for  me,  and  not 
I  for  them."  The  task  before  the  self,  is  self-realization, 
first  by  adjustment  to  the  rationality  of  the  universe  whose 


136  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

inward  purpose  is  opened  by  the  key  of  worth,  and  sec- 
ondly, by  functioning  autonomously  to  deepen  and  inten- 
sify experience  as  this  extends  itself.  There  is  an  infinity 
of  two  kinds  in  experience — extension  and  intension.  It 
is  the  ever-varying  product  of  the  horizontal  line  of  quan- 
tity and  the  vertical  line  of  quality  or  interpretation. 
Personality  is  found  in  both  of  these  lines,  but  in  the  latter 
specifically,  its  creative  initiative  can  be  observed. 

117.  Value  gives  a  Practical  Theory  for  Life's  Activi- 
ties.    Finally,  the  discovery  of  the  functioning  of  worth 
as  both  conditioning  and  conditioned  in  the  evolution  of 
experience  must  emphasize  throughout,  the  practical  bear- 
ing of  value  upon  life.     Value  furnishes  the  theory  upon 
which  is  built  the  series  of  ideal  concepts  without  which 
belief  and  conduct  are  impossible.     It  is,  indeed,  a  synthe- 
sis of  the  theoretical  and  the  practical  aspects  of  reality 
making  each  the  servant  of  the  other  in  the  construction 
of  the  ideal  world  of  the  self.     It  has  exalted  intelligence 
which  is  found  to  be  no  mere  happy  accident  in  evolution, 
but  a  self  willing  its  development  and  expressing  its  free- 
dom in  the  inter-related  manifestations  of  religion,  art, 
science,  and  society. 

1 1 8.  The  Reciprocity  of  Individual  and  Society  in  the 
Intension-Extension    of  Experience.     Worth   enables   the 
individual  to  say,  "My  ideal  moments  and  attitudes  are 
significant;    my   love   counts."      It   confers   upon   him   a 
certain  self-relation  that  makes  him  entirely  self-depend- 
ent, and  guarantees  a  self-identity  that  behaves,  not  in- 
deed, as  a  mirror  of  the  universe,  but  as  one  of  its  inde- 
feasible subjects.    Worth  thus  isolates  the  self  in  its  inde- 
pendent  individuality,   but   its   next  moment   recombines 


Value  as  Philosophy  and  Life  137 

it  in  the  reciprocity  of  the  social  situation.  The  act  of 
intension  by  individuality  finds  its  proper  extension  in  so- 
cial relations.  The  individuality  of  the  self  signifies  that 
it  is  engaged  in  the  task  of  formulating  a  contribution  in 
its  indefeasible  manner.  Evolution  by  self -adjustment 
cannot  be  but  evolution  by  co-operation,  for  the  adjust- 
ment or  adaptation  is  to  a  cultural,  idealizing  self  in  a 
sphere  where  the  moral  law  rules  the  environment. 

119.  Value  Constructs  an  Ethical  Program.  Worth 
furnishes  a  practical  ethical  program  that  calls  for  devo- 
tion and  cultivation,  as  does  any  art  or  any  technical  sci- 
ence. For  values  must  be  deliberately  self-mediated  and 
the  soul  must  study  and  educate  itself  in  its  culture. 
Worth  seeks  to  inspire  the  self  by  means  of  its  religious 
ideals  relating  to  totality  and  to  destiny.  It  seeks  to 
make  the  self  use  its  autonomy  in  a  positive  constructive- 
ness  of  evolutionary  experience.  It  is  a  practical  program 
and  a  universal  program,  where  the  former  is  arranged 
with  reference  to  the  latter.  Worth  teaches  that  a  man  is 
most  truly  a  man  when  he  is  self-creative,  that  he  is  most 
truly  self-creative  when  he  builds  up  a  personality  upon 
a  Weltanschauung  and  that  his  Weltanschauung  is  most 
truly  in  accord  with  the  aim  of  reality  when  it  sympathizes 
and  harmonizes  and  co-operates  with  the  universal  will 
and  intelligence  whose  thoughts  are  objectified  in  the  ra- 
tionality of  evolution.  The  self-enlightenment  brought 
about  by  the  realization  of  worth  and  the  consequent  uni- 
fication in  culture  of  the  various  departments  of  life  and 
knowledge,  bestows  a  most  intimate  sense  of  active  par- 
ticipation in  reality.  It  makes  the  self  a  part  of  the  world, 
and  the  world  a  part  of  it,  in  an  inward  manner  unknown 


138  Philosophic  Function  of  Value 

to  science  alone.  It  consummately  enriches  the  individual 
with  a  unique  technique  that  enables  him  to  assimilate  all 
the  data  of  life  and  of  science.  The  essential  procedure 
of  this  method  is  to  be  looked  for  in  philosophy;  while 
its  historic  and  abiding  power  over  races  and  men  is  to  be 
found  in  the  ideals  of  religion. 

1 20.  The  Category  of  Personality.  As  the  basis  of  a 
practical  philosophy  of  life,  worth  with  its  platform  that 
life's  chief  category  is  not  that  of  things  but  of  persons, 
furnishes  a  theoretical  background  for  an  inspiring  belief 
in  personality.  It  yields  a  satisfying  conviction  as  to  the 
lasting  benefits  of  idealizing  self-expressive  activity  both 
on  the  part  of  the  individual  and  in  social  co-operation. 
It  furnishes  a  ground,  also,  for  the  joy  of  life  in  the  imme- 
diate experience  of  its  personally-created  manifold  and 
progressive  content.  The  joy  may  be  the  pleasure  of 
aesthetic  contemplation  that  views  the  moving  ideal  in  the 
symbol  of  the  static  form.  It  may  be  the  happiness  of 
living  the  act  that  embodies  the  self-selected  ideal  concept. 
It  may  be  the  quiet  unobtrusive  emotion  of  the  more  drab 
and  ordinary  self-regulated  course  of  experience  that  flows 
between  the  crises  of  life.  The  joy  is  not  seldom  mingled 
with  suffering.  But  suffering  as  such  is  not  necessarily 
evil  and  it  may  emphasize  the  intensity  of  the  joy  that  is 
self-won.  For  suffering  as  distinguished  from  mere  pain, 
is  the  mark  of  moral  capability.  It  indicates  the  self's 
vital  interest  and  participation  in  the  upward  overcoming 
struggle  of  the  moral  ideal.  The  nature  of  evil  is  also 
moral.  It  enters  with  the  voluntary  abatement  of  the 
vital  moral  interest  and  becomes  applicable  to  the  mal- 
adjustment that  results  as  a  consequence. 


Value  as  Philosophy  and  Life  139 

121.  Science  and  Religion  Reconciled  by  Value.  Worth 
makes  the  reconciliation  between  religion  and  science,  so 
ardently  demanded  by  the  very  earnestness  of  person- 
ality, more  than  just  a  truce,  more  than  a  neighborly  con- 
tiguity of  closed  systems.  They  are  proved  to  be  mu- 
tually involved,  complementary,  and  constructive  aspects 
of  experience.  Both  represent  formative  agencies  of  life 
and  knowledge.  Life  seeks  the  values  offered  by  the  one 
and  the  relations  brought  by  the  other,  the  motivation 
of  the  one  in  "deed-thoughts"  and  the  clarification  of  the 
other  in  the  analysis-synthesis  of  content.  Each  side  of 
life  is  corrected  and  stabilized  by  the  other.  The  ten- 
dency to  formalistic  externalism  that  confronts  religion 
and  science  when  they  are  tempted  to  separate  their  theory 
from  the  actualities  of  life,  is  effectively  curbed  in  each 
case  by  the  claims  of  the  other.  Furthermore,  the  realm 
of  religious  faith  is  removed  from  the  danger  of  formalism 
which  would  threaten  a  faith  that  rested  on  simple  in- 
tellectual acquiescence.  Belief  is  not  made  to  rest  upon 
mere  past  eventhood,  but  upon  the  knowledge  and  the 
most  solemn  recognition  and  application  of  worth.  Re- 
ligion must  substantiate  its  claim  as  value.  It  is  the  very 
spirit  of  the  age  that  demands  at  least  a  practical  and 
present-day-world  test  for  religion,  though  its  non-experi- 
ential reach  may  be  fully  allowed. 

In  a  word,  worth  requires  that  every  personality  should, 
like  the  monads  of  Leibnitz's  Monadology,  reflect  the 
world ;  but  it  also  requires  that,  by  virtue  of  its  indefeasi- 
ble selfhood,  it  should  refract  the  world  as  well,  and 
thus  modify  the  further  reflection  possible  to  itself  and  to 
every  other  monad. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books 

Bosanquet,  Bernard,  Value  and  Destiny  of  the  Individual. 

Bradley,  Francis  H.,  Ethical  Studies. 

Dewey,  John,  Logical   Condition   of  a  Scientific    Treat- 
ment of  Morality. 

Ehrenfels,  Christian  von,  System  d.  IVerththeorie. 

Eucken,  Rudolf,  Meaning  and  Value  of  Life. 

Guyau,  Jean  M.,  Esquisse  d'une  Morale  sans  Obligation 
ni  Sanction. 

Krueger,  FeL,  Der  Be  griff  des  Absolut-Werthvollen  als 
Grundbegriff  d.  Moralphilosophie. 

Liebert,  A.,  Das  Problem  der  Geltung. 

MacKenzie,  John  S.,  Introduction  to  Social  Philosophy. 

Meinong,   Alexius,   Psychologisch-ethische    Untersuchung 
zur  Werththeorie. 

Montgomery,  Geo.  R.,  The  Place  of  Value. 

Munsterberg,  Hugo,  Der  Ursprung  d.  Sittlichkeit. 

Munsterberg,  Hugo,  The  Eternal  Values. 

Nietzsche,  Friedrich,  The  Genealogy  of  Morals. 

Ormond,  Alexander  T.,  Foundations  of  Knowledge. 

Ostwald,  Wilhelm,  Die  Philosophic  der  W 'erthe. 

Royce,  Josiah,  The  World  and  the  Individual. 

Shaw,  Charles  G.,   The   Value  and  Dignity  of  Human 
Life. 

Shaw,  Charles  G.,  The  Ego  and  its  Place  in  the  World. 

Simel,  Georg,  Einleitung  in  der  Morahuissenschaft. 

141 


142  Bibliography 

Stuart,  Henry  W.,  Valuation  as  a  Logical  Process  (in 
Dewey's  Studies  in  Logical  Theory}. 

Tarde,  Gabriel,  La  Logique  Sociale. 

Urban,  Wilbur  M.,  Valuation;   its  Nature  and  Laws. 

Windelband,  W.,  The  Problem  of  Values  (in  History  of 
Philosophy  j  pp.  660-681;  Tr.  James  H.  Tufts). 

Articles 

Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology  and  Scientific  Meth- 
ods: 
Moore,  T.  J.,   The  System  of  Values.      (Vol.  VII,  pp. 

282-291 ). 
Perry,  Ralph   B.,   The  Definition  of  Value.      (Vol.  XI, 

pp.   141-162). 
Urban,  Wilbur  M.,  Knowledge  of  Value  and  the  Value 

Judgment.      (Vol.  XIII,  pp.  673-687). 
Urban,  Wilbur  M.,  Value  and  Existence.     (Vol.  XIII, 

pp.  449-465). 
Urban,  Wilbur  M.,  The  Relation  of  the  Individual  to  the 

Social-value  Series.    Philosophical  Review  (1902). 
Wright,  Wm.  K.,  The  Evolution  of  Value  fro?n  Instincts. 

Philosophical  Review.        (Vol.    XXIV,    pp.    165- 

183). 
MacKenzie,  J.  S.,  Notes  on  the  Theory  of  Value.   Mind. 

(Vol.  XXV,  1895,  PP.  425-449). 

Mead,  G.  H.,  Philosophical  Basis  of  Ethics.  Interna- 
tional Journal  of  Ethics  (1908). 

Zillig,  P.,  Zur  Frage  der  Ethischen  Werthsch'dtzing.  Zeit- 
schrift  f.  Phil,  und  Pad.  (Vol.  VII,  1900). 


INDEX 


Action  and  being,  83 

free,  126 

Activity    and    value-develop- 
ment,  104 

and   contemplation,   132 
Adaptation  and  environment, 

35 

and  organism,  31 
Adjustment  to  self,  121 

versus  evolution,  16 
Aesthetic  faculty  and  instinct, 

32 

Analysis-synthesis,   63ff 

Art  and  religion,  purpose  in, 

128 
Autonomy  and   society,  78 

Bergson,  Henri,  28,  29,  30,  32, 

34,  41,  51,  52,  53,  134,  135 
Biological  situation,  The,  25, 

28,  29,  85,  103,  133 
and  environment,  33,  34 
function  of,  85 
and  instincts,  32 
and   interests,   16 
Metaphysics  of,  66,  67 
as  non-moral,  73 
as  negative,  88 
as  over-experience,  39 
and  repetition,  51 
skeleton  form  of,  42 
and    the    thought-situation, 

15,  60,  86,  93 
Biology  and  History,   17,  50, 

Si 

Cartesianism,  36,  68 
Categorical   imperative,   The, 

19,  94,  99 

and  social  thinking,  101 
two  forms  of,  95 


Conduct,  77,  78 
Conscience,  20,   107 

and  aesthetic  sense,  in,  112 

and  emotion,   109,   112 

the   functioning  of,   108 

genesis  of,  109,  no 

and  the  moral  problem,    no 
Consciousness,  instinctive,  33 
Content  of  thought  as  a  diffi- 
culty, 64 

as   inherited,   85 
Continuance,  The  aim  of,  73 
Creation  in  life's  continuum, 
30 

as  freedom,  61 
Culture,  90,  91,   124,   125 

and  the  moral  status,  122 

and    religion,  97 

and  willing,  122,  123 

Datum,  The,  or  given,  15,  25, 

39 
Dewey,  John,  21,  40,  44,  45 

Dichotomy,  as  disclosing  the 

factors,    17,   94 
in  experience,  60,  90 
method  of,  16,  82,  84 
and  its  moments,  95 
of  self  and  not-self,  68 
Dilemma       of       quantitative 
value,  80 

Economic    values,    126 
Ego,    The,    conditioning    ex- 
perience, 68 

and  conscience,  108,  no 
as   creative,   81 
and  freedom,  61 
as  idealized  desire,  74 
as  logical  antecedent,  81 
as  source  of  value,  95 

143 


144 


Index 


as  will  in  culture  and  re- 
ligion, 90,  91 

(See  also  Self;  Intelligencer) 
Egohood   and   quality,    74 
Ends   as    motive    and   cause, 

44,  45,  57 

as  relation  and  value,  46 
as  value,  48 
Environment    and    duration, 

69 
the  extension  and  intension 

of,  17 

the  final,  67 
the  ideal,  55,  74 
as  limited,  53 
nature  of,  35,  36 
as  a  need,  134 
perceptual  and  conceptual, 

49 

the   perfect,  85 
and  organism,  33 
reciprocity  of,  27,  28,  29 
as  mutually  reconstructive, 

34 

Equilibrium,  34,  42,  43,  45,  56 

Ethics,   78,   79 

Experience,    advancing,    124 

auto-centric,  73 

bifurcation  of,  29 

continuum  of,  59 

as    extension-intension,   89, 
91,  119,  120,  136 

final  form,  67 

genesis  of,  40 

as  history,  69 

humanness   of,    17,   84 

individual  and  non-individ- 
ual, 61 

intensification  of,  77 

as  a  monism,  130 

perfect,   119 

point  of  departure  for,  25 

and  logical  problem,  65 

qualitative   aspect,   70 

and  the  self,  17,  39,  70 

supreme,  118 


texture  of,  43 

a?  two-dimensional,  20,  57 

as  value-process,  79 

Everett,  Chas.  C,  see  Fichte 

Evolution,  aim  of,  55 
belongs    to    individual   and 

environment,   27,   28 
biocentric,   37 
drama  of   intelligence,    100 
of   the  environment,  35 
as  harmonization,  30,  31 
as  a  kingdom  of  ends,  96 
and  man,  135 
as   two-dimensional,  82 
as  unlimited,   133 

Falckenberg,  Richard,  25,  no, 

124 

Fichte,  J.  G.,  33,  42,  63 
Forces    operative    in    experi- 
ence, 43,  44 
Freedom,  61,  76,  77,  98 
of  God,  117 
necessity  of,  55 

God  as  immanent  and  trans- 
cendent,  116,   117 
existence    from   the   moral 
standpoint,  115,  116 

Harris,      William      T.,      see 

Hegel 
Hegel,  G.  W.  F.,  35,  67,  69, 

7i»  78,  132 
Heteronomy  as  a  preference, 

1 06 

History  as  experience,  69 
Home,    Herman    H.,   38,    53, 

121 

Ideal  content,  41 
Ideal  desire,  48,  56 
Ideal    environment,    see   En- 
vironment 
Idealization  in  thought,  70 


Index 


Indefeasibility,  20,  21,   134 

Instinct,  32 
and  its  aims,  32,  33 
and  its  factorable  world,  33 
funds  intelligence,  83 
as  objective  rationality,  32, 

53  ' 

and  pleasure  and  pain,  33 

and  value,  46,  47 

work  of,   66 

Instrumentality  and  end,  55 
Intellect,   first  appearance  in 
life,  40,  41 

inadequacy  of,  87 

as  introactive,  53 

as  negation,  88 

as  reason,  72,  83,  84 

solves  its  own  problems,  55 

supplemented  by   will,   58 

as  theoretical,  71,  72 
Intelligence,  dignity  of,  134 

and  experience,  67 

as  instrumental,  52 

objective,  85 

reciprocal   with   world,   65, 
66 

and  the  sense  of  want,  85 

as   subjectivity,  68 

and  time,  83,  69,  70 
Interests    and    the   biological 
situation,  16 

and  instincts,  34 

and  values,  16,  104 

and  the  world,  35 
Involution  as  a  possibility,  81 
Isolation  of  aims  in  experi- 
ence, 46 

of  personality,  98 

and  recombination,  59 

supreme,   87,  88 

and  value,  58,  59 

James,  William,  46 
Joy,  133 

and  sorrow,  74 
Judgments,  creative,  43 


moral,   124 

as  structure  of  experience, 
59 

Kant,   Immanuel,   19,   77,  95, 

in,  114,  116,  118,  124 
Kingdom  of  ends,  114,  126 
of  Heaven,  99,  115 

Legality  and  morality,  78 
Life  as  activity,  40,  55 

and   creation,  30 

as  the  datum,  24 

definition,  27,  28 

and  environment,  27,  28 

the  grand  end,  35 

the   incommensurable,  26 

as   inward-outward,   27 

and  organism,  25 

and  its  processes,  27 

as  reaction,  35 
Logic,  37,  40,  42,  43,  65,  67 

Moments  of  the  thought-sit- 
uation, 58,  59 

Mood  of  want,  83,  84 

Moods  of  the  self,  97 

Moral  crisis,  The,  21,  81,  96, 

106,  no 

and  adolescence,   105 
as    attitude    to    the    world, 

118 

and  its  background,   103 
and  its  conditions,  82 

Moral  dilemma,  The,  112 
in  Kant,  20,  77 

Moral  law,  The,  82,  93 
conditioning  experience,  94 
one  and  many,  93 

Moral     self,    The,    and    the 
psychological  self,  20 

Morality  and  autonomy,  75 
dynamically  continuous,  124 
and  experience,  76,  77 
and  freedom,  76 
and  habit,  76,  77 


146 


Index 


and  legality,  76,  78 

unites  culture  and  religion, 

19 

Motive  in  value,  125 
Mutuality  of  inward-outward, 

16,  41 

Nature,    The   notion   of,   36 

Objectivity  in  experience,  44 
the  product  of  judgments, 

.43 
Objectivity   and    subjectivity, 

39,  40,  43 

Objects,   genesis   in   interest- 
centers,  42 

as  peculiarly  man's,  29 
Organic  and  inorganic,  25,  26 
Organism  as  process  of  adap- 
tation, 31 

reciprocal     with     environ- 
ment, 27,  28 
Over-experience,    16,   86 
and    the    biological    situa- 
tion, 39 
as  will-to-live,  40 

Perry,  Ralph  B.,   107,  116 
Personality,  98,  105,  138,  139 

in  aesthetics,  in 

as  center,   135 

universal,    H4ff 
Persons,  category  of,  19 
Philistinism,   124 
Pleasure  and   happiness,    112 

and  pain,  33,  35,  41 

as    intellectual    representa- 
tion, 49 
Positing      and      pre-positing 

stages,  71 

Pragmatism  supplemented,  21 
Prince,  Morton,  76,  77 
Prophetic  mood,  84 
Purpose  and  the  moral  law, 
93,  94 


Qualitative  in  experience,  70, 

9i 

and  morality,  124 
Qualitative  differentiation  and 

values,  39,   55,  56 
Quality  and  intrinsic  value,  18 
in  the  thought-situation,  58 
in  value,  54,  55 

Reality  auto-centric,   19 
humanistic  formulation,  44 
participation    in,    137 
and  personality,   105 

Reason     as     completing     the 
thought-movement,   72 
as  the  positing  stage,  71 
self-active,  90 

Reciprocal    evolution    of    in- 
ternality-externality,     34, 

35 

Reciprocity    of    analysis-syn- 
thesis,  63,   64 
of  culture  and  religion,  97 
of  ego  and  non-ego,  68 
of  man  and  God,  119 
of     moral     and     economic 

values,  126,  127 
of     material     world     and 

organism,  40 
of    self    and    environment, 

69,  72 
of   subject   and   object,   39, 

40 

of    theoretical     and    prac- 
tical,  136 

of  truth  and  value,  46 
of  will  and  intellect,  59 
of  will  and  totality,  88 
Reflective  process,  41 
Relations,  43,  44,  46 
Relations   and   value,   59,  60, 

62 

Religion,  91 
aims  of,  128 
and  culture,  97 
and  science,   139 


Index 


147 


Religious  institutions,  128          Sittlichkeit,  76,  77 

•i         i*  C^   _         I 1        .«  .^  _  .  .n  Li  v-x  I  f  i  *-«••« » 


Renunciation  and  fate,  54 
Right  and  wrong  in  motives, 

74 
Rigorism,  77 


Social  psychology   and   free- 
dom, 77,  78 
Space,  see  Time 
Spencer,   Herbert,  36,  37,  50 
Stout,  Geo.  F.,  29,  31 
Subject  related  to  object,  19 


Satisfaction,  moral,  97  , 

Schliermacher,  F.  D.  E.,  no,  Summary  of  value-theory,  79, 

123  H3 

Self,    The,    as    indefeasible,  Symbols,  moral,  128 

ipi,  134 

as  individuality,  130,  137  Teleology,  37 

and  its  moods,  97  Temporal,   The,   88 
the  mould  of  experience,  i33Things,  44 

the  origin  and  terminus  of  Thought-situation,  The,  21 

experience,  70  as  conduct,  130 

the  supreme  value,  70  an(j  experience,  21,  59 

the   unity  of    intellect   and  inner  movement  of,  44 

will,  79 


Self-activity  in  the  thought- 
situation,   60 

Self-adaptation,  67,   133 

Self-affirmation,   18 

Self-positing      and      adoles- 
cence,   105 
conditions  of,  81 
as  a  dichotomy,  72,  73 
as  a  mere  occurrence,  80 
as   non-empirical,   90 
and  pre-positing,  78 
as  prophetic,  84 
recovered  by  reflection,  71 
and  self-realization,  79 
in  time,  69,  70 
the    unification   of    experi- 


as    quantitative   and   quali- 
tative, 58 

and  self-activity,  60 

as  social,  102 

and    its    wave-like    move- 
ment, 63,  64 

and  values,  16 
Time  and  experience,  69 

forms   and  intelligence,  41 

and  space  judgments,  42 
Totality,  88,   131 

as  an  ideal,  18,  95,  97 

Understanding,  The,  or  pre- 
positing  phase,  71 

as  the  theoretical  phase,  72 
Unity  as  a  thought-ideal,  87 

how  obtained,  88 
Utilitarianism,    criticism    of, 

50,  51 


ence,  72,  73 
as  will,  88 

Self  to  self  adaptation,   134 
Self\yard  adaptation,  133 

adjustment,   121,*  122 
Self-willing  as  negation  and    Value  as  action,  122 

affirmation,  98  as  God's  activity,  117 

Sentiency,  33  categorical  per  sc,  127,  128 

and  emotion,  49  classes  of,  125 

Shaw,  Chas.  G.,  41,  48,  49,  55,        a  complex,  118 

69,  84,  88,  91,  97,  132  conferred  by  reason,  72 


148 


Index 


and  conscience,  107 

and  Deity,  H4ff 

economic,  122,  125,  126 

and  eternity,  121 

and  ethical  importance,  136 

genesis  of,  131,  132 

heteronomous,  53 

and  history,  51 

as  idealized  desire,  48,  84 

in  individual  development, 

102,  103 

and  interests,  39,  60 
as  isolation,  87 
and  joy,  138 
and  judgments,  124 
and  life,  20,  136 
as  method  only,  131 
and  the  moral  quale,  19 
and  a  moral  sense,  130 
and  motivation  by  the  self, 

46 

and  the  non-empirical,  135 
as  objective  fitness,  130 
passive,  98 
and    a    practical    program, 

137 

psychological,  54 
and  the  qualitative,  54,  56 


and  real  content,  84 

and  relation,  59,  60,  62,  65, 

79 

and  revaluation,  103 
and  self-positing,  60,  70,  95 
and  self-relation,  60,  136 
a     subject-object     relation, 

19,  49 
and  supreme  isolation,  87, 

88 

summary  of,  22ff,  113 
as  a  thought-mould,  56,  57, 

H3 

and  the  whole,  90 

Want,  mood  of,  83,  84,  105 
and  intelligence,  85 
supreme,  18,  87 

Weltanschauung,    125,    137 

Will  and  intellect,  58,  59 
and  joy,  89,  90 
and   totality,  21,  88,  89 

World,  The,  as  common,  43 
as  humanistic,  65 
as  an  ideal,  68 
and  life-interests,  35 

Worth,  see   Value 


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